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The first essay (Chapter 1) explores the importance of spatial interactions in an 
overlapping generation model using an Agent-Based Model (ABM) approach.  
Incorporating geography into the original Galor-Zeira’s model (1993) and allowing 
heterogeneous agents to interact locally, we show that social interactions play an 
important role in determining the long-run welfare and wealth distribution. This model 
shows the impact of endogenous wages and local interactions on agents’ decision to 
invest in human capital. Our simulation reveals that neighborhood interactions lead to 
changes in the system’s steady-state behaviors. In particular different strength of 
agents’ interaction produces different outcomes in terms of the number of educated 
people and wealth inequality. This might explain persistent inequality in agents’ 
wealth across locations. Policy implications are discussed. 
The second essay (Chapter 2) introduces the time elements of structural path analysis 
(SPA). Structural path analysis, which was first introduced by Defourny and 
 Thorbecke (1984), broke down the global multipliers of the social accounting matrix 
(SAM) into direct influence and total influence. The introduction of time elements into 
SPA has enabled policymakers to estimate the range of time required for a shock to 
travel from its origin to its destination. Using the 2008 Indonesian SAM with a focus 
on the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, this study successfully introduces time 
into the SPA framework and estimates the possible time range within which a shock 
from the agricultural and manufacturing sectors will impact different households. 
The third essay (Chapter 3) explores impacts of monetary policy on the welfare of 
people in different income groups in Indonesia with a dynamic demand system. In the 
model, income groups adjust their expenditures shares in response to changes in 
commodity prices and aggregate expenditure levels. These adjustments are taken to be 
functions of the rate of change in the flow of financial services, which is affected by 
the rate of growth of the money supply (M2). Results of model estimation and 
deterministic numerical simulations conducted with the estimated model suggest that 
the welfare of the low-income group is affected more by monetary policy than is the 
welfare of the high-income group.  
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PREFACE 
 
This dissertation book seeks to raise up two issues regarding the income inequality 
and one issue regarding the improvement of methodology. In the first chapter, we 
employ an agent-based model to Galor-Zeira’s 1993 model of education attainment 
and income inequality by adding local interactions between heterogeneous agents 
within a two-dimensional space. It is quite interesting to observe how simulations with 
local interactions show different results than that which excludes local interactions. It 
demonstrates how the local interactions and space play an important role in 
determining the number of skilled workers in the economy and thus the economic 
growth of the region. 
In the second chapter, we tried to add time elements to Defourny and Thorbecke’s 
1984 structural path analysis. This methodology is then applied to a case of shock 
transmission from the agricultural crop sector and the chemical and metallic sector to 
different household groups based on the 2008 Indonesian Social Accounting Matrix. 
This exercise shows that the receivers would receive the impacts within some periods 
of time in which most of the influences are transmitted. Some paths containing a fixed 
schedule of transmission might significantly delay the transmission of the shocks and 
thus reducing the present values of the impacts received. 
In the third chapter, we use econometrics to explore how different income groups, 
namely high- and low- income groups, react differently toward changes in monetary 
policy. Employing a dynamic demand system with non-homothetic preferences 
enabled us to observe the households’ reactions to adjustments their expenditures 
shares in response to changes in commodity prices and aggregate expenditure levels. 
The results suggest that the welfare of the low-income group is affected more than that 
of the high-income group by monetary policy changes.  
1 
CHAPTER 1 
THE EFFECT OF EDUCATION ATTAINMENT AND LOCAL INTERACTIONS 
ON WEALTH INEQUALITY WITHIN OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS 
IN A SPATIAL ECONOMY 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
One of the main tasks of regional scientists is to explain spatial inequality as an 
outcome of a decentralized process, and to understand the human behavior that leads 
to uneven patterns. This chapter examines how local interactions affect human capital 
investments and the distribution of wealth in a decentralized economy. The analysis is 
based on Galor and Zeira (1993)’s overlapping generation model with indivisible 
investments in human capital designed to study the role of historical dependence in 
generating persistent wealth inequalities.  
How do human interactions in space affect the distribution of wealth? Drawing on 
the framework of complex systems studies, we propose an agent-based model where 
adaptive individuals change their attitude toward education as they interact with local 
neighbors. The role of local interactions and neighborhood feedbacks in changing 
economic stratification has been explored before. Previous studies, however, usually 
emphasize income inequality and often neglect the role of inter-generational transfers 
(e.g., Durlauf, 1996), or utilize space in a very abstract sense (e.g., Benabou, 1996). 
This chapter seeks to make modest contributions to the literature. First, as far as 
we know, ours is the first attempt to explore the impact of local interactions on wealth 
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inequality in an agent-based model with inter-generational transfers. We do so by 
implementing a general equilibrium model with known analytical solutions, thus 
allowing the benchmark agent-based simulations to be validated (i.e., “structural 
validation”). We then investigate how aggregate economic performance and inequality 
change as a result of changes in the extent of local interactions. Finally, we show that 
neighborhood effects impinge on the efficacy of policies that aim to generate an 
equitable distribution of wealth. 
 
1.2. Literature Review 
Conventional wisdom views wealth inequality as an outcome of either unequal 
inheritance or labor market choices (i.e., the decision to work in industries that require 
certain skills but reward higher pay). Thus Piketty (2011) argues that employment and 
inheritance are substitutes in that one can become wealthy either by working hard or 
by marrying somebody with a large family inheritance. It can be argued, however, that 
inheritance complements labor market outcomes when access to good jobs depends on 
the kind of educational achievements that only the wealthy can afford. This is the view 
that we espouse in this chapter. 
Our analytical framework extends Galor and Zeira (1993)’s overlapping 
generation model of human capital investments. An overlapping generation model, as 
Samuelson (1958) introduced, describes a demographic structure where parents and 
offspring live together in one (or more) period. Parents then die at the end of the 
shared period, while the youth live on to the next period and beget their own children 
before they, too, die. Inter-generational transfers occur during the time together, 
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motivated by the parents’ desire to secure a better future for offspring. The dynamic 
then repeats with a different, younger set of agents in perpetuity. 
Galor and Zeira (1993) show how the ancestry distribution of endowments coupled 
with costly investments in human capital can produce a bipolar distribution of wealth. 
The main message is that the poor and the rich can continue to co-exist even in the 
very long-run if the initial distribution is sufficiently heterogeneous. To this general 
equilibrium model we add geography, which allows us to focus on the role of local 
interactions in perpetuating the inequality between poor and rich neighborhoods. 
Numerous studies have documented the relationship between human capital and 
economic status. The notion of human capital investments as a source of inequality 
was originally formalized by Mincer (1958), and developed further by Becker (1964). 
Since then, it has been the tradition in labor economics to describe the diversity of 
individual earnings as a function of schooling.1  The micro-level empirics are 
generally consistent with the macro-level data. Nomura (2007) for example shows 
using cross-country data that initially the poor benefit the most from education in 
terms of the improvement in living standards.  Imperfect capital markets, however, 
curtails the poor’s ability to invest in education, and this preserves, if not worsens, 
aggregate inequality. This strand of human capital literature, however, rarely links 
economy-wide inequality to spatial patterns. 
It is the studies on agglomeration economies (Rosenthal and Strange, 2001) that 
produce evidence of the tendency for skilled workers to cluster in cities. The starting 
point of this research is the hypothesis that the interactions of skilled workers–a proxy 
                                                 
1 See the extensive survey in Card (1999). 
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for the stock of human capital–in a crowded urban environment increase everybody’s 
returns to education, which in turn attracts even more skilled workers. That is, there is 
something about local interactions in close proximity that promote the accumulation of 
human capital. The econometric analyses generally support this hypothesis (e.g., 
Glaeser and Mare, 2001; Moretti, 2004). At about the same time, the creative class 
literature that Florida (2002, 2008) champions received a lot of attention in the popular 
media because of its socio-economic implications. In Who’s Your City for example, 
Florida refers to the growing geographical divide between skilled workers and the rest 
of society. The segregation is inevitable, asserts Florida, because of the need for 
skilled workers to cluster in order to become more productive, and in so doing powers 
economic growth. Compelling as it is, however, the creative class literature is 
generally silent about the role of initial wealth in generating spatial inequality. 
Nakajima and Nakamura (2009) show that the inability of the poor to invest in 
education aggravates inequality further. Initially, diminishing returns allow the poor to 
reap most of the benefits of education and improve their wealth, both in absolute terms 
and in relation to the rich. Over time, however, demand pressures cause the price of 
schooling to rise, leading to an outcome where only the rich can afford to invest in 
education. Unequal access to human capital investments then creates a persistent gap 
between the rich and the poor (Andergassen and Nardini, 2007). Only by lowering 
education costs—presumably through government subsidies—can inequality diminish 
in the long run. 
Inter-generational transfers come into play when the ability to finance children’s 
schooling depends on the parents’ wealth.   Das (2007) shows that descendants of the 
Chapter 1 – Gunawan Wicaksono 
 
5 
poor are more likely to stay in poverty than the offspring of the rich. The key insight 
here is that initial wealth distribution determines future distribution through transfers 
from the older generation to the next, which may include both inheritance and gifts 
(e.g., the parents’ “purchase” of their offspring’s education).  Rich parents leave large 
bequests in order to secure their descendants’ future, while the poor’s inability to 
invest in their children’s education prevent their children from moving to the higher 
income stratum.  It is this parents’ feeling of insecurity about their children’s future 
that motivate the transfer of wealth to the children (Fan, 2006). 
Equal opportunity to education alone, however, does not guarantee an egalitarian 
distribution of wealth. Social milieu also matters. Bowles, Loury and Sethi (2010) 
show that voluntary segregation in social networks causes persistent inequality. That 
is, segregation by class (e.g., the rich interacting only with the rich) increases the 
likelihood for the poor to remain trapped in poverty. The role of neighborhood local 
interactions is examined by Mookherjee et al. (2010a, 2010b), which advances a 
theoretical model showing the role of the educated in inspiring others in the 
neighborhood to also invest in education. The theoretical importance of neighborhood 
effects has been confirmed by empirical studies. Corcoran et al.  (1989) for example 
found the link between community characteristics and offspring future economic 
status. Further, Stewart et al. (2007) reveals the impact of neighborhood composition 
on the educational aspirations of younger generations. 
The empirics motivate the present study to introduce agent heterogeneity and 
direct interactions to the general-equilibrium framework of Galor and Zeira (1993). In 
many previous studies of wealth inequality, space is often represented by a single 
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parameter designed to capture the extent of local interactions. The present study 
distinguishes itself from these studies in proposing a spatially-explicit model where 
agents are situated in a two-dimensional grid lattice.  Heterogeneity implies agents 
making different education choices initially.  Direct interactions with neighbors, 
however, allow agents to observe the education prospects of neighbors in the vicinity. 
Based on pure economic calculations (i.e., without taking social influences into 
account), agents observe the peers to whom human capital investments would be a 
viable option. If there are sufficient prospects around, agents may be persuaded to 
adapt in order to conform to the social milieu. Adaptations then occur when agents 
imitate their neighbors and make a different choice. 
The introduction of space and local interactions agents renders the equilibrium 
distribution of wealth analytically intractable. Simulations are thus the only resort. It is 
to simulate the emerging spatial patterns of production and inequality in a 
decentralized economy that we exposit an agent-based model.2 Computational models 
have been used to explain emerging patterns in urban and regional systems with 
heterogeneous agents (Mansury and Gulyas, 2007; Parker and Filatova, 2008). Here 
we present a new bottom-up approach showing how results change depending upon 
the degree of local interactions and neighborhood effects. 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. The next section lays out the analytical 
framework for the numerical simulations. Following that, Section (1.3) details the 
                                                 
2 ABM is also known as Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) (Tesfatsion, 2005). 
Tesfatsion stressed the importance of ACE in dealing with complicated micro behavior in real 
world (etc. asymmetric information, imperfect information and multiple equilibria). 
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mathematical model and implementation of the agent-based algorithm with 
endogenous skilled workers. It also outlines the various scenarios that we consider in 
this chapter, and Section (1.4) reports the simulation results. We close in Section (1.5) 
with concluding remarks and suggestions for future research direction. 
  
1.3. Model 
1.3.1. Mathematical Model 
The model extends Galor and Zeira (1993) with important differences in several 
respects. First, our agent-based model is numerical and spatial, and it treats workers 
and capital as discrete variables. In addition, we allow neighboring agents to interact 
directly, which is the main value-added of agent-based simulations where geography 
matters. Last but not least, we explicitly model the skilled labor market, allowing 
skilled-worker wages to be endogenously determined. The numerical implementation 
of the agent-based model is detailed in the next sub section (1.3.2). This section 
describes mathematically the micro-foundations of production, human capital 
investments, and workers behavior. 
We begin by reviewing the canonical model of Galor and Zeira (1993), which 
combines continuous variables (i.e. labor and capital) with indivisible human capital 
investments in a discreet time within an overlapping generation model where every 
agent lives for two periods. Young agents have to choose between working as an 
unskilled (uneducated) worker and foregoing work in order to attain education. It is 
assumed that only by acquiring education when they were young would agents be able 
to work as skilled workers in the second period of their life. The production economy 
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employs both types of workers—though at different sectors—, namely skilled and 
unskilled worker sectors =	ሼݏ, ݊ሽ, in order to supply output. The economy produces a 
single commodity, which is consumed by old agents, who also give birth to the next 
generation of agents, exactly one offspring per parent. Having given birth, parents give 
bequest to their descendants, and consume the remaining wealth. This cycle continues 
indefinitely. 
Each sector utilizes a distinct recipe in manufacturing output. Specifically, the 
production recipe for the sector employing unskilled workers is linear: 
௡ܻ ൌ ∅	ܮ௡,   (1.3.1.1) 
where ∅ is the sector’s constant marginal product of labor (MPL), and ܮ௡ the number 
of unskilled workers employed. By contrast, the production function for the skilled 
labor sector is using a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
௦ܻ ൌ ܣ	ܭ௦ఛ	ܮ௦ଵିఛ   (1.3.1.2) 
where ܭ௦ denotes the physical capital, ܮ௦ the number of skilled workers, A the 
technological constant, and ߬ the share parameter. These two recipes produce the same 
homogenous commodity, to be consumed by utility maximizing agents in the second 
period of their life. Note that an alternative medium of exchange needs to be identified 
since the model focuses on a non-monetized economy. We simply assume here that 
agents agree to set the consumption good as a numeraire and, without loss of 
generality, fix its price ܲ ൌ 1. 
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Two major assumptions in the model are indivisibility of human capital 
investment and imperfect capital market. Education indivisibility instigates people 
with choices of either endow part of their income for schooling and work as skilled 
labor or just work as unskilled labor. Agents only live for two periods of time and the 
choice of schooling is made in the first period of their lifetime. The stream of income 
consists of wages and bequest and is consumed all in the second period of the lifetime 
after leaving aside inheritance for the next generation. 
We depart from Galor and Zeira (1993) by introducing direct interactions, which 
allow local neighbors to influence agents’ human capital choices. Young agents 
observe their local neighbors’ prospects for education based solely on economic 
ground, which agents take into account in making allocation decisions. We assume a 
simple rule of engagement where a weighted average is calculated to capture the agent 
i’s tendency to invest in human capital: 
ߨ௜ ൌ ߠ߮ି௜ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ߮௜   (1.3.1.3) 
where 0 ൑ ߠ ൑ 1 is the weight for neighborhood effects, ߮௜ is based on the agent’s 
internal economic calculations (= 1 if education is economically viable, 0 otherwise), 
and ߮ି௜	 is based on the neighbors’ economic prospects. Equation (1.3.1.3) is inspired 
by Wilson (1987), which has documented the persistent under-investments in human 
capital among the poor isolated in inner city neighborhoods. Here educational choices 
depend on whether i exceeds a critical level (and exogenously given) ߨ୫୧୬ which, if 
surpassed, will lead to agents investing in human capital. The exception of this rule is 
when wealth falls below zero because local interactions persuade agents to invest in 
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education that they could not afford. In this case, agents revert back to the default 
choice of working as an unskilled worker in both periods of their lives. 
Agents consume only in the second period of their life. The satisfaction that agents 
get from consumption (and bequest) is described by a log-linear utility function (Galor 
and Zeira, 1993): 
௜ܷሺܿ௜, ܾ௜ሻ ൌ ߙ ln ܿ௜ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ln ܾ௜  (1.3.1.4) 
where ܿ௜ and ܾ௜ denote agent i's consumption and bequest, both in terms of the 
aggregate commodity, and 0 ൏ ߙ ൏ 1 the share parameter. Agents are rational in the 
sense that they choose the division of wealth between consumption and bequest that 
maximizes welfare. The log-linear formulation implies that agents allocate a fixed 
proportion ߙ of their lifetime wealth M (defined below) to own-consumption, and 
leave the rest for their offspring. 
The lifetime wealth of an agent depends on its skills, as well as on whether the 
agent borrows to finance education. Agents who opt out of education would then work 
as unskilled workers in the two periods of their lives and earn: 
ܯ௜ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺݔ௜ ൅ ݓ௡	ሻ ൅ ݓ௡   (1.3.1.5) 
where ݓ௡ denotes the wages for unskilled workers, x the inheritance they receive from 
their parents, and r the interest rate on the first-period’s savings. That is, since agents 
consume only in period 2, they save the wages, ݓ௡, earned and bequests, ݔ௜, inherited 
in period 1, which would then yield interests that become available in period 2. 
On the other hand, those who choose to invest in human capital and can afford to 
self-finance their education would have lifetime wealth as follows: 
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ܯ௜ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺݔ௜ െ ݄	ሻ ൅ ݓ௦		݂݋ݎ	 ൒ ݄  (1.3.1.6) 
where h denotes the cost of education, and ݓ௦ the market-determined wages for skilled 
workers. The idea here is that agents forgo work when they are young in order to 
acquire skills, and their inheritance, ݔ௜, is large enough that they can afford the cost of 
education, h, without borrowing from the financial market. The acquired skills would 
then allow educated agents to earn a wage, ݓ௦ ≫	ݓ௡, that is significantly higher than 
for unskilled employment. 
The third type of agents correspond to those with small inheritance that—should 
they invest in human capital—they would have to borrow in order to finance their 
education. This is simply because the cost of education exceeds their inheritance. 
Their lifetime wealth as skilled workers then would be as follows: 
ܯ௜ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻሺݔ௜ െ ݄	ሻ ൅ ݓ௦       (1.3.1.7) 
where i is the interest rates on the loan, ݔ௜ െ ݄, that borrowing agents would have to 
repay in period 2. For this choice to be financially viable, skilled workers must earn a 
large enough wage, ݓ௦, in order to create wealth exceeding that of unskilled workers 
receiving the lower wages, albeit in two periods. 
Since agents are rational and utility maximizing, they make choices (i.e., whether 
to invest in human capital or not) that yield the highest lifetime wealth ܯ௜. Having 
made education choices, agents then decide how to split wealth between own 
consumption and bequests. It can be shown the log-linear utility function implies that 
the optimal bequest and consumption—based solely on economic calculations—would 
be: 
ܾ௜ሺݔሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻܯ௜,	        
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ܿ௜ሺݔሻ ൌ ߙܯ௜         (1.3.1.8) 
In this case, following Equation (1.3.1.8), we would have the optimized utility of 
unskilled labor is determined from maximization of Cobb Douglas utility function 
subject to the budget constraint. The bequest of unskilled labor (ܾ௜௡) and skilled labor 
(ܾ௜௦) is computed as in the following; for the unskilled labor’s bequest (1.3.1.9a), the 
skilled labor with bequest greater than education cost (1.3.1.9b) and the skilled labor 
with bequest less than education cost (1.3.1.9c) (Galor & Zeira, p.39): 
ܾ௜௡ሺݔ௜ሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሾሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺݔ௜ ൅ ݓ௡ሻ ൅ ݓ௡ሿ;		 
ܿ௜௡ሺݔ௜ሻ ൌ ߙሾሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺݔ௜ ൅ ݓ௡ሻ ൅ ݓ௡ሿ      (1.3.1.9a) 
ܾ௜௦ሺݔ௜ሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሾݓ௦ ൅ ሺݔ௜ െ ݄ሻሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሿ;		   
ܿ௜௦ሺݔ௜ሻ ൌ ߙሾݓ௦ ൅ ሺݔ௜ െ ݄ሻሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሿ      (1.3.1.9b) 
ܾ௜௦ሺݔ௜ሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሾݓ௦ ൅ ሺݔ௜ െ ݄ሻሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻሿ;		 
ܿ௜௦ሺݔ௜ሻ ൌ ߙሾݓ௦ ൅ ሺݔ௜ െ ݄ሻሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻሿ      (1.3.1.9c) 
The relationship of borrowing rate and deposit rate is the following (Galor & Zeira, 
p.39): 
݅ ൌ ଵାఉ௥ఉିଵ          (1.3.1.10) 
with 1   to make borrowing rate greater than zero. 
Galor and Zeira shows that when  individuals who inherit more than f but less 
than g will invest in human capital and work as skilled labors but after several 
generations, they will all back to unskilled labors and back to nx . Individuals who 
inherit more than g will invest in human capital generations after generations and will 
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end up in sx . The value of f and g are determined respectively by the following 
equations (Galor & Zeira, p.41, 44)3: 
(2 ) (1 )n sw r h i wf
i r
             
(1 )[ (1 )]
[1 (1 )(1 )]
sw h ig
i


             (1.3.1.11) 
When we add space into the model, how do local interactions affect education 
decisions? The spatial structure of our model corresponds to a two dimensional grid 
lattice, where every agent is surrounded by and interacts with at most eight adjacent 
neighbors (the so-called Moore neighborhood). Given this structure, the decision 
whether to invest in human capital depends on (i) the neighborhood composition and 
(ii) the strength of local interactions. Thus, for example, when interactions strength is 
maximum,ߠ ൌ 1, then education decisions depend exclusively on the neighbors’ 
economic prospects according to the calculations in Equations (1.3.1.5) – (1.3.1.7). 
Furthermore, if there are enough prospects to persuade an agent — more than the 
threshold TD — then the agent would pursue education, as long as it results in a 
positive lifetime wealth. Note the bounded rationality inherent in agents making 
choices based on the neighbors’ prospects—i.e., without knowing what the neighbors 
would ultimately decide to do. This may be interpreted as agents anticipating peers to 
                                                 
3 The point ݂ is determined from equating the bequest of the skilled workers to that of the 
unskilled ones: ሺ1 െ ߙሻሾሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻሺ݂ െ ݄ሻ ൅ ݓ௦ሿ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሾሺ݂ ൅ ݓ௡ሻሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ ൅ ݓ௡ሿ and solve it 
for	݂. The critical point ݃ is determined from the intersection of the bequest of the skilled 
workers ( )sb x  and 45 degree line when  ݂ ൑ ݃ ൑ ݄ : and then solving it for g.  
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receive significant inheritance from their well-to-do parents. But some candidates for 
education would opt out of school if interactions are strong and there are not sufficient 
prospects in their neighborhood. Our model assumes that agents lack the wherewithal 
to foresee their neighbors’ actual decisions. 
For concreteness, consider once again the maximum dependency (ߠ ൌ 1) example 
where, in addition, agents need to be persuaded by at least two prospective neighbors 
(TD = 2) in order to pursue education. Now consider agent C who has three neighbors, 
A, B, and D (see panel (i) in Fig. 1.3.1.1). Let “type 1” agents be those for which a 
skilled job yields wealth higher than unskilled employment, and let “type 0” be the 
opposite. Suppose the economic calculations are such that education is feasible for 
everybody in that neighborhood (panel (ii) in Fig. 1.3.1.1). In this case all agents end 
up investing in human capital, not due to their internal economic calculations, but 
because every agent has at least two skilled-worker candidates as neighbors. But 
suppose instead education is not economically feasible for A and B as in panel (iii), 
then that information could lead agent C to make the opposite decision. If 
neighborhood effects are sufficiently strong, agent C could end up in the unskilled 
sector (panel (iv)) because, from his perspective, that is where the overwhelming 
majority of his neighbors would work. Agent C would then follow the anticipated 
career path of peers in order to conform to the social milieu. 
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Figure 1.3.1.1: Neighborhood Composition and Human Capital Decisions with 
Maximum Interaction ሺߠ ൌ 1ሻ  
  
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
 
Note: we assume an agent needs at least two skilled worker candidates (TD = 2) in 
order to invest in human capital 
 
1.3.2. Skilled Worker Wages 
How is the unskilled labor wage, ݓ௡, determined? The unskilled worker sector is 
considerably more tractable because the production function implies a linear 
relationship between price and the wages, ݓ௡ ൌ ݌∅. As output has been chosen as the 
numeraire with fixed price ܲ ൌ 1, the wages for  unskilled workers are fully 
determined. We discuss here the calibration of skilled worker wages, ݓ௦, that are 
theoretically determined endogenously.4 
We assume that initially there are ܮ௡ unskilled workers and no skilled ones. Thus, 
the pool of workers, ܮ ൌ ܮ௡, and because production begins at time t=1, aggregate 
output can be determined based on Equation (1.3.1.1). Initial endowments (“bequests” 
from heaven) are randomly distributed across agents according to a uniform 
                                                 
4 Galor and Zeira (1993) consider the case of endogenous wages for unskilled workers. 
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probability distribution function. Subsequently, randomly selected agents are offered 
jobs in the skilled sector but, in order to qualify, they must first acquire the necessary 
skills. For agents that choose to invest in education, how much would they be 
compensated? The question is a challenge for numerical analysis because human 
capital investments and the compensation are both endogenous: wages depend on the 
supply of skilled workers and vice versa. Fortunately, the following proposition helps 
resolve the chicken-and-egg aspect of the market for skilled workers. 
Proposition 1. The long-run wages for skilled workers converge almost surely to 
the level that makes an agent to be indifferent between investing and not 
investing in human capital. It can be shown that this wage satisfies the following 
lower bound: 
Minimum ݓ௦ ൌ ሺ2 ൅ ݎሻݓ௡ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ݄               (1.3.2.11) 
The proof is by contradiction, but it can also be easily demonstrated by numerical 
simulations.  
By proposition 1, in the long run the compensation for skilled workers is always 
higher than (more than twice) the unskilled workers wages, ݓ௡. The marginal product 
of skilled workers (derived from Eq. 1.3.1.2) then determines how many agents, ܮ௦, 
would be hired at that wage. Production in the skilled sector begins at t=2, at which 
time the (now “old”) agents decide how much to consume and how much to leave for 
their offspring. The old agents then give birth to the newborns, from which a randomly 
selected few are offered the skilled worker wages. The young agents who chose to opt 
out of school are then employed in the unskilled sector, producing output that is again 
used to pay for sunk costs. 
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To help intuition, Figure 1.3.2.3 illustrates the connection between wages and 
aggregate output. When wages in the skilled sector are lower than the minimum ௦ܹ 
(Eq. 1.3.2.11), in equilibrium all workers choose unskilled-sector employment. 
Conversely, all agents invest in human capital when skilled worker wages are higher 
than the minimum. Unskilled and skilled workers co-exist only when wages are such 
that agents are indifferent between the two sectors. 
 
Figure 1.3.2.3: Skilled Worker Wages and Aggregate Output  
 
We perform numerical simulations where skilled worker wages are calibrated 
according to Proposition 1 in order to prevent the economy from degenerating into a 
homogeneous equilibrium. The next section details the agent-based algorithm. 
 
1.3.3. Algorithm Implementation 
We implement the agent-based algorithm in Java Development Kit 1.6 in 
conjunction with the RePast library version 3.1 (http://repast.sourceforge.net/repast_3/ 
index.html). Before running scenarios of interests, we set the model parameters at 
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values that would ensure that the simulation produce outcomes where both skilled and 
unskilled workers coexist. This is a necessary step because, as it turns out, initial 
explorations suggest that skilled and unskilled workers coexist only in a narrow range 
of exogenous variables and parameter values. We have already calibrated skilled 
worker wages based on proposition 1. Table 1.3.3.1 list the values of the additional 
variables and parameters calibrated in the agent-based simulations. 
Table 1.3.3.1: Fixed Parameter Values in the Agent-Based Simulations 
Parameters Value 
Share parameter in skilled labor production function, β 0.7 
Technology parameter, A 30 
Wages of unskilled workers 10 
Interest rate, r 0.01 
Maximum bequest, x 100 
Total number of workers, L 100 
Consumption parameter, α 0.7 
Minimum threshold to invest in education, ߨ୫୧୬ 0.5 
  
 
Having initialized the parameters, the following algorithm is implemented: 
1. First, we derive the labor demand schedules for both sectors from the production 
functions (Eqs. 1.3.1.1 and 1.3.1.2).  The demand schedules relate wages to 
incremental output for both the skilled and unskilled labor sectors. Aggregate 
supply is the combined output produced in the two sectors. 
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2. Each agent is then initialized with three binary variables (each taking the value of 
either one or zero), which represent, respectively, ࣐࢏, ࣐ି࢏, and the tendency to invest 
in education, ࣊࢏. Agents first determine whether they are prospective skilled 
workers by comparing the lifetime wealth from an investment in education (Eq. 
1.3.1.8 or 1.3.1.9) with that from a career as an unskilled worker (Eq. 1.3.1.7). The 
binary variable ࣐࢏ is set = 1 if agent is a prospect, = 0 otherwise. 
3. In simulations where we allow neighborhood effects, agents then observe whether 
nearest neighbors are skilled worker prospects. Since the spatial structure is a square 
grid lattice, each agent has a maximum of 8 neighbors (the so-called Moore 
neighborhood structure). We consider the case where agents make educational 
choices depending on the number of neighbors, TD, who are expected to invest in 
education based purely on economic ground (i.e., without taking neighborhood 
effects into account). Thus, for example, TD = 1 means that an agent would invest 
in human capital if there is at least one prospect for skilled worker in the 
neighborhood.  
4. If the number of prospects ൒ ܶܦ, then ߮ି௜ takes the value of 1, otherwise = 0. The 
tendency to invest in human capital, ߨ௜, can then be calculated for every agent based 
on Equation (1.3.1.3). Agents for which ߨ௜ exceeds the minimum threshold, ߨ௠௜௡, 
would actually invest in human capital.  
5. The computation of agents’ wealth and bequest in the subsequent period follows 
directly from current period’s education choices. In order to avoid negative wealths, 
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a restriction is imposed on agents’ choices so that an investment in human capital 
occurs only if lifetime wealth is not negative.5 
6. We consider three different setups: 
a. Setup 1 corresponds to a backward society where initially no agent pursued 
education. Subsequently, higher wages are offered to randomly selected agents, 
some of which would be motivated to invest in human capital. The wages for 
prospective skilled workers are calibrated according to Proposition 1.  
b. In Setup 2, the probability for an agent to be offered the higher wage is higher if 
the parent is a skilled worker. This allows education choices to be correlated 
across generations. 
c. Setup 3 combines Setups 1 and 2, and in addition all agents offered the higher 
wages (which they accept) are clustered in one neighborhood. This setup is 
designed to capture the notion of class segregation (Schelling, 1971). Thus here, 
unlike in the other setups, the spatial distribution of wealth will strongly affect 
the future educational status of younger generations. 
7. For each setup, we compare the outcomes of simulations with interacting agents 
with those without interactions under various assumptions regarding interactions 
strength and the offspring’s likelihood to replicate parents’ education and economic 
status (in Setup 2). 
The flowchart below (Fig. 1.3.3.1) summarizes the logic of the agent-based algorithm. 
 
 
                                                 
5 This restriction is necessary in order to prevent the economy from spiraling out of control. 
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Figure 1.3.3.1: The Logic of the Agent-Based Algorithm 
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1.4. Results 
1.4.1. Parameter Observation of Basic Results 
 
Before we introduce spaces into the basic version of Galor and Zeira’s model, we 
need to observe some of the important parameters that drives its characteristics.  In 
order to establish the positive threshold ݃, the model requires that either agents have 
positive wages of skilled labor after education cost	ݓ௦ െ ݄ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ ൐ 0 and slope  
ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ ൏ 1 (Galor & Zeira, p.41), or when the skilled labor wages is - 
negative after education cost ݓ௦ െ ݄ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ ൏ 0 then the slope ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ ൐ 1  
(Galor & Zeira, p.41) which requires that ݅ ൏ ఈଵିఈ.  From Equation (1.2.1.4) we can 
derive that  ଵାఉ௥ఉିଵ ൏
ఈ
ଵିఈ  with 
ଵ
ఈି௥ሺଵିఈሻ ൏ ߚ with ݎሺ1 െ ߙሻ ് ߙ. In this study, we chose 
the value of	ߙ ൌ 0.7.  
To have the value of ݂ ൐ 0, since we know that ݅ ൐ ݎ, then what we only need the 
numerator term is to be greater than zero, which we can write as ݓ௡ሺ2 ൅ ݎሻ ൅
݄ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ െ ݓ௦ ൐ 0 or simply ݓ௦ ൏ ݓ௡ሺ2 ൅ ݎሻ ൅ ݄ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ. Furthermore, to determine 
that 0 ൏ ݂ ൏ ݃, it is necessary that: 
(1 )( ) (1 ) (1 )( )(2 ) (1 ) 1
[1 (1 )(1 )] [1 (1 )(1 )]s n
i r h i i rw w r h i
i i
 
 
                         
Now let’s begin with an example where r = 0.01, 1.1  , 0.7   and 20h  , 
10nw  , bequest = 100. We can check that we have: 10.11i  , (1 )(1 ) 3.33i   , 
(1 )(1 ) 0.303r   , the skilled labor wages that is required to obtain positive ݃ is  
222.20sw  , and the skilled labor wages required to obtain positive f is 242.30sw  . 
Using several values of skilled labor, we checked the related Gini coefficients and 
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obtained results displayed in Figure 1.4.1.1. These results confirms that in the area of 
{10,20,30,..., 220}sw  , we have only the values of Gini that do not converging to 
zeros in the area of [70,80,90,100,110,120,130,140,150]sw  . 
 
Figure 1.4.1.1: Values of Gini on Different Skilled-Worker Wages 
 
 
 
 
 The graph provided by Galor and Zeira for the case when wages are exogenously 
determined requires that the value of g > f > 0 and the slope of (1 )(1 ) 1i   . Since 
threshold g is positive it requires skilled labor wages to be less than human capital 
investment (1 )sw h i  , which also guarantees the positive f since 
(2 ) (1 )n sw r h i w    . There exists a range of values where the condition g > f is 
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satisfied. This range can be seen in the following example. Table 1.4.1.1 shows that 
there exists a range when f > g, f > 0 and g > 0 when 154.9 ൏ ݓ௦ ൏ 242.3 (see panel 
a) in which the coexistence of low- and high-income groups disappear as shown by 
panel b when	௪ೞ௪೙ ൐ 15.5 which implies	ݓ௦ ൐ 154.9.   
Table 1.4.1.1: Example of Available Range for g > f > 0 
  
a. Parameters in the basic model b. Values ݓ௦/ݓ௡ on f and g 
 
 
Parameters Values
h/wn 2
wn 10
h  20
r 0.01
b 1.1
i = (1+br)/(b‐1) 10.11
(h/wn)(1+i) 22.22
a 0.7
(1‐a)(1+i) 3.333
(1‐a)(1+r) 0.303
g pos ws < 222.200
f < g  needs ws < 154.921
f > 0 needs ws < 242.300
bequst  100.000
(1‐a)(i‐r) 3.0
1‐(1‐a)(1+i) ‐2.333
(1‐a)(i‐r)/[1‐(1‐a)(1+i)] ‐1.29876
ws‐h(1+r) 29.8
wn(2+r) 20.1
ws > wn(2+r)+(h(1+r)) 40.3
h(1+r) 20.2
ws > h/(1‐a) 66.7
ws/wn f g
1 23.0 27.29
2 22.0 26.00
3 21.0 24.71
4 20.0 23.43
5 19.0 22.14
6 18.0 20.86
7 17.1 19.57
8 16.1 18.29
9 15.1 17.00
10 14.1 15.71
11 13.1 14.43
12 12.1 13.14
13 11.1 11.86
14 10.1 10.57
15 9.1 9.28
16 8.1 8.00
17 7.2 6.71
18 6.2 5.43
19 5.2 4.14
20 4.2 2.85
21 3.2 1.57
22 2.2 0.28
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1.4.2. Scenarios 
We consider the following scenarios corresponding to three alternative policy 
changes, and compare the equilibrium number of skilled workers. 
– A reduction in borrowing cost achieved by lowering the loan rates, and this will 
make education affordable to a greater number of agents. 
– A direct reduction in the cost of education for all agents in the economy while 
leaving the loan rates unchanged. 
– A targeted subsidy, focuses on agents who otherwise would not have invested in 
human capital. For simplicity, we provide the example of a direct subsidy by 
adjusting the cost of education by a parameter that takes a value between zero 
and one. This mechanism implies that a transfer payment equals the difference 
between the subsidized and the full price of education. 
In the targeted subsidy simulation, the wealth equation for agents whose bequest 
values are less than the education cost is modified to include a subsidy parameter, ߦ.  
Thus, in this scenario the wealth of skilled workers who otherwise would have needed 
to borrow in order to finance their education would be: 
௦ܹ,௜ሺݔሻ ൌ ݓ௦ሺܮ௦ሻ ൅ ሺݔ௜ െ ሺ1 െ ߦሻ݄ሻ	ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ  (1.4.2.1) 
where ߦ	takes a positive value that is less than one, and ߦ݄ is the implicit transfer 
payment. We use this equation to investigate the impact of different subsidy levels on 
human capital investments. 
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1.4.3. Results of Simulations 
For each combination of parameter values and initial setup, we ran Monte Carlo 
simulations with five different random seeds to control for random fluctuations. Each 
simulation was run for 1,000 periods. The results reported here correspond to a system 
populated by 100 agents that live for two periods, in which the borrowing rate, i, is 
fixed at 0.05. Exactly 100 offspring are born to parents that consume, make bequests, 
and then die in the second period of life. 
We validate the agent-based algorithm (structural validation) by replicating the 
analytical results of Galor and Zeira (1993), where skilled worker wages are 
exogenously determined and direct interactions are absent. In particular, our agent-
based simulations successfully reproduce the long-run divergence between skilled and 
unskilled workers from a random-uniform distribution of initial wealth (Galor and 
Zeira, Fig. 1, p. 41). We note that a model with space but without local interactions 
produces the same results. 
We discuss first the effect of stronger interactions as a result of an increase in the 
strength of neighbors’ influence as captured by the parameter ߠ (Eq. 1.3.1.3). Note 
that ߠ ൌ 0 represents the no-interaction case, where agents make decisions based 
purely on economic considerations. As it turns out, Setup 2 produces results very 
similar to those from Setup 3, and not shown here. Figure 1.4.3.1a displays the 
relationship between interactions and human capital investments (measured by the 
number of skilled workers) over 1,000 periods in Setup 1. The figure indicates that 
human capital is consistently highest when agents assign equal weights (ߠ ൌ 0.5) to 
neighbors’ influence and their pure economic calculations (i.e., without outside 
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influence), and lowest when agents consider only the former (ߠ ൌ 1). Intermediate 
levels are observed when neighborhood effects are positive but weak (0 ൏ ߠ ൏ 0.5), 
or somewhat strong (0.5 ൏ ߠ ൏ 1). Thus human capital is highest when agents assign 
equal weights (ߠ ൌ 0.5) to neighbors’ influence and their pure economic calculations 
(i.e., without outside influences). At this optimal level, interactions succeed in 
increasing the likelihood of skilled worker prospects to pursue education and actually 
realize their potential. Distributions, on the other hand, are most uneven at maximal 
interactions (ߠ ൒ 0.8 in Fig. 1.4.3.1b), and consistently most equal (lowest Gini) when 
neighborhood effects are weak or completely absent. Furthermore, it appears that a 
positive association characterizes the inequality-interaction nexus. 
Figure 1.4.3.1: Time Series of (i) the Number of Skilled Workers and (ii) the 
Distribution of Wealth, Various ࣂ’s, Setup 1 
 
a. Society’s level of education, measured by the 
number of skilled workers over 1000 periods 
b. Distribution of wealth, measured by Gini index 
over 1000 periods 
Note: 10-period averages are shown in order to reduce noise. 
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Figure 1.4.3.2 reinforces the findings in a cross section of equilibria at t=1000. As 
Figure 1.4.3.2a confirms, the steady-state relationship between interaction strength and  
human capital investments remains non-linear — it is positive — when interactions 
are weak, but becomes negative as ߠ exceeds 0.5. The figure also shows that across all 
levels of interactions, the combination of class segregation and path dependence 
(Setup 3) yields a higher level of human capital investments. The resulting expansion 
of output, however, has social repercussions as inequality rises (higher Gini index) and 
peaking at ߠ ൌ 0.5 (Fig. 1.4.3.2b). Thus, a tradeoff must be made between higher 
output and a less equal distribution of wealth when interactions are moderate. Strong 
interactions (ߠ ൐ 0.5) lead to lower education and, by extension, a fall in output. At 
the same time, highly intertwined agents also create a more equal distribution of 
wealth. 
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Figure 1.4.3.2: The Relationship between the Strength of Interactions and (a) 
Society’s Level of Education and (b) the Distribution of Wealth, Various Setups, 
t=1,000  
 
a. Society’s level of education, measured 
by the number of skilled workers 
b. Distribution of wealth, measured by 
Gini index 
 
Note: all simulation runs are with TD = 4. 
 
Figure 1.4.3.3 shows the long-run spatial patterns that emerge from Setup 3 under 
various interaction levels, ߠ, with TD fixed at a value of 4. The no-interactions case 
(ߠ ൌ 0) leads to about two-tenths of workers being educated. At a moderate level of 
interactions (ߠ ൌ 0.5), the proportion of skilled workers is highest, i.e., about one-
third of the total. When agents are highly intertwined (ߠ ൌ 0.8), skilled workers fall 
precipitously to less than 10% of the entire laborforce. Results from the other setups 
show very similar pattern. 
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Figure 1.4.3.3: Spatial Patterns of Neighborhood Seggregation between Skilled 
(Blue) and Unskilled (Red) Workers, Various Levels of Interactions  
 
 
a. Without interactions, 
ߠ ൌ 0 
b. With interactions, 
ߠ ൌ 0.5
c. With interactions, ߠ ൌ 0.8
Note: simulations are run with TD = 4. 
Next, we examine an increase in the minimum required number of skilled worker 
prospects in the neighborhood, TD, which led to a decline human capital investments 
(Fig. 1.4.3.4a) across all setups. This is intuitive. Agents are less likely to pursue 
education when doing so requires a strong presence of “positive influences” in the 
neighborhood. Even with stringent requirements, however, segregation and path 
dependence (Setup 3) continue to yield a steadily high level of education that declines 
only slightly. The upside of this decline is a concurrent drop in wealth inequality as 
evident in the lower Gini indexes (Fig. 1.4.3.4b). By contrast, the combination of path 
dependencies (Setup 2) and a very high requirement for “positive influences” bring 
about both higher inequality and lower investments in education. 
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Figure 1.4.3.4: The Relationship between the Minimum Number of Skilled 
Worker Prospects (TD) and (a) Society’s Level of Education and (b) the 
Distribution of Wealth, Various Setups  
 
a. Society’s level of education, measured 
by the number of skilled workers 
b. Distribution of wealth, measured by 
Gini index 
Note: simulations are run with ߠ ൌ 0.5. 
  
 
1.4.4. Scenario Analysis 
We turn now to the analysis of the three alternative policies mentioned earlier: (A) 
a reduction in borrowing rates; (B) a reduction in education costs; and (C) targeted 
subsidies to agents who otherwise would not have invested in human capital. Here the 
simulations focus on Setup 1, where higher wages are randomly offered and class 
segregation is absent.6 Figure 1.4.4.1a shows that lower borrowing rates in Scenario A 
are associated with a higher level of education, which is bolstered even more by social 
interactions (ߠ ൌ 0.5).  That is, local influences and lower borrowing rates 
                                                 
6 It turns out that results are qualitatively very similar under Setups 2 and 3. 
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complement each other in raising human capital. Figure 1.4.4.1b shows, however, the 
interaction dependence of the correlations between borrowing rates and inequality. 
Lower borrowing rates appear to be associated with a decrease in inequality in the no-
interactions case (ߠ ൌ 0). Moderately strong neighborhood effects (ߠ ൌ 0.5), by 
contrast, render ambiguous the distributional impact of a decrease in borrowing rates. 
Starting from a relatively high level (i = 5%), a reduction in the cost of borrowing 
exacerbates initial inequality, but when borrowing costs are already low (i = 2%), a 
further reduction appears to improve the distribution of wealth. More simulations at 
finer intervals for both borrowing rates and interactions strength are needed before a 
more complete picture can be obtained. 
Figure 1.4.4.1: Scenario A: Borrowing Rates and (a) Society’s Level of Education 
and (b) the Distribution of Wealth, Various Levels of Interactions  
a. ߠ ൌ 0 and ߠ ൌ 0.5 for the without and 
with interaction cases, respectively 
b. ߠ ൌ 0 and ߠ ൌ 0.5 for the without and 
with interaction cases, respectively 
Note: simulations are run with TD = 4. 
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As expected, in scenario B where education costs are reduced, the level of 
education when interactions are allowed (ߠ ൌ 0.5) is significantly higher than when 
interactions are not allowed (ߠ ൌ 0).7 At the same time, the higher number of skilled 
workers in the interactions case brings about a dramatic increase in inequality. Thus, a 
reduction in either education costs or borrowing rates (Senario A) brings about results 
that are very similar in terms of aggregate output and inequality, as can be seen in 
Figure 1.4.4.2. 
Figure 1.4.4.2: Scenario B: Education Costs and (a) Society’s Level of Skilled 
Workers and (b) the Distribution of Wealth, Various Levels of Interactions  
a. ߠ ൌ 0 and ߠ ൌ 0.5 for the without and 
with interaction cases, respectively 
b. ߠ ൌ 0 and ߠ ൌ 0.5 for the without and 
with interaction cases, respectively 
Note: simulations are run with TD = 4. 
Next, we examine scenario C, where we use subsidies to target agents who 
otherwise would have borrowed to finance their education. Figure 1.4.4.3a shows that 
human capital investments begin to respond only when education is close to being 
                                                 
7 Results not reported here due to space considerations. 
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fully subsidized. The increase, however, is dramatic (more than double) when the 
subsidy is at least 90% of costs, which suggests a phase transition in education. When 
the subsidy is not high enough, education is impervious to transfer payments. Once the 
90% breakpoint is surpassed, education becomes very responsive to additional 
subsidies. All the investigated cases exhibit phase transitions, yet, as in the other 
scenarios, the increase in human capital worsens the distribution of income. Notice, 
however, that inequality increases even before education starts its upward trajectory 
(Fig. 1.4.4.3b). As it turns out, subsidies increase the lifetime wealth of those that are 
fortunate to be the recipients, and this brings about higher inequality despite the stable 
overall level of education. 
Figure 1.4.4.3: Scenario C: Targeted Subsidies and (a) Society’s Level of 
Education and (b) the Distribution of Wealth, Setup 1  
a. ߠ ൌ 0 and ߠ ൌ 0.5 for the without and 
with interaction cases, respectively 
b. ߠ ൌ 0 and ߠ ൌ 0.5 for the without and 
with interaction cases, respectively 
Note: simulations are run with TD = 4. 
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The results for Setup 3 are qualitatively very similar to those under Setup 1. Thus, 
regardless of whether wealth is correlated over generations or across locations, we 
found out human capital responds only to very high subsidy levels. When it does 
respond, however, the results are dramatic in terms of both output (because there are 
many more skilled workers) and inequality. Figure 1.4.4.4 shows the long-run spatial 
patterns that emerge under different levels of subsidies. Absent to moderate subsidies 
(ߦ ൌ 0 and 0.5) result in not only the same level of human capital (with one-fourth of 
workers being educated) but also virtually identical patterns of class segregation (Fig. 
1.4.4.4a and 1.4.4.4b). When subsidies are very high covering at least 90% of 
education costs (ߦ ൌ 0.91), the share of skilled workers jumps to over half of the 
laborforce (Fig. 1.4.4.4c). Moreover, educated workers tend to cluster together within 
the same neighborhood. 
Figure 1.4.4.4: Spatial Patterns of Neighborhood Seggregation between Skilled 
(Blue) and Unskilled (Red) Workers, Various Levels of Subsidies  
  
a. ߦ ൌ 0 b. ߦ ൌ 0.50 c.  ߦ ൌ 0.91 
 
Note: simulation runs with Setup 1, interaction level ߠ ൌ 0.5, and TD = 4. 
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How does inequality rise when more workers become educated, despite the 
constant population? This seems to be counter-intuitive, at least at first glance. Figure 
1.4.4.5 shows the widening wealth gap between skilled and unskilled workers as 
subsidies are increased. Under the no-interactions case (panel a), the original scenario 
(ߦ ൌ 0) leads to a mean wealth (=29.08) that roughly coincides with the minimum and 
maximum values. A subsidy that effectively reduces education costs by 70% (ߦ ൌ
0.7), on the other hand, results in a 26% increase of maximum wealth while keeping 
the minimum at about the same level, thereby creating a chasm between skilled and 
unskilled workers. The size of the skilled workers group, however, remain the same 
(about two-tenths of the total laborforce) as in the original scenario. When subsidy is 
further increased to cover 90% of costs, the amount of skilled workers suddenly jumps 
to over 85% of the total (see fig. 1.4.4.3). At the same time, the dramatic expansion in 
output pushes inequality higher by virtue of the increasing isolation of the low-wage, 
unskilled workers. 
Allowing direct interactions (ߠ ൌ 0.5) brings about a larger gap at every non-zero 
level of subsidies (panel b). It appears that the combination of neighbors’ influences 
and high subsidies not only raises the top wealth as in the absence of interactions, but 
also lowers the wealth of those already at the bottom of the distribution. 
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Figure 1.4.4.5: Scenario A: Targeted Subsidies and the Distribution of Wealth, 
Setup 1  
a. No direct interactions, ߠ ൌ 0 b. With interactions, ߠ ൌ 0.5 
Note: simulation runs with Setup 1, interaction level ߠ ൌ 0.5, and TD = 4. 
 
1.5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Several insights can be drawn from this agent-based model of wealth inequality in 
a spatial economy which is characterized by local interactions and initial 
heterogeneity.  We found that human capital investments (and therefore output) are 
maximal when local interactions are moderate (i.e., ߠ ൌ 0.5), neither too weak nor too 
strong. Thus, equal consideration of one’s own-economic calculations and information 
about one’s neighbors’ prospects produces the highest level of education, and 
therefore output. Stronger interactions (ߠ ൐ 0.5) lead to prospects in the poor (low-
wealth) neighborhood to opt out of school (though non-prospects in the wealthy 
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neighborhood remain in education), and this reduces overall human capital. On the 
other hand, weaker interactions (ߠ ൏ 0.5) lead to non-prospects in wealthy 
neighborhood to opt out of school (though skilled worker prospects in the poor 
neighborhood remain in education), and this also reduces overall human capital. 
The distributional impact of interactions exhibits a similar pattern, but of course 
with very different ramifications assuming that society values an egalitarian 
distribution of wealth. Specifically, the level of interactions (ߠ ൌ 0.5) that maximizes 
output also generates the most unequal distribution. Thus, the agent-based simulations 
suggest diametrically-opposite directions for output and equity should the extent of 
local interactions change either way. An exogenous shock leading to a more cohesive 
community (associated with ߠ ൐ 0.5) for example, lowers output but at the same time 
produces a more equitable distribution. The upper tail of Figure 1.4.4.5 suggests, 
however, that very strong interactions beget a severe contraction in output, but only a 
moderate reduction in inequality. By contrast, very weak interactions precipitate a 
mild contraction and, at the same time, significantly lower inequality. It appears that 
when agents are strongly interacting, the influence that causes prospects in poor 
neighborhood to adapt (by opting out-of-school) overwhelms the influence that 
persuades non-prospects in wealthy neighborhood to adapt (by staying in school). 
Thus, very strong interactions produce “too much” adaptation among would-be 
prospects but not enough among non-prospects, which in turn is associated with a 
severe contraction of output coupled by relatively high inequality. 
The adaptation of agents through interactions might be motivated by the influence 
of “others” who are perceived to be socially superior (Mugny and Perez, 1991). 
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Agents in our model become susceptible to conversion (e.g., an initial non-prospect 
becomes educated, or vice versa) if a critical mass of “others” is present nearby. 
Adaptation occurs if, in addition, agents are allowed to locally interact (ߠ ൐ 0) and the 
resistance to local influence (ߨ௠௜௡) is not too high.  Under a favorable set of 
conditions, the presence of prosperous neighbors converts a non-prospect into a skilled 
worker due to the perceived advantages associated with being educated, and vice 
versa.  As Turner (1983) argues, the descendants of poor families likely identify 
themselves as being socially inferior and economically disadvantaged. It is precisely 
this social identity that motivates them to follow the anticipated education path of their 
well-to-do peers if there is a critical number of the latter in the neighborhood. 
Kirman (1993) has argued the importance of critical points in explaining the 
switch from one choice to another. In our context here, skilled-work prospects 
“recruit” other agents in the neighborhood, even those for whom education would be 
the second best choice. History matters because of positive feedbacks in the sense that 
the size of the educated neighborhood determines the probability for non-prospects to 
convert. Conversion occurs if the number of educated neighbors reaches a critical 
level, and this makes offspring even more likely to be educated in subsequent periods.  
Thus in a different context, when confronted with choices that are comparable in every 
aspect, social interactions might nevertheless compel people to consistently choose 
one over the other (Becker, 1991). 
The agent-based simulations reported in Section (1.4.4) suggest that the economic 
impact of education policies depends on the history of the policy itself and the extent 
of social interaction. A prime example is targeted subsidies that produce results in 
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terms of higher human capital investments and output, but only when a large subsidy 
is already in place. Furthermore, the impact magnitude also depends on the strengths 
of local interactions. But in order to explore which policy is most effective in 
promoting education, the simulations must be setup such that the efficacy of different 
policy instruments can be compared. 
Comparability can be accomplished by assuming a fixed government budget, 
which in any run can only be used to fund a single policy implementation. This 
enables us to compare the policy of reducing education costs with the policy of 
targeted subsidy, as long as the total expenditures for both are ex-ante identical.8 
Preliminary results suggest that human capital investments under targeted subsidies 
almost double the level under a comparable scheme to slash education costs. That is, 
subsidies targeted toward those who would otherwise be unable to pay for education 
appear most effective in terms of motivating people to pursue education. In terms of 
per dollar of public expenditures, cost reduction results in higher human capital 
investments and lower inequality than subsidies. Thus, reducing education costs 
across the board appears to be effective not only in motivating people to pursue 
education but also in creating a more egalitarian distribution of wealth. 
Decision makers can make policy even more effective if they know the extent of 
local interactions because they can then determine the amount of subsidies required to 
achieve a given level of education. While efficiency (i.e., a smaller budget) and 
effectiveness (i.e., more skilled workers) generate higher output in the aggregate, it 
                                                 
8 The total expenditures would be ex-post identical only in the trivial case where every agent 
invests in human capital because education has been artificially made affordable to all agents. 
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also brings about possible setbacks associated with the negative consequences of 
wealth disparities. Our preliminary analysis indicates that targeted subsidies lead to a 
significantly more unequal distribution of wealth as measured by the Gini coefficient. 
Due to the efficiency-equity tradeoffs, the decision-makers’ preference for different 
mixes of output and inequality becomes very important. While our model does not 
examine the social consequences of higher inequality, it does suggest that a focus on 
human capital investments that neglects this negative side effect would severely 
overestimate the impact on the broader society. 
One final point that our model makes is the role of spatial interactions in the 
presence of heterogeneity. The wealth gap between the poor and the rich is becoming 
increasingly more pronounced in today’s economy, and our model suggests that 
interactions play an important role in influencing one’s decision to invest in education. 
One could imagine a more complex system where there is also heterogeneity across 
agents in terms of the minimum number of skilled worker prospects required in order 
to invest in education. In addition, geography plays a role as those who are in the 
proximity of skilled neighbors are more likely to pursue education than they would 
have been otherwise. Relating to economic growth, when more people are educated, 
more output will be produced. Therefore, when two areas have different population 
characteristics in term of social interaction and segregation (upon education 
attainment) then the economic growth of those two areas will differ. In a bigger 
spectrum, this may explain at least partially why the same policies toward education in 
one area might create different outcomes in term of the number of skilled workers and 
its economic growth. The social interaction and segregation of agents might be one of 
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the social aspects that need to be investigated more in addition to the possible 
frameworks of research in economic development.  
Future research might also consider the possibility of examining the case where 
educated agents who work as skilled workers and have significantly higher income are 
actively promoting education to those who are uneducated. We could also add the 
migration of low-income groups into a higher-income groups’ society, attracted by 
such one-way promotion from the skilled workers, thus setting the high income 
earners to one specific location in the lattice and letting the low earners be somewhere 
outside. This and other policy implications need to be investigated further in future 
studies. 
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APPENDIX 1A 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 BY CONTRADICTION 
 
Since we know that the wealth of the non-skilled labor is ܯ௡ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺݔ ൅ ݓ௡ሻ ൅
ݓ௡ and the wealth of skilled labor is either ܯ௦ ൌ ݓ௦ ൅ ሺݔ െ ݄ሻሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ or ܯ௦ ൌ ݓ௦ ൅
ሺݔ െ ݄ሻሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ, then it follows that every agent will be indifferent when ݓ௦ ൌ
ሺ2 ൅ ݎሻݓ௡ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ݄. Suppose that ݓ௦ ൐ ሺ2 ൅ ݎሻݓ௡ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ݄, then there is an 
incentive for any unskilled workers to pursue education and work at level ݓ௦ᇱ ൌ ݓ௦ െ
߳ ൐ ሺ2 ൅ ݎሻݓ௡ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ݄ with ߳ ൐ 0 thus increasing the number of skilled workers 
and pulling down the level of skilled wages further. Now if ݓ௦ ൏ ሺ2 ൅ ݎሻݓ௡ ൅
ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ݄, then no more unskilled workers are attracted to pursue education and work 
as a skilled worker as they would be better off by being unskilled workers. Therefore, 
by contradiction, ݓ௦ ൌ ሺ2 ൅ ݎሻݓ௡ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ݄. ∎ 
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APPENDIX 1B 
RESULTS OF CHANGING TD AND STRENGTH OF INTERACTION 
(SETUP 1, 2, AND 3) 
 
The result of changing TD toward number of skilled workers (panel a) and Gini Index 
(panel b) under three Setup 1, Setup 2 and Setup 3: 
 
  
a. Skilled workers effects b. Gini Index effects 
 
The result of changing strength of interaction, ߠ toward number of skilled workers 
(panel a) and Gini Index (panel b) under three Setup 1, Setup 2 and Setup 3: 
 
  
a. Skilled workers effects b. Gini Index effects 
 49 
 
1 0 1
0 X 1
0 0 0
1 0 1
0 X 1
0 1 0
APPENDIX 1C 
PROSES OF MAKING A CHOICE BY AN AGENT (TD = 4): 
 
The Proses of Making A Choice by An Agent Under TD = 4: 
 
 
 
Agent X observes 3 neighbors (identified by number 
“1”) choose education and 5 not, so agent X 
determines that the neighbors choose not to invest in 
education. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agent X observes 4 neighbors choose education 
(identified by number “1”) and 4 not, so agent X 
determines that the neighbors invest / not invest in 
education with 50:50 chance. 
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1 0 1
1 X 1
0 1 0
 
Agent X observes 5 neighbors choose education 
(identified by number “1”) and 3 not, so agent X 
determines that the neighbors choose to invest in 
education. 
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CHAPTER 2 
TIME INCLUSION IN STRUCTURAL PATH ANALYSIS WITH A CASE STUDY 
OF THE 2008 INDONESIAN SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRIX  
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This paper seeks to estimate the use of time in Structural Path Analysis (SPA). In 
SPA the relationships between sectors in Social Accounting Framework (SAM) can be 
decomposed into three important influences: direct, total and global influence 
(Defourny and Thorbecke, 1984). Direct influence represents the size of influence 
from the origin sector to the destination caused by changes of its inputs through a 
specific path without considering the loops.  The total effect itself represents the total 
of all direct and indirect influences (through various loops) between the origin and 
destination sectors. The global influence is simply the output SAM multipliers or in a 
more precise term as marginal expenditure multipliers.  The influence can be thought 
as a subsequent influences arriving to a destination sector at various time starting with 
its direct influence. As noted by Defourny and Thorbecke in their paper’s footnote 
(1984, p.131): 
“… The various influences and effects occasioned by an exogenous 
injection are assumed to be instantaneous (including the multipliers). 
In reality, however, the transmission of economic influence from one 
pole to others takes time. In particular, it is reasonable to assume that 
the time required for the transmission of the influence along of a given 
elementary path would vary in function of the number and length of 
adjacent circuits. It is also reasonable to assume that the larger the 
number of poles contained in an elementary path or an adjacent circuit, 
the longer it will take for the influence to be transmitted from the pole 
of origin to the pole of destination. Consequently, the existence of 
relatively long and powerful circuits and correspondingly high path 
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multipliers would seem to imply that the transmission of influence 
would tend to be slower than in the converse case of low path 
multipliers and a high ratio of direct to total influence.” 
The time required for the transmission of those influences determines the proxy of 
the length of time needed for an economic shock to travel from its origin to its 
destination. The transmission of an economic influence depends on the production and 
distribution process time and may impose some time value related to the processes.  
SAM which was pioneered by Richard Stone is a square matrix depicting a 
‘snapshot’ of the economic structure of a region. The matrix contains several 
economic accounts. Each of which consists of one row and one column. The row of 
each account represents income from other accounts while the column represents the 
expenditure. The total income must be equal to the total expenditure which is 
represented by the equal sum of the total columns and the total rows.  Inherently, SAM 
can capture the structure of interactions between factors of production, institutions and 
production sectors.  
Thorbecke (1998) discuss how SAM with its regional and interregional framework 
can contribute significantly to the analysis of social welfare of different economic 
groups related to particular government policies or programs. One of its uses is to 
track how the transmission of the economic influences resulted from one economic 
shock. The overall economic influence from one sector to another is represented 
specifically by the SAM multiplier of those specific sectors. SAM multipliers are 
essentially the cells in the inverse matrix that result from the subtraction of the SAM 
coefficient matrix from the identity matrix after putting aside some exogenous 
accounts. Unlike the input-output (IO) model which has explicit exogenous accounts, 
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in SAM, there is at least one account that is treated as an exogenous account to make 
the SAM matrix invertible and thus can be treated as in the IO model.  
Pyatt and Round (1979) break the multipliers of SAM into three categories in three 
multiplicative terms which can then be rearranged into four additive components 
(Stone, 1985), namely the initial injection, the net contribution of the transfer 
multiplier effects, the net contribution of open-loop or cross multiplier effects and the 
net contribution of circular closed-loop effects. In term of regional SAM, these can be 
referred to as net intra-regional effect, net spillover effect and net inter-regional 
feedback. One of the applications of this decomposition is figuring multipliers of 
regional and world trade in Malaysia (Round, 1985). 
Though this decomposition can help policy makers to analyze the structure of one 
economic system, it cannot be used to examine the possible bottlenecks that could 
exist in the system. Furthermore, the previous decomposition cannot sufficiently 
explain the SAM multipliers in term of tractable influence transmission from the 
origin to the destination sector. These last two goals were accomplished by Defourny 
and Thorbecke (1984)’s SPA which decomposes the SAM multipliers (which is also 
called as the Global multipliers) into total influences consisting of direct and indirect 
influences. Direct influence is simply the influence that travels directly from the origin 
to the destination without going through any loops; total influence, on the other hand, 
is the amount of influence (including indirect effects) that is transmitted through all 
possible structures in the path connecting the origin to the destination pole. We are 
going to discuss in a more detail way about this method in the methodology section.  
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Many papers have been published exploring the usage of SPA in various countries 
to explain the mechanism by which a shock is transmitted to specific sectors of 
interest. Of the many examples that are related to Indonesia’s economic development, 
a few make use of SPA: Azis (2006, 2009) tracked the influence of oil price increase 
and oil subsidies in Indonesia; Azis (2000) analyze transition from financial crisis to 
social crisis, Sonis et al. (1997) explored the structure of the interregional economies 
in Indonesia, Thorbecke and Jung (1996) analyzed poverty alleviation in Indonesia, 
and Khan and Thorbecke (1989) analyzed technological choices in the agricultural 
sector in Indonesia. 
Employing the SPA method, we can locate bottlenecks that may arise in our 
system when one shock is transmitted via several other sectors before reaching its final 
destination sector. In practice, the bottlenecks are determined in context of the analysis 
and influenced by our understanding of the mechanism through which one specific 
shock should be transmitted. By employing SPA, one can estimate the total effect and 
its related path multiplier which reinforces the initial injection and determine paths 
where the multipliers are considerably small and possible obstructions in its paths. 
Though this is quite informative, people often ask how long the initial shock will take 
to reach its final destination. If we could somehow estimate the time required to 
transmit the shock, then we could come up with the probable timeframe within which 
a shock would reach a given sector. 
In this paper, we will introduce how actually time can be computed and apply that 
as an exercise to analyze the transmission of influences from two sectors namely 
agricultural-crop sector and chemical and metallic sector to various household groups 
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in Indonesia based on the 2008 Indonesian SAM. Of course during all the 
computation, we apply the main SAM assumptions such as a fixed-price multiplier 
and demand driven model, no substitution possibilities, the same structure of 
production across sectors as a result of employing some aggregation across different 
economic sectors. The papers will be divided into five sections. The first and second 
sections cover the introduction and the literature review.  The third section will discuss 
the methodology of SPA and how the inclusion of time can be done and the fourth 
section explains the results of our exercises. The last section provides the summary 
and discussion of this chapter. 
 
2.2. Literature Review 
SAM is a data system which inter-linkages factors of production, institutions and 
production sectors into one square matrix where the sum of the rows (receipts) equals 
the sum of the columns (expenditures). It adopts the single-entry system instead of the 
double-entry system that is common in accountings. The double-entry system is also 
known as the T-account where each transaction is recorded twice in asset as well as 
credit. By using the single-entry system, each transaction is only recorded once, either 
as income or expenditure. The equality of the row total to the column total ensures that 
every receipt must be spent entirely in the form of consumption (domestic 
commodities or import commodities) and savings (investment).  
Compared to IO model, SAM is more useful in modeling especially related to the 
analysis on income distribution and welfare of different income groups. While it is 
always possible to derive the IO from the SAM, the opposite conversion derivation 
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from the IO to the SAM is really difficult (Pyatt, 1999).  Pyatt and Thorbecke (1976) 
show how SAM as a consistent and complete data system can capture the 
interdependence between production activities, institutions and factors and can be used 
as a solid framework for policy analysis. From the standpoint of economic modeling, a 
model that is built upon a SAM matrix can guarantee against the possibility of no 
solution to the model since at least it has a solution in its base period (Pyatt, 1988). 
Whereas many other models have focused on economic welfare, industrial structures 
and economic resources, the SAM focuses more on income distribution and social 
welfare issues related to different economic groups within an economy. 
The relationship between factors (F), institutions (I) and production (P) can be 
summarized as in Figure 2.2.1. Of all the cells in the SAM matrix, only the gray cells 
have non-zero values, and these cells reflect the circular flows of economic activities. 
Inter-linkages between production sectors are captured in the sub-matrix P-P in the 
lower-right corner of the SAM matrix, which is essentially an IO matrix. This P-P sub-
matrix describes the inputs of each sector and its output to other sectors, including the 
value-added to the factors of production. These values-added to the factors of 
production are called ‘factor incomes’ and are represented by the sub-matrix F-P in the 
upper-right corner of the SAM matrix. These factor incomes are owned by households 
under the institution and are represented by the sub-matrix I-F in the mid-left of the 
SAM matrix. There are transfers between the households such as that between parents 
to children and between neighbors, and also between enterprises and households as 
well as between government and households. These transfers are captured in the sub-
matrix I-I in the center of the SAM matrix. Later on, these incomes are spent on goods 
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and services, whether domestic or imports. These activities are captured in the sub-
matrix P-I in the lower-center portion of the SAM matrix.  
Consumption by institutions creates demand for goods and services produced by 
the production sectors. This increase in demand is then transformed into an increase in 
the goods and services produced by the production sectors. Thus, such circular flows 
of the economic activities are represented clearly by the SAM matrix. 
 
Figure 2.2.1: SAM Matrix Structure 
 
This study uses the 2008 Indonesian SAM, which is comprised of 102 by 102 
cells. Since 1975, SAM statistics have been issued every five years by the Indonesian 
Statistical Body (Badan Pusat Statistik - BPS). Though, in the event of drastic changes 
in the economic structure due to a crisis or political instability, SAM can be published 
more frequently (i.e., SAM 1998 and SAM 2008). In this case, the 2008 SAM was 
Chapter 2 - Gunawan Wicaksono 
 
58 
produced as an estimation by Bank Indonesia and BPS before the official release of 
SAM 2010, which will be within the 2013/2014 period. Therefore, there are currently 
about 9 SAM matrices: 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2005 and 2008.  
Among all other SAMs, the 1998 SAM contains much less cells than the other SAMs 
and serves mainly as preliminary figures of the structural changes of the economy 
after the 1997 Indonesian financial crisis.  
The 2008 Indonesian SAM is a 105x105 cell matrix, consisting of 17 factors of 
production (16 labor factors and 1 non-labor factor), 8 household groups (including 
two groups of non-labor force and one unclear worker classification), 1 enterprise and 
1 government, 24 sectors of production, 48 commodities (24 domestic commodities 
and 24 import commodities), 2 trade and transport margins, 2 indirect taxes and 
subsidies, 1 capital account and 1 external account. Due to some zero rows and 
columns under the import commodities, there are only 102 non-zero rows (columns). 
A small version of the 2008 Indonesian SAM (13x13 cells) can be seen in Table 2.2.1. 
Based on the 2008 Indonesian SAM, the distribution of income between different 
households can be seen in Table 2.2.2. It is clear that the government transfer plays an 
important role in contributing to the farm workers’ income. As a comparison, the 
government transfer comprises almost one-fourth of the total farm workers’ income, 
whereas it comprises less than five percent of the total high entrepreneurs’ income. On 
the other side, the capital income of the high entrepreneur rural group is the largest, 
while that of the farm workers, as expected, is the lowest. 
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Table 2.2.1: 2008 Indonesian SAM (13 x 13 Matrix) 
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Table 2.2.2: Households’ Income and Government’s Transfer to Households 
 
2.3. Methodology 
SAM as a balanced matrix system has enormous advantages for analyzing the 
economic structure of one country. As discussed in depth by Pyatt (1999) how SAM 
can be used to explain the interdependence links between income distribution and 
production structures and hold key features of balance T-Account identity1 which is 
very important to the social accounting framework. Pyatt and Round (1979), Defourny 
and Thorbecke (1984), and Round (1985) contributed significantly to decomposing 
SAM multipliers in an effort to explain and track the transmission of the economic 
influences caused by an exogenous shock. Defourny and Thorbecke decomposed 
SAM multipliers into their elementary paths and related the multipliers with the SAM 
marginal expenditure propensities.  
                                                 
1 The T-Account represents every transaction in a double entry system: one in asset (debet) 
and the other in liabilities (credit).  
Transfer
Capital Labor Government
Farm workers 6.4% 59.6% 24.0% 173,145       3.3%
Farm enterpreneurs 18.1% 70.9% 7.1% 1,246,993    23.5%
Low Enterpreneurs rural 18.5% 67.5% 8.6% 1,162,701    21.9%
Not a labor force and unclear 
workers classification rural 21.3% 64.5% 8.1% 206,047       3.9%
High Enterpreneurs rural 30.2% 66.7% 0.7% 1,219,989    23.0%
Low Enterpreneurs urban 18.4% 72.9% 4.2% 965,459       18.2%
Not a labor force and unclear 
workers classification urban
21.6% 70.0% 4.7% 285,032       5.4%
High Enterpreneurs urban 23.2% 74.7% 0.4% 39,603         0.7%
Source: Author's Process on Indonesian SAM 2008
Total
% of 
Institution 
Income
% of Income Receipt
Factor IncomeHousehold Groups
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We employ Khan and Thorbecke (1988)’ suggestion of using the marginal 
expenditure instead of just the average expenditure since any additional expenditure 
might not follow the simple ratio of consumption and income. The average 
expenditure propensity (AEP) is the ratio of the expenditure from the consumption 
block divided by the total expenditure, ܣܧܲ ൌ ܥ ܻ⁄  with ܥ as the consumption and ܻ 
as the total expenditure. The expenditure approach assumes that any additional 
expenditure would be spent in the same proportion as the ratio of consumption to total 
expenditure. On the other hand, the marginal expenditure is defined as the ratio of any 
additional consumption to the total expenditure, ܯܧܲ ൌ ∆ܥ ∆ܻ⁄  with ∆ܥ is the 
additional consumption and ∆ܻ is the additional total expenditure. The relationship of 
marginal expenditure and the average expenditure is through the elasticity of 
consumption, ߝ ൌ ሺ∆ܥ ܥ⁄ ሻ ሺ∆ܻ ܻ⁄ ሻ⁄  such that the marginal expenditure is the product 
of the elasticity of consumption with the average expenditure	ܯܧܲ ൌ ߝ. ܣܧܲ. We use 
the data of the elasticity of consumption from Khan and Thorbecke (1988 p.194-195). 
As a common practice, generally people just assume that all influences will be 
transmitted within some period of time without elaborating it in more specific details. 
With regards to this, when we are seeking to estimate the range of time required to 
transmit almost all of the influence, we must examine the behavior of the paths that 
transmit the shock from one pole to the other with regard to time. Three important 
considerations should be taken into account. First, there will be a range of time within 
which the influence will be transmitted. This can range from a very short to a very 
long period of time. If the slower paths do not take very much time, and if loops 
dissipate very quickly, then the full influence requires a finite range of time. Under 
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this assumption, the influence of an economic shock on some group of people can be 
estimated within some range of time once we assume a cut-off value for the possible 
influence.  
Second, the time required to transmit a shock highly depends upon the capacity of 
the paths associated with that shock. For example, if the capacity associated with the 
production of an agricultural product determines the amount of time that is required to 
transmit the influence, then any increase in the demand for that agricultural product 
will take time to accomplish due to the delay in the agricultural sector’s ability to 
increase production. For the last consideration, we will use the term of the 
transformation process as a process through which inputs are transformed into outputs. 
In light of this, within the path between one pole to another, there are always three 
possibilities: (i) an instantaneous transformation, where the shock is transmitted 
instantly to the next path; (ii) a fixed-time transformation, where the transformation 
usually takes a definite amount of time, i.e., the time required from planting to 
harvesting; and (3) a flexible-time, which depends upon the available capacity and the 
transformation process.  
In addition to that, instantaneous transformations happen in paths from virtual 
sectors to the real sectors. For example, all paths from factor income to an institution 
would be considered as having a zero time length. In order to avoid problems with 
capacity constraints, we would assume that SAM assumptions work properly as there 
is no capacity constraint in our model. By imposing this assumption, we would free 
ourselves from having to deal with the possibilities of shortages due to the capacity 
constraints embedded in one or more sectors. Moreover, we would also assume that 
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during the time of influence transmission, prices will not change, and any 
increase/decrease of demands is translated fully to increase/decrease of goods and 
services production.   
Fixed and flexible-time transformations are not foreign concepts in production 
management. A fixed-time transformation requires a definite time, no matter the size 
of the input in that transformation. For example, a time required to produce rice from 
its seeds basically remains constant at around 3-4 months and largely depends on the 
harvesting season. For the sake simplicity, in the 2008 Indonesian SAM, we impose a 
fixed-time transformation for all agricultural outputs, tax payments from households to 
the government, and any activities related to government activities. 
On the other hand, a flexible-time transformation is determined by the size of its 
inputs. Assuming that a transformation process is constant, then the process time 
equals the quantity divided by the speed (defined as quantity per time). When we have 
a series of processes, i.e., one process followed by another, then the total time of that 
transformation will be the summation of the times required by each of the 
transformations. For example, if the time to produce 1,000 cars is 20 weeks, then as 
many as 50 cars are produced each week. If there is an increase in demand by 100 
cars, then the time required to meet that additional will be two weeks. 
In SPA, ‘total influence’ is defined as the product of all elementary path 
influences, which can consist of both direct and indirect effects. On the other hand, a 
global influence is a coefficient that results from inverting a SAM marginal 
expenditure matrix (or SAM coefficient matrix when using APC) with some 
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exogenous accounts. For the sake of clarity, we begin by elaborating the SPA concept 
and then examine the inclusion of time in the SPA. 
In the following explanation of the SPA and the theory that underpins the inclusion 
of time, we will begin by introducing the SPA. This explanation will follow the SPA 
developed by Defourny and Thorbecke, who define a ‘path’ as “a sequence of 
consecutive arcs” (1984, p. 119). A specific path ݌ such as ሺ݅, ݇, ݆ሻ consists of an arc 
from pole ݅ to pole ݇ as well as an arc from pole ݇ to pole ݆. This path is represented 
by a subscript with arrows as in ܺሺ௜→௝ሻ with the additional subscript	݌, ܺሺ௜→௝ሻ೛  or can 
be written as in ܺሺ௜,…,௝ሻ for transmission from pole i to pole j. For example, subscript 
ሺ݅, ݇, ݆ሻ indicates the specific path from pole ݅ to pole ݆ through pole ݇.  
 
Figure 2.3.1: The Path from Pole i to Pole j through Pole k Consisting Arc i to k 
and Arc k to j 
 
We define ௝ܽ௜ as a marginal expenditure from pole i to pole j. We use notation 
ܫሺ௜→௝ሻ೛஽  for  the direct influence from the pole ݅ to the pole ݆ along the path ݌. For 
example ܫሺ௜,௞,௝ሻ஽  and ܫሺ௜,௥,௦,௝ሻ஽  correspond to the direct influence from pole ݅ to pole ݆ 
within the specific paths ሺ݅, ݇, ݆ሻ and ሺ݅, ݎ, ݏ, ݆ሻ, respectively. The direct influence ܫሺ௜,..,௝ሻ஽  
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is defined as the change of income (production) of the pole ݆ induced by the change of 
income (production) of the pole ݅ with income (production) of every other pole 
remaining constant except for those in the path from pole ݅ to pole ݆ (Defourny and 
Thorbecke, p. 120). We also use notation ܫሺ௜→௝ሻ೛்  for the total influence from pole ݅ to 
pole ݆ within the specific path ݌. For example, ܫሺ௜,௞,௝ሻ்  and ܫሺ௜,௥,௦,௝ሻ்  correspond to the 
total influence from pole ݅ to pole ݆ within the specific paths ሺ݅, ݇, ݆ሻ and ሺ݅, ݎ, ݏ, ݆ሻ, 
respectively. The total influence ܫሺ௜,..,௝ሻ்  is defined as the influence transmitted from the 
pole ݅ to pole ݆ through the specific path ݌, including all of the indirect effects 
embedded in the structure within the specific path ݌ (Defourny and Thorbecke, p. 
120). The notation ܫ௝௜ீ  is used for the global influence from pole ݅ to pole ݆, which is 
essentially the sum of all possible total influences from pole ݅ to pole ݆. 
 
2.3.1. SPA Methodology 
 
In Figure 2.3.1.1, we have a very simple structure with only three poles and no 
loops. The marginal expenditure from pole 1 to pole 2 and from pole 2 to pole 3 are 
identified with ܽଶଵ and ܽଷଶ, respectively.  
 
Figure 2.3.1.1: The Path from Pole 1 to Pole 3 without any loops 
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A direct influence from pole 1 to pole 3, ܫሺଵ,ଶ,ଷሻ஽  can be written simply: 
ܫሺଵ,ଶ,ଷሻ஽ ൌ ܽଷଶܽଶଵ        (2.3.1.1) 
With a structure that has no loops, the value of the total influence is the same as that of 
the direct influence with a path multiplier that equals one.  
Now, let us extend Figure 2.3.1.1 by adding one more path and introduce a loop 
between pole 2 and pole 3. With the new structure as in Figure 2.3.1.2, we can 
compute the direct influence: 
ܫሺଵ,ଶ,ଷ,ସሻ஽ ൌ ܽସଷܽଷଶܽଶଵ        (2.3.1.2) 
The total influence will be: 
ܫሺଵ,ଶ,ଷ,ସሻ் ൌ ܽସଷሺ1 ൅ ܽଷଶܽଶଷ ൅ ܽଷଶଶ ܽଶଷଶ ൅ ܽଷଶଷ ܽଶଷଷ ൅ ⋯ሻܽଷଶܽଶଵ 
ൌ ܽସଷܽଷଶܽଶଵ ቀ ଵଵି௔యమ௔మయቁ      (2.3.1.3) 
The path multiplier is simply the ratio between the total influence and the direct 
influence. The second term in bracket in Equation (2.3.1.3) represents the path 
multiplier. It follows directly that the total influence is just the product of the direct 
influence and the path multiplier of the corresponding path. 
Figure 2.3.1.2: The Path from Pole 1 to Pole 4 with 1 loop  
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Now with a more complex structure that has three paths and two loops, as in 
Figure 2.3.1.3, we can compute the direct influence, the total influence, and the path 
multiplier all in the same way. The total influence of the path ሺ1 → 2 → 3 → 8ሻ 
denoted by ܫሺଵ,ଶ,ଷ,଼ሻ் , the path ሺ1 → 5 → 8ሻ denoted by ܫሺଵ,ହ,଼ሻ் , and the path ሺ1 → 6 →
8ሻ denoted by ܫሺଵ,଺,଼ሻ்  are as follows in Equation (2.3.1.4), Equation (2.3.1.5), and 
Equation (2.3.1.6), respectively: 
 
ܫሺଵ,ଶ,ଷ,଼ሻ் ൌ ܫሺଵ,ଶ,ଷ,଼ሻ஽ .ܯሺଵ,ଶ,ଷ,଼ሻ ൌ ଼ܽଷܽଷଶܽଶଵ ቀ ଵଵି௔యమ௔మయቁ   (2.3.1.4) 
ܫሺଵ,ହ,଼ሻ் ൌ ܫሺଵ,ହ,଼ሻ஽ ൌ ଼ܽହܽହଵ       (2.3.1.5) 
ܫሺଵ,଺,଼ሻ் ൌ ܫሺଵ,଺,଼ሻ஽ .ܯሺଵ,଺,଼ሻ ൌ ଼ܽ଺ܽ଺ଵ ቀ ଵଵି௔లళ௔ళలቁ    (2.3.1.6) 
 
The global influence is the summation of all possible total influences from pole 1 to 
pole 8, which in this example is the summation of the total influence of the path 
ሺ1 → 2 → 3 → 8ሻ, the path ሺ1 → 5 → 8ሻ and the path ሺ1 → 6 → 8ሻ: 
 
଼ܫ ଵீ ൌ ܫሺଵ,ଶ,ଷ,଼ሻ் ൅ ܫሺଵ,ହ,଼ሻ் ൅ ܫሺଵ,଺,଼ሻ்  
ൌ ଼ܽଷܽଷଶܽଶଵ ቀ ଵଵି௔యమ௔మయቁ ൅ ଼ܽହܽହଵ ൅ ଼ܽ଺ܽ଺ଵ ቀ
ଵ
ଵି௔లళ௔ళలቁ  (2.3.1.7)  
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Figure 2.3.1.3: Pole 1 to Pole 8 with 3 Elementary Paths and 2 Loops  
 
2.3.2. Time Inclusion in SPA Methodology 
 
Referring back to Figure 2.3.1.1, we now assume that, in addition to the structure, 
we have a fixed-time transformation between poles 1 and 2, ݐ௙ଶଵ, and a flexible-time 
transformation between poles 2 and 3, ݐ௩ଷଶ. Since in poles 2 to 3, we have a flexible-
time transformation, ݒଷଶ ൌ ܺଷଶ ݐ௩ଷଶ⁄  represents input amounts per unit time between 
pole 2 and 3, which is essentially the total input on the path from pole 2 to pole 3, ܺଷଶ, 
divided by the flexible-time required. The new structure can be seen in Figure 2.3.2.1. 
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The time required to reach pole 2 is computed as a fixed-time transformation 
regardless of the size of the influence transmitted from pole 1 to pole 2, which then 
equals the fixed-time transformation from pole 1 to pole 2, ݐ௙ଶଵ.  When we estimate 
the time required to reach pole 3, since pole 2 to pole 3 takes a flexible-time 
transformation, the time required for the influence to travel from pole 2 to pole 3 
depends on the size of the influence transmitted from pole 1 to pole 2. If we assume 
that the original influence is X, then the input to pole 2 will be ܽଶଵ. ܺ and the time 
required to process that will be: 
ݐ௩ଷଶ ൌ ௔మభ.௑	௩యమ           (2.3.2.1) 
 
Therefore, the total time required to reach pole 3 from pole 1 will be: 
 
ݐଵ→ଶ→ଷ ൌ ݐ௙ଶଵ ൅ ݐ௩ଷଶ ൌ ݐ௙ଶଵ ൅ ௔మభ.௑	௩యమ       (2.3.2.2) 
 
Figure 2.3.2.1: Direct Path from Pole 1 to Pole 3 without Any Loops  
 
 
In the same way, we can compute the time in the structure as in Figure 2.3.1.2 by 
adding the time elements to it. Suppose that after adding the time elements, it then 
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becomes as in the Figure 2.3.2.2. We can assume that there is a fixed-time 
transformation between pole 1 and pole 2 while all other arcs are inhibiting the 
flexible-time transformations. Let us assume also that there is an input which has the 
value of money	ܺ.  
 
Figure 2.3.2.2: Path from Pole 1 to Pole 4 with One Loop and Specified Time 
between the Poles Added 
 
 
Since the time added between pole 1 and pole 2 is a fixed-time transformation 
which does not depend on the input to pole 1, the time required from pole 1 to pole 2 
is fixed at ݐ௙ଶଵunits of time. The time required to reach pole 3 from pole 1 can be 
computed as follows: 
ݐሺଵ,ଶ,ଷሻ ൌ ݐ௙ଶଵ ൅ ௔మభ௑௩యమ ൅
௔యమ௔మభ௑
௩మయ ൅
௔యమ௔మభమ ௑
௩యమ ൅
௔యమమ ௔మభమ ௑
௩మయ ൅ ⋯   (2.3.2.3) 
The infinite series beginning with the second term of (2.3.2.3) can be simplified 
further so that Equation (2.3.2.3) becomes Equation (2.3.2.4): 
Chapter 2 - Gunawan Wicaksono 
 
71 
ݐሺଵ,ଶ,ଷሻ ൌ ݐ௙ଶଵ ൅ ቀ௔మభ௩యమ ൅
ଵ
௩మయቁ ቀ
ଵ
ଵି௔యమ௔మభቁܺ     (2.3.2.4) 
The last time piece is from the pole 3 to pole 4, which depends on the size of input to 
pole 3: 
ݐሺଷ,ସሻ ൌ ቀ ଵ௩రయቁ ቀ
ଵ
ଵି௔యమ௔మయቁ ܽଷଶܽଶଵܺ      (2.3.2.5) 
Combining Equations (2.3.2.4) and (2.3.2.5), we can compute the time required from 
pole 1 to pole 4 as the summation of the time required from pole 1 to pole 3 and from 
pole 3 to pole 4: 
ݐሺଵ,ଶ,ଷ,ସሻ ൌ ݐሺଵ,ଶ,ଷሻ ൅ ݐሺଷ,ସሻ 
ൌ ݐ௙ଶଵ ൅ ቀ௔మభ௩యమ ൅
ଵ
௩మయቁ ቀ
ଵ
ଵି௔యమ௔మభቁ ܺ ൅ ቀ
ଵ
௩రయቁ ቀ
ଵ
ଵି௔యమ௔మయቁ ܽଷଶܽଶଵܺ  (2.3.2.6) 
Next, we work with the structure (2.3.1.3) with time imposed in each of its arcs as 
can be shown in Figure 2.3.2.3.  This simply combines all of the structures we had 
before with additional required time attached. The time required for the first path 
ሺ1 → 2 → 3 → 8ሻ is the same as in Equation (2.3.2.6) and the required time for the 
second path ሺ1 → 5 → 8ሻ is the same as in Equation (2.3.2.2).  
The third path ሺ1 → 6 → 8ሻ with a loop at pole 6 can be computed the same way 
as before. Denoting the input to pole 1 as ܺ, we find that the size of the input to pole 6 
is ܽ଺ଵܺ. When the influence reaches pole 8, the size of this influence follows Equation 
(2.3.1.6). The time required for this path can be computed as follows: 
ݐሺଵ,଺ሻ ൌ ௔లభ௑௩లభ          (2.3.2.7) 
ݐሺ଺,଼ሻ ൌ ቀ௔ఴల௩ఴల ൅ ቂ
௔ళల
௩ళల ൅
௔లళ௔ళల
௩లళ ൅
௔ఴల௔లళ௔ళల
௩ఴల ቃ ൅ ቂ
௔లళ௔ళలమ
௩ళల ൅
௔లళమ ௔ళలమ
௩లళ ൅
௔ఴలమ ௔లళమ ௔ళలమ
௩ఴల ቃ ൅
ቂ௔లళమ ௔ళలయ௩ళల ൅
௔లళయ ௔ళలయ
௩లళ ൅
௔ఴలయ ௔లళయ ௔ళలయ
௩ఴల ቃ ൅ ⋯ቁܽ଺ଵܺ       (2.3.2.8) 
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Equation (2.3.2.8) can be simplified further into Equation (2.3.2.9): 
 
ݐሺ଺,଼ሻ ൌ ቀ௔ఴల௩ఴల ൅
௔ళల
௩ళల ൅
௔లళ
௩లళቁ ቀ
ଵ
ଵି௔లళ௔ళలቁ ܽ଺ଵܺ      (2.3.2.9) 
 
We can rewrite the total time required for path 1 – 2 – 3 – 8 as in Eq. (2.3.2.10), path 1 
– 5 – 8 as in Eq. (2.3.2.11). Combining Equation (2.3.2.8) and Equation (2.3.2.9), we 
have Equation (2.3.2.12) which represents the time required of the path 1 – 6 – 8: 
 
ݐሺଵ,ଶ,ଷ,଼ሻ ൌ ݐ௙ଶଵ ൅ ቀ௔మభ௩యమ ൅
ଵ
௩మయቁ ቀ
ଵ
ଵି௔యమ௔మభቁܺ ൅ ቀ
ଵ
௩ఴయቁ ቀ
ଵ
ଵି௔యమ௔మయቁ ܽଷଶܽଶଵܺ   (2.3.2.10) 
ݐሺଵ,ହ,଼ሻ ൌ ݐ௙ହଵ ൅ ௔ఴఱ.௑	௩ఴఱ          (2.3.2.11) 
ݐሺଵ,଺,଼ሻ ൌ ቂ1 ൅ ቀ௔ఴల௩ఴల ൅
௔ళల
௩ళల ൅
௔లళ
௩లళቁ ቀ
ଵ
ଵି௔లళ௔ళలቁቃ ܽ଺ଵܺ    (2.3.2.12) 
 
The time required from pole 1 to pole 8 is the maximum time from pole 1 to pole 8 
through every possible path: 
 
ݐ଼ଵ ൌ ݉ܽݔሼݐଵ→ଶ→ଷ→଼, ݐଵ→ହ→଼, ݐଵ→଺→଼ሽ  
ൌ ݉ܽݔ ቄݐ௙ଶଵ ൅ ቀ௔మభ௩యమ ൅
ଵ
௩మయቁ ቀ
ଵ
ଵି௔యమ௔మభቁܺ ൅ ቀ
ଵ
௩ఴయቁ ቀ
ଵ
ଵି௔యమ௔మయቁ ܽଷଶܽଶଵܺ, ݐ௙ହଵ ൅
௔ఴఱ.௑	
௩ఴఱ ,
ቂ1 ൅ ቀ௔ఴల௩ఴల ൅
௔ళల
௩ళల ൅
௔లళ
௩లళቁ ቀ
ଵ
ଵି௔లళ௔ళలቁቃ ܽ଺ଵܺቅ     (2.3.2.13) 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 - Gunawan Wicaksono 
 
73 
Figure 2.3.2.3:  Pole 1 to Pole 8 with 2 Possible Direct Paths 
 
After the first several loops, however, the effects generally become very small. The 
following two imaginary examples will compare and compute the time required from 
the origin pole to the destination pole. 
 
2.3.3. An Example of Fixed-time and Flexible-time Transformation 
Suppose we have the following structure, as shown in Figure 2.3.3.1, with two 
main paths from pole 1 to pole 5 and there is a shock from pole 1 of as much as $1B. 
The time notation follows the same notation as in the previous section with subscript ݂ 
indicating the fixed-time transformation, subscript ݒ indicating the flexible-time 
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transformation, and ݒ௝௜ indicating the speed of the transformation. In each arc, the 
fixed-time transformation and the speed of transformation associated with the flexible-
time transformation are posted.  
 
Figure 2.3.3.1:  Pole 1 to Pole 5 with 2 Possible Direct Paths with 1 Loop 
 
We will examine the size of the influences transmitted along each path and compute 
those influences. Table 2.3.3.2 shows that the influence becomes smaller as the it is 
transmitted through more loops. For example, a shock moving from pole 1 to pole 5 
through poles 2 and 3 results in influence of $35M (since ሺ0.25ሻሺ0.2ሻሺ0.7ሻሺ1ሻ ൌ
0.035). Continuing in that way, by the third loop, the change in the influence 
transmitted at the third loop is only 0.02% of the original influence of $1B or just 
around $0.2M. 
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Table 2.3.3.2:  Pole 1 to Pole 5 Influence Size through Path 1 – 2 – 3 – 5 after 1st, 
2nd, and 3rd Pass on the Loops and Direct Influence through Path 1 – 4 – 5  
 
 
The first approach uses a fixed-time transformation where time does not depend on 
inputs. In this first approach, when the influence travels n times on the same path, then 
the time required is simply the product of n and the amount time required for a single 
pass along that path. The second approach differs from the first in that time depends 
on the inputs. When the input to one specific path is smaller, then the time required to 
transmit the influence will be shorter too. 
A fixed-time transformation requires much more time to transmit the influence 
than a flexible-time transformation; a flexible-time transformation requires time in line 
with the inputs which reduces significantly once the first pass has been completed. 
The fixed-time transformation of path 1 → 2 → 3 → 5 is ݐଶଵ ൅ ݐଷଶ ൅ ݐହଷ ൌ 2 ൅ 4 ൅
1 ൌ 7	weeks. With one loop and fixed-time transformation ሺ1 → 2 → 3 → 2 → 3 →
5ሻ, the computation is ݐଶଵ ൅ ݐଷଶ ൅ ݐଶଷ ൅ ݐଶଷ ൅ ݐହଷ ൌ 2 ൅ 4 ൅ 2 ൅ 4 ൅ 1 ൌ 13 weeks.  
If we assume flexible-time, then the path ሺ1 → 2 → 3 → 5ሻ is computed as ଵ௩మభ ൅
௔మభ
௩యమ ൅
௔మభ௔యమ
௩ఱయ ൌ 2.1075 weeks. With one loop and the fixed-time transformation ሺ1 → 2 →
3 → 2 → 3 → 5ሻ, the time required for this path is computed as ଵ௩మభ ൅
௔మభ
௩యమ ൅
௔మభ௔యమ
௩మయ ൅
No. Paths Influence (%)
1 1 ‐ 2 ‐ 3 ‐ 5 3.50%
2 1 ‐ 2 ‐ 3 ‐ 2 ‐ 3 ‐ 5 0.63%
3 1 ‐ 2 ‐ 3 ‐ 2 ‐ 3 ‐ 2 ‐ 3 ‐ 5 0.11%
4 1 ‐ 2 ‐ 3 ‐ 2 ‐ 3 ‐ 2 ‐ 3 ‐ 2 ‐ 3 ‐ 5 0.02%
5 1 ‐ 4 ‐ 5 10.50%
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௔మభ௔యమ௔మయ
௩యమ ൅
ሺ௔యమሻమ௔మయ௔మభ
௩ఱయ ൌ 2.2936 weeks. The rest can be seen in Table (2.3.3.2). After 
the first three loops, the additional time in a flexible-time transformation decreases 
significantly. 
Table 2.3.3.3:  Pole 1 to Pole 5 under Fixed- and Flexible-Time Transformations 
  
 
2.3.4. Estimating the Minimum and Maximum Time 
As shown in the example above, under the fixed-time transformation, time from 
one pole to another can simply be a sum; however, since we know that the influence 
size reduces significantly after the first few loops, we can establish some cut-off time 
for the loops in the fixed-time transformation under which the influence is no longer 
significant. That is what we will find in this second example. The time allocation for 
each arc in our previous example can be put into the form of a two-dimensional matrix 
where the each entry aij refers to marginal expenditure propensity from sector-i to 
sector-j as can be seen in the following matrix in Table 2.3.4.1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under Under
No. Paths (pole‐i  ‐ pole‐j ) Fixed‐time Flexible‐time
1 1 ‐ 2 ‐ 3 ‐ 5 7 2.1075
2 1 ‐ 2 ‐ 3 ‐ 2 ‐ 3 ‐ 5 13 2.2936
3 1 ‐ 2 ‐ 3 ‐ 2 ‐ 3 ‐ 2 ‐ 3 ‐ 5 19 2.3214
4 1 ‐ 2 ‐ 3 ‐ 2 ‐ 3 ‐ 2 ‐ 3 ‐ 2 ‐ 3 ‐ 5 25 2.3277
5 1 ‐ 4 ‐ 5 8 5.9
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Table 2.3.4.1:  Marginal Expenditure Matrix 
 
 
In the above matrix, the point (sector 2, sector 1) represents the marginal expenditure 
from sector 1 to sector 2, which in this case has the value of 0.25; likewise, the point 
(sector 3, sector 2) represents the marginal expenditure from sector 2 to sector 3, 
which in this case has the value of 0.2. 
Using the same procedure, we can embed time in the form of a matrix as well for 
both the fixed-time transformation and the flexible-time transformation. The following 
matrix in Table 2.3.4.2 represents the fixed-time transformation matrix. For example, 
point (sector 2, sector 1) represents a fixed-time transformation from sector 1 to sector 
2, and point (sector 2, sector 2) represents a fixed-time transformation from sector 2 to 
sector 3, which in this case are 2 and 4 weeks, respectively.  
 
Table 2.3.4.2:  Fixed-Time Transformation Matrix  
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To compute the flexible time transformation matrix, we must assign each non-zero 
cell the value of the rate of change by dividing it by the amount of time required to 
accomplish the job, ݒ௝௜ ൌ 1 ݐ௝௜⁄  for any poles i to poles j. Table 2.3.4.3 represents the 
flexible-time transformation matrix constructed for our example. For example, point 
(sector 2, sector 1) represents a flexible-time transformation from sector 1 to sector 2, 
point (sector 2, sector 2) represents a flexible-time transformation from sector 2 to 
sector 3, which in this case are 0.5 and 0.25 units per week, respectively. 
 
Table 2.3.4.3:  Flexible-Time Transformation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
By applying the SPA method, we can compute the direct effects, path multipliers, total 
effects, and global effects. The results are shown in Table 2.3.4.4: 
 
Table 2.3.4.4:  SPA Results of the Example 
 
 
Direct Path Total Global
Paths Influence Multiplier Influence Influence
1, 2, 3, 5 0.035 1.220 0.043 0.078
1, 4, 5 0.035 1.000 0.035 0.078
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We can then think of the path multiplier p as a convergent infinite series with a 
multiplicative factor r, which has a value of less than one by the simple formula: 
݉ ൌ ሺ௣ିଵሻ௣          (2.3.4.1) 
For example, a path multiplier of 0.035 can be restated as a simple infinite convergent 
series with a multiplicative factor of 0.18. With less than 3 loops, the summation of 
the series reaches more than 95% of its total effect.  
 
Table 2.3.4.5:  The Sum Series of the Path Multiplier (1, 2, 3, 5) 
 
 
 
Table 2.3.4.5 shows that when the influence passes the same loop for the second 
time, the total influence of that route increases to more than 95% of the total influence. 
When the consumption block’s path multipliers are examined, more than 90% are 
between 1.0 and 2.2, and more than 95% are between 1.2 and 2.4. Accordingly, 
around 80% of the path multipliers lie between 1.4 and 2.2. This implies that when 
running the whole route two or three times, the influence equals more than 75% of the 
total influence. Running the whole path four times guarantees more than 90% of the 
total influences. Therefore, we can use the path multiplier to compute the maximum 
time for flexible-time transformation. Figure 2.3.4.1 shows the distribution of the path 
multipliers from the consumption block in SAM 2008, which fall well within the 
range of 1.2 to 3.2. 
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Figure 2.3.4.1: Distribution of Path Multipliers of the Consumption Block of 
SAM 2008  
 
 
 
The maximum time for the fixed-time transformation in this example is computed 
with the loops were passed through for just few times. For flexible-time 
transformations, we can create a range within which the maximum time will follow 
the size of the influence when it reaches at least 95% of the total influence. In the 
same way, determining the maximum time as the direct flexible-time multiplied by the 
number of passes through that path, which in this case is two times, the flexible time 
equals 4.2 weeks. The result of the computation is shown in Figure 2.3.4.1. Therefore, 
the maximum time from pole 1 to pole 5 ranges from 8 (without loops) to 14 weeks 
(with loops) under the fixed-time transformation and from 2.1 (without loops) to 5.9 
weeks (with loops) under the flexible-time transformation. 
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Table 2.3.4.6: Minimum and Maximum Time of the Example 
 
 
 
The question of how many passes are required for one specific path to reach 95% 
of its total influence is related to the path multiplier of that specific path. Based on the 
SAM 2008, path multipliers between 1 and 3.2 will require periods of between 1 to 8 
passes. This can be seen in Figure 2.3.4.2, which shows how the increase of path 
multipliers requires more periods in order to reach significantly higher than 95% of the 
total influences. The number in brackets indicates the number of loops that must be 
passed in addition to the direct path. For example, ݌ ൌ 1.2	ሺ1ሻ indicates that the path 
multiplier value of 1.2 requires at least one pass through the loop in order to reach 
more than 95% of its total influence. In general, for the Indonesian SAM 2008, one to 
five passes through the loops are needed in order to reach at least 95% of the total 
influences. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fixed Flexible Fixed Flexible
Paths Time Time Time Time
1, 2, 3, 5 7.0              2.108         14.0          4.215      
1, 4, 5 8.0              5.900         8.0            5.900      
Max Time for 95% 
Total Influence
Time Required for 
Direct Influence
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Figure 2.3.4.2: Path Multipliers and Periods to Required Reach More than 95% 
of Total Influences 
 
 
2.3.5. Imposing Time Value of Money 
Let the interest rate in the economy in this example be 10% annually. If all 
computations use weeks, then we can compute the decline of value caused by this 
shock transmission. Assuming that interest is compounded on a weekly basis, we can 
compute the interest on a weekly basis by using this simple formula: 
݅ ൌ ݁௥.௧ െ 1 ൌ ݁଴.ଵ.௧ െ 1       (2.3.5.1) 
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Interest rate, i, here is the yearly effective interest rate, and r is the annual interest 
rate with t as its compounding period. Taking the maximum (95% influence) fixed-
time transformation, we can employ ݐ ൌ 14/52 and ݐ ൌ 2.57/52 for the maximum 
flexible time. The computed discount rates equal 2.73% and 0.50% for fixed- and 
flexible-time, respectively. Therefore, under a fixed-time transformation, when there is 
a shock of $1B in sector 1, it will arrive at sector 5 in the amount of as much as 
$0.043B through poles 1 – 2 – 3 – 5 with the present-value of $0.0415B dollars in 
roughly 14 weeks, delivering more than 95% of its full influences. 
 
2.3.6. Agricultural and Manufacturing Sectors in Indonesian Economy 
The agricultural sector plays a very important role in contributing to the 
Indonesian economic development. Since the 1960s, Indonesia has experienced vast 
economic growth in all economic sectors. According to Thorbecke and Pluijm (1993),2 
agriculture plays four important roles in Indonesian economic development. First, 
agriculture provides food and raw materials for sectors that rely on it; thus, it 
contributes to the GDP growth. Second, agriculture provides “productive employment 
opportunities” and income for people who live in rural areas. Third, it reduces 
malnutrition and provides structures of production that enable small farmers and 
landless agricultural workers to share the benefits of agricultural growth. Lastly, the 
agricultural sector can help boost the exports which in turn would improve the 
country’s balance of payment. 
                                                 
2 Thorbecke, Erik and Theodore van der Pluijm use SAM from various years to examine 
Indonesian rural socio-economic development.  
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The phase of industrialization in Indonesia was driven by agricultural-based 
industries, which were built to exploit the low-cost of labor and the potential supply of 
domestic agricultural products. As can be seen in Table 2.3.6.1, during the nation’s 
four decades of economic development, the manufacturing sector has grown its share 
of the economy more rapidly than other sectors. In contrast, the mining sector has 
reduced its share drastically. The development of the manufacturing sector has been 
accompanied by the development of the financial and service sectors too, which 
commonly happens in industrialized countries throughout the world. 
 
Table 2.3.6.1: Distribution of GDP from the 1960s to 2000s 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation on BPS’s National Account Statistics 
The oil industry boom from the early 1970s to the mid 1980s also contributed to 
the vast growth of the Indonesian economy. The relatively low price of domestic oil 
and gas boosted the demand and increased the consumption of goods and services, 
which in turn fed the growth of the manufacturing industry. The low price of oil and 
gas were been maintained by the government to aid industrial growth and stable socio-
political conditions, but this came at at the cost of a continual increase in the burden of 
subsidies. Several efforts to reduce or eliminate such subsidies always exacerbated the 
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restlessness of the people as general price increases followed almost instantly. Azis 
(2009) showed that many important sectors were affected and eventually reduced their 
employment, which brought grater hardship to the low-income group. 
Public sector growth also contributed to higher economic growth. According to 
Sundrum (1986), higher public sector growth was more likely caused by higher 
payments (salaries) than by higher productivity. Improvements in labor productivity 
were also driven by the movement of laborers from low-productivity jobs to higher-
productivity ones. In line with it, the significant build-up of capital investment also 
enhanced the technology used in raw material processing in Indonesia. This in turn led 
also to higher labor productivity growth. In general, there have been some structural 
changes in the Indonesian economy that can be seen from the composition of 
Indonesia’s GDP.  The manufacturing and mining sectors’ shares of the GDP 
continued to increase along with the financial and service sectors especially since 
1980s, thereby changing the structure of the Indonesian economy.3 
Though Indonesian economic growth increased people’s general standard of 
living, it also created another social problem – namely, an increase in inequality 
throughout the country. During the period from 1975 to 1985, the relative distribution 
of the income among different households has not improved much (Fig. 2.3.6.1). Only 
non-poor urban household experienced a significant increase of income from just 
around 15% to more than 25%, while the rest remained largely the same. The 
improvement started to take effect in the early 1990s when the amount of non-poor 
                                                 
3 SAM and supporting data in this paper are taken from various months of Badan Pusat 
Statistik (BPS) and Statistik Ekonomi Keuangan Indonesia, Bank Indonesia. 
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rural households dropped drastically from more than 45% to only slightly above 30%. 
At the same time, the amount of the poor households increased from below 15% to 
well above 20%. 
As explored by Azis (1997), Booth (2000), Mishra (2009) Resosudarmo and 
Vidyatama (2006), and D’Silva and Bysouth (1992), the income inequality has 
worsened during the 1990s even before the financial crisis. The recent financial crisis 
in 1997-1998 slightly reduced the income inequality because many people lost their 
wealth. Since 2005, the economic growth was rebound again and had relatively grew 
faster though still with the worsening of income inequality as indicated by the the 
worsening of the Gini coefficients again. Several efforts have been made by the 
government to reduce this inequality introducing a tax hike for high-income people, a 
cross-subsidy of oil and gas prices, direct transfers to the poor, and some social 
programs for education and health. Though these programs are somewhat effective, 
they are simply not effective enough due to the lack of funds and the presence of 
rampant corruption in the execution of these programs. 
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Figure 2.3.6.1: Distribution of Income Based on SAM 1975 - 2008  
 
 
 
2.4. Results of SPA with Time: Indonesian Case 
Two cases will be discussed: (1) agricultural crop sectors, and (2) the effects of 
oil-intensive sectors on the population. The former relates to food crops sector, and the 
latter is related to the chemical and metallic sectors. We will analyze the paths by 
which the influence (direct and total) travels to different households. In addition, we 
will assume an interest rate of 8.5% based on the average of interest rate in 2008.4 We 
will use this rate to compute the present value of the various influences involved in our 
case an in our computation process.5 
                                                 
4 The average is computed according to the 12-month interest rate of demand deposit in 2008 
based on Bank Indonesia data. 
5 We developed the software program used for the inclusion of time in the SPA using Matlab 
program that was based on the program developed by John Zollweg for the purpose of the 
Cornell Project about Cornell’s impact on the community. 
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2.4.1. Transmission of Influence from Agriculture Crop Sector to Farm Workers 
For the purpose of illustration, we will take only the direct effects that are greater 
than 0.0001 and the paths that have the longest direct time paths. These paths are 
included is to illustrate the time required to reach the destination. 
The following description is based on Figure 2.4.1.1. In that figure, we use the 
following abbreviations: AgWRu for agricultural workers in rural area who receive 
wages, AgWUr for agricultural workers in urban areas who receive wages, AgNWRu 
for agricultural workers in rural areas who receive no wages, AgNWUr for agricultural 
workers in urban areas are who receive no wages, CAP for factor of capital, FarmEn 
for farm entrepreneur households, Ent for enterprises, Gov for government, DCAgFish 
for domestic commodities of agricultural fishery, and SAgFish for the agricultural 
fishery sector. A complete list of all abbreviations used in all graphs and tables can be 
found in Appendix (A). All factor payments from the agricultural crop sector 
(SAgCrop) take 16 weeks because planting and harvesting require 4 months on 
average.  Payment from factors to institutions happens instantaneously, which means 
that no time is required to transmit institution income.  As we can see, the shortest 
time is 16 weeks and the longest is 76. Much of the influence is transmitted directly 
from SAgCrop to various factors before arriving at the farm labor households (FarmL) 
(Fig. 2.4.1.1). Using the interest rate of 8.5%, the present value of every rupiah 
received by the farm worker household is between 0.877 and 0.987 thousand rupiah. 
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Figure 2.4.1.1:  Paths from Agriculture Crop Sector to Farm Workers 
 
 
 
Table 2.4.1.1:  SPA and Time Related to Transmission of Influences from 
Agricultural Crop Sector to Farm Workers 
 
 
When we use all the direct paths with the minimum of 0.0001 influence size, the 
cumulative total influence is only 57% of the global influence. This means that many 
of the influences travel through various loops and various other paths whose direct 
SAgCrop
AgWRu
AgWUr
AgNWRu
AgNWUr
CAP
FarmLFarmEn
Ent
Gov
DCAgFish SAgFish
0.113
0.197
0.023
0.581
0.562
0.023
0.055
0.189
0.045
0.644 0.339
0.034
0.011
0.614
0.050
0.751 0.108
0.197
16 wk
16 wk
16 wk
16 wk
16 wk
4 wk
48 wk
12 wk
1 b/wk 0.5 b/wk
12 wk
0.002
4 wk
%tage
Paths Direct Total Path mult Fixed Mixed Fixed Mixed of Global
SAgCrop ‐ AgWRu ‐ FarmL 0.0223 0.0297 1.3353 16.00 16.00 48.00 48.00 25.1%
SAgCrop ‐ AgWUr ‐ FarmL 0.0135 0.0177 1.3125 16.00 16.00 48.00 48.00 14.9%
SAgCrop ‐ AgNWRu ‐ FarmL 0.0128 0.0174 1.3582 16.00 16.00 48.00 48.00 14.7%
SAgCrop ‐ AgNWUr ‐ FarmL 0.0104 0.0137 1.3136 16.00 16.00 48.00 48.00 11.6%
SAgCrop ‐ AgNWUr ‐ FarmEn ‐ Gov ‐ FarmL 0.0000 0.0000 1.8496 32.00 32.00 128.00 128.00 0.0%
SAgCrop ‐ CAP ‐ Ent ‐ Gov ‐ FarmL 0.0003 0.0007 2.1069 76.00 76.00 380.00 380.00 0.6%
SAgCrop ‐ DCAgLivSt ‐ SAgLivSt ‐ AgNWRu ‐ FarmL 0.0002 0.0002 1.4799 20.00 19.82 60.00 59.46 0.2%
SAgCrop ‐ AgNWRu ‐ FarmEn ‐ DCTextLeath ‐ 
STextLeath ‐ PrWRu ‐ FarmL 0.0000 0.0000 2.0138 23.00 22.74 115.00 113.69 0.0%
Global Multiplier 0.1183
Effects Direct Time Max Time
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influences are less than 0.0001.6  Table 2.4.1.1 shows that the longest time path has a 
total influence of only 0.001 or just 0.1% of the global influence but takes between 80 
and 400 weeks to fully transmit that influence. Every rupiah received by farm labor 
has the present value of only between 0.52 and 0.88 rupiah. These rupiah values 
contain more than 95% of the total influence, which is generally achieved after a few 
loops. 
If we are just interested in direct influences, as shown in Figure 2.4.1.2, farm labor 
receives around 50% of the global effect within just 16 weeks, while the remaining 7% 
is spread over a period of 60 weeks. Meanwhile, if we also include the loops, then the 
cumulative total influence reaches around 78% of the global effect, and 68% of the 
global influence is achieved in less than a 50-week period with the remaining 10% 
spread out over a period of 350 weeks. The graph shows all significant direct and total 
influences that travel from the agricultural crop sector to farm workers. This suggests 
the range of time within which the influences will reach certain percentages of global 
influence. Within 20 weeks of the initial shock, the direct influence will increase to 
around 50% of the global influence; however, it will takes another 30 weeks for the 
total influence to reach 95% of its total influence for some specific paths. Table 
2.4.1.2 provides a summary of time and influence. Here, we define the mixed-time 
transformation as the combination o fixed- and flexible-time transformation. 
Interestingly, the minimum and maximum time under both fixed- and mixed-time 
transformation are relatively not different. 
                                                 
6 There are actually many more direct impacts than are presented here; the direct impacts are greater 
than 0.0001, but we only present those few paths that are significant in term of size and time. 
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Figure 2.4.1.2:  Required Time for Direct and Total Influences to Travel from 
Agricultural Crop Sector to Farm Workers 
 
 
 
Table 2.4.1.2:  Time Summary of Agricultural Crop to Farm Workers 
 
 
According to Table 2.4.1.1, in the transmission of influences, the government may 
serve as a possible bottleneck due to the rigid structure of the government budget, 
which is either based on a yearly or quarterly basis.  
Total of significant Impact
direct paths (> 0.00001) min average max % Global
Fixed time (w/o loops) 8.0            28.7          80.0          56.9%
Fixed time (incl. loops) 32.0          120.4       560.0       78.2%
Mixed time (w/o loops) 7.7            28.5          80.0          56.9%
Mixed time (incl. loops) 30.8          119.3       556.5       78.2%
Time (weeks)
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2.4.2. Transmission of Influence from Agricultural Crop Sector to Various 
Households 
When we plotted all of the times required for the initial direct influences to be 
transmitted from the agricultural crop sector to the households, we found that farm 
entrepreneurs and farm labor were the two households that received the highest direct 
influences under certain periods of time (Fig. 2.4.2.1). Here, we use the following 
abbreviations: FarmL for farm labor, FarmEn for farm entrepreneur, HiEnUr for high-
urban entrepreneur, HiEnRu for high-rural entrepreneur, LoEnUr for low-urban 
entrepreneur and LoEnRu for low-rural entrepreneur. These abbreviations will be used 
in all of the subsequent graphs and tables. According to our findings, all households 
receive most of their direct influences within 30 weeks from the initial shock with the 
lowest influences (about 25%) being received by the high-urban entrepreneurs and the 
highest influences (about 64%) being received by farm entrepreneurs. 
However, using threshold of 95% of the total influence, we estimate that much of 
the indirect influences are transmitted from around 60 to 150 weeks (Fig. 2.4.2.2). 
Again, we see that farm entrepreneurs receive the most benefit of the influences in the 
shortest period of time, i.e., within a 60-week period. In contrast, all of the urban 
entrepreneur households receive the smallest fraction of the total influences as well as 
the longest period of time, i.e., around 150 weeks. The two graphs reveal almost the 
same patterns regarding which households are most affected within a certain time 
period. The influences in both graphs dramatically increase after a certain period of 
time (20-60 weeks). Here, we graph all the possible timelines through all possible 
paths from agricultural sector to households. The dramatic increase of the impacts 
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reveals that in almost all of the paths, the transmission of influences accelerates 
between 20 and 60 weeks, after which it begins to decelerate again. 
Considering the time required to transmit the influences, by defining the mixed-
time transformation as the combination of fixed- and flexible-time transformation, 
Tables 2.4.2.1 and 2.4.2.2 show the results under fixed- and flexible-time 
transformation, respectively. The fixed-time approach shows a slightly higher 
minimum, average and maximum time than the mixed-time approach. In general, up to 
65% of the influences are transmitted within just 20 weeks of the initial shock, while 
the rest of the influences (i.e., up to at least 95% of the total influences) require up to 
560 weeks. 
 
Figure 2.4.2.1: Minimum Time Required for Influences to Travel from 
Agricultural Crop Sector to Households under Mixed-Time Transformation 
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Figure 2.4.2.2: Maximum Time Required for Influences to Travel from 
Agricultural Crop Sector to Households under Mixed-Time Transformation 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4.2.1: Time Required for Influences to Travel from Agricultural Crop 
Sector to Households under Fixed-Time Transformation 
 
 
 
 
Influence Influence Global
Origin ‐ Destination Min Average Max % Global Min Average Max % Global Impact
SAgCrop ‐ FarmL 7.7            28.5          80.0          56.9% 30.8          119.3       556.5       78.2% 0.1183    
SAgCrop ‐ FarmEn 7.7            17.1          23.0          63.8% 23.8          71.3          136.4       92.0% 0.6877    
SAgCrop ‐ LoEnRu 7.7            17.3          23.0          38.3% 23.8          71.8          136.4       57.9% 0.1836    
SAgCrop ‐ HiEnRu 7.7            18.2          23.0          53.6% 23.8          75.9          136.4       78.1% 0.2903    
SAgCrop ‐ LoEnUr 7.7            14.3          23.0          16.1% 23.8          61.3          135.5       28.4% 0.1835    
SAgCrop ‐ HiEnUr 7.7            14.5          23.0          18.4% 23.8          63.6          136.0       32.0% 0.2573    
Mixed time direct Mixed time with loops
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Table 2.4.2.2: Time Required for Influences to Travel from Agricultural Crop 
Sector to Households under Mixed-Time Transformation 
 
 
Regarding the time value of money, for every 1 rupiah that should be received by 
households, only a fraction is received due to the loss of its value with regards to the 
time value of money. Under the mixed-time approach7 with an annually compounded 
interest rate of 8.5%, for every dollar of the direct influence that should be received by 
farm labor households, they only receive 0.877-0.987 rupiah within 8 to 80 weeks 
from the initial shock. This means that when there is an injection of 1 million rupiah in 
the agricultural crop sector, we know that the farm labor households will receive a 
global influence of 118.3 thousand rupiah; however, since we are using 95% of total 
influence and excluding all paths whose direct influence is less than 0.0001, the 
cumulative total influence is as much as 87.9 thousand rupiah.  Employing the mixed-
time approach, at the time when this 87.9 thousand rupiah is received by farm worker 
households, it only has the present value of 35.2-86.8 thousand rupiah within 8 to 560 
weeks from the initial shock. If we consider only direct influence, the present value 
will be between 77.1 and 86.8 thousand rupiah. In other words, there is a loss of 
                                                 
7 Mixed-time transformation uses both fixed and flexible time in one specific path. 
Influence Influence Global
Origin ‐ Destination Min Average Max % Global Min Average Max % Global Impact
SChemMet ‐ FarmL 4.0            22.5          79.8          30.2% 12.0          107.4       478.9       50.1% 0.0434    
SChemMet ‐ FarmEn 4.0            9.0            11.9          23.5% 12.0          41.6          65.9          39.6% 0.1922    
SChemMet ‐ LoEnRu 4.0            9.4            11.9          36.1% 12.0          38.2          64.0          54.5% 0.1195    
SChemMet ‐ HiEnRu 4.0            9.6            11.0          28.5% 12.0          39.3          64.4          43.6% 0.1276    
SChemMet ‐ LoEnUr 4.0            9.0            11.0          38.2% 12.0          37.8          64.0          58.2% 0.1870    
SChemMet ‐ HiEnUr 4.0            9.0            11.0          30.0% 12.0          36.3          63.5          48.3% 0.2151    
Mixed time direct Mixed time with loops
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income between 1.3% and 60.0% of the value that the farm workers should have 
received.  
How can we relate the SPA effects to its time completion using the 95% level of 
influence thresholds? Table 2.4.2.3 shows the effects transmitted from agricultural 
crops to (i) farm workers and (ii) farm entrepreneurs. Farm workers receive their 
income mainly through agricultural factors of production – both rural and urban as 
well as wage and non-wage labor. With path multipliers around 1.3, around four 
passes through the loops are needed in order to reach at least 95% of their total 
influence. Direct influences from the agricultural sector through agricultural factors 
require 16 weeks, whereas 95% of the total influences require around 48 weeks to 
accomplish.  
Table 2.4.2.3: SPA Results with Mixed-Time Direct and Maximum Mixed-Time 
from Agricultural Sector to Households 
 
a. Agricultural Sector to Farm Labor 
 
 
b. Agricultural Sector to Farm Entrepreneur  
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The influences from the agricultural sector are higher on farm entrepreneurs than 
on farm workers. In almost all paths, any increase in production from agricultural 
sectors would benefits the farm entrepreneurs more than it benefits farm labor. This is 
in line with D’Silva and Bysouth (1992, p. 16), who argued that policies to boost 
agricultural production may increase income inequality. These total influences will 
reach their destinations (i.e., either farm workers or farm entrepreneurs) within 16 to 
48 weeks.  
 
2.4.3. Transmission of Influence from Chemical and Metallic Sector to Farm Workers 
In this section, we examine the transmission of influences from the chemical and 
metallic sector to farm workers. It was found that the paths with direct influences 
greater than 0.0001 from the chemical and metallic sector (SChemMet) to farm 
workers (FarmL) account for 27% of the global influence, while the total of influences 
greater than 0.0001 accounts for 46% of its global influence. The shortest significant 
routes take around 4 weeks to reach the farm workers. All of these significant short 
routes have a direct influence and total influence of around 11% and 16% of the global 
influence, respectively. Figure 2.4.3.1 shows the routes, time and SAM marginal 
expenditure between poles. In addition to the abbreviations in Figure 2.4.1.1, several 
additional abbreviations are used in Figure 2.4.3.1: PrWRu for production workers in 
rural areas as receivers of wages, PrWUr for production workers in urban areas as 
receivers of wages, PrNWRu for production workers in rural areas as non-receivers of 
wages, PrNWUr for production workers in urban areas as non-receivers of wages, and 
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MgNWRu for management workers in rural areas non-receivers of wages. The 
complete list can be seen in List of Abbreviations (Appendix 2.A).  
 
Figure 2.4.3.1:  Paths from Chemical and Metallic Sector to Farm Workers 
 
Table 2.4.3.1:  SPA and Time Related to Transmission of Influences from 
Chemical and Metallic Sector to Farm Workers 
 
 
SChemMet
PrWRu
FarmL
PrWUr
PrNWRu
PrNWUr
MgNWRu
CAP
LoEnRu
HiEnRu
Gov
0.022
0.054
0.019
0.007
0.0010.322
0.044
0.026
0.008
0.003
0.012
0.053
0.057
0.004
0.029
0.034
4 wk
4 wk
4 wk
4 wk
4 wk
4 wk
4 wk
48 wk
12 wk
%tage
Paths Direct Total Path mult Fixed Mixed Fixed Mixed of Global
SChemMet ‐ PrWRu ‐ FarmL 0.00098 0.00130 1.3249 4.00 4.00 12.00 12.00 3.0%
SChemMet ‐ PrWUr ‐ FarmL 0.00141 0.00194 1.3744 4.00 4.00 12.00 12.00 4.5%
SChemMet ‐ PrNWRu ‐ FarmL 0.00015 0.00019 1.3167 4.00 4.00 12.00 12.00 0.4%
SChemMet ‐ PrNWUr ‐ FarmL 0.00002 0.00003 1.3229 4.00 4.00 12.00 12.00 0.1%
SChemMet ‐ MgNWRu ‐ FarmL 0.00001 0.00002 1.2919 4.00 4.00 12.00 12.00 0.0%
SChemMet ‐ CAP ‐ LoEnUr ‐ FarmL 0.00007 0.00013 1.6726 8.00 8.00 32.00 32.00 0.3%
SChemMet ‐ CAP ‐ HiEnRu ‐ Gov ‐ FarmL 0.00002 0.00004 1.9721 64.00 64.00 320.00 320.00 0.1%
Global Multiplier 0.0434
Effects Direct Time Max Time
Chapter 2 - Gunawan Wicaksono 
 
99 
The time required to transmit the influences ranges from 4 to 320 weeks based on 
Table 2.4.3.1; however, if we look at even smaller total influences in other paths, the 
time required to transmit increases to around 480 weeks. The detailed results can be 
found in Appendix 2B.  
If we only consider direct influences, farm labor receives more than 20% of the 
global influence within just about 20 weeks of the initial shock with the remaining 7% 
spread out across the next 60 weeks. By around 90 weeks from the initial shock, the 
sum of all total influences reaches around 30% of the global influence, while the 
remaining 16% is spread out over the next 390 weeks. The development of influences 
and the required-time can be seen in Figure 2.4.3.2.8  A summary of required-time 
based on fixed- and mixed-time transformations can be seen in Table 2.4.3.2, which is 
based on direct paths that are bigger than 0.00001. In Table 2.4.3.2, the range of time 
required under fixed- and mixed-time transformation are relatively not different. The 
direct influence takes between 4 and 80 weeks while the 95% of the total influence 
takes between 12 and around 480 weeks. Figure 2.4.3.2 summarizes all of the 
required-time (fixed- and flexible-time) of the direct influences for the paths from 
chemical and metallic sector to farm workers sorted from the shortest to the longest 
time. Several paths have the same length of time for their direct influences, and create 
what looks like the vertical line in the graph. The same is true with the mixed-time 
with loops which represents all of the times required (fixed- and flexible-time) to 
reach at least 95% of the total influences sorted from the shortest to the longest time. 
Several paths require the same length of time, which creates what looks like the 
                                                 
8 In Figure 2.4.4.2, for the sake of clarity, data beyond 400 weeks are not presented. 
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vertical segment of the graph. In this case, we can think of the mixed-time direct as the 
shortest time required by the influences to travel from chemical and metallic sectors to 
the farm workers, whereas the mixed-time with loops can be thought of as the longest 
time required for 95% of the total influences to travel from chemical and metallic 
sector to the farm workers. 
 
Figure 2.4.3.2:  Required Time for Direct and Total Influences to Travel from 
Chemical and Metallic Sector to Farm Workers 
 
Table 2.4.3.2:  Time Summary of Chemical and Metallic Sector to Farm Workers  
 
 
Total of significant Impact
direct paths (> 0.00001) min average max % Global
Fixed time (w/o loops) 4.0             22.7           80.0           30.2%
Fixed time (incl. loops) 12.0           108.4        480.0        50.1%
Mixed time (w/o loops) 4.0             22.5           79.8           30.2%
Mixed time (incl. loops) 12.0           107.4        478.9        50.1%
Time (weeks)
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2.4.4. Transmission of Influence from Chemical and Metallic Sector to Various 
Households  
Figure 2.4.4.1 shows the times required for the initial direct influence to be 
transmitted from the chemical and metallic sector (SChemMet) to different household 
groups.  As expected, farm labor is the household group that receives the lowest direct 
influences of only around 22% of the global influences within just 30 weeks of the 
initial shock. Surprisingly, farm entrepreneurs follow directly behind the farm labor 
group as the second-lowest receiver of direct influence, which reaches only about 33% 
of the global influence within 30 weeks of the initial shock. In general, all household 
groups (with the exception of farm labor) receive most of their direct influences within 
30 weeks of the initial shock. Beginning around 60 weeks from the initial shock, all 
other household groups have relatively small increase of the cumulative transmitted 
influences, while only the farm labor group has a sudden increase to 30% of the global 
influence. The receiver of the highest influences (about 43%) is the low-urban 
entrepreneur group. 
When we include the loops required to reach up to 95% of the total influence, the 
results are not much different. As expected, all of the urban entrepreneurs who 
essentially use a lot of these chemical and metallic products require between around 
60 to 80 weeks to receive 50-70% of the global influences (Fig. 2.4.4.2). Though the 
farm labor group receives the lowest transmitted influence, it continues to receive 
more influences to reach up to almost 45% of the global influence within 350 weeks 
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after the initial influence. In general, 95% of total influences are achieved within 
around 450 weeks.9  
In contrast, all of the urban entrepreneur households which are expected to receive 
the highest total influence are also identified as those that have the shortest required 
time to achieve the 95% of the total influences. While all urban households require 
only about 80 months to receive 95% of the total influences, farm households require 
about 150-450 weeks. 
Considering the required time for transmitting the influences, Tables 2.4.4.1 and 
2.4.4.2 show the results under fixed- and mixed-time transformation, respectively. 
Again, we observe that the fixed-time approach, as expected, shows slightly higher 
minimum, average and maximum times than the mixed-time approach. In general, 
nearly 70% of the global influences are transmitted within 50 weeks of the initial 
shock, and the remaining 25% of the influences require up to almost 500 weeks from 
the initial shocks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 In Figure 2.4.4.2, for the sake of clarity, data beyond 400 weeks are not presented. 
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Figure 2.4.4.1: Minimum Time Required for Influences to Travel from Chemical 
and Metallic Sector to Households under Mixed-Time Transformation 
 
 
Figure 2.4.4.2: Maximum Time Required for Influences to Travel from Chemical 
and Metallic Sector to Households under Mixed-Time Transformation 
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Table 2.4.4.1: Time Required for Influences to Travel from Chemical and 
Metallic Sector to Households under Fixed-Time Transformation  
 
 
Table 2.4.4.2: Time Required for Influences to Travel from Chemical and 
Metallic Sector to Households under Mixed-Time Transformation 
 
 
Considering the time value of money, for every 1 rupiah that should be received by 
households, only a fraction is received due to the time loss during the transmission to 
the households. Let us examine one example from the fourth row of Table 2.4.4.2. 
Using 95% of the total influence, and excluding all paths with direct influence of less 
than 0.0001, we find that the cumulative total influence is as much as 58.2% of the 
global influence of that specific origin and destination poles. This means that for every 
1 million rupiah, the low-urban entrepreneur household receives the 95% of the total 
influence, which is 103.4 thousand rupiah. With an annual compound interest rate of 
8.5%, and under the mixed-time approach, the present values of 103.4 thousand rupiah 
Influence Influence Global
Origin ‐ Destination Min Average Max % Global Min Average Max % Global Impact
SChemMet ‐ FarmL 4.0            22.7          80.0          30.2% 12.0          108.4       480.0       50.1% 0.0434    
SChemMet ‐ FarmEn 4.0            9.1            12.0          23.5% 12.0          42.2          66.0          39.6% 0.1922    
SChemMet ‐ LoEnRu 4.0            9.5            12.0          36.1% 12.0          38.8          66.0          54.5% 0.1195    
SChemMet ‐ HiEnRu 4.0            9.7            11.0          28.5% 12.0          39.8          66.0          43.6% 0.1276    
SChemMet ‐ LoEnUr 4.0            9.1            11.0          38.2% 12.0          38.4          66.0          58.2% 0.1870    
SChemMet ‐ HiEnUr 4.0            9.1            11.0          30.0% 12.0          36.7          66.0          48.3% 0.2151    
Fixed time direct Fixed time with loops
Influence Influence Global
Origin ‐ Destination Min Average Max % Global Min Average Max % Global Impact
SChemMet ‐ FarmL 4.0            22.5          79.8          30.2% 12.0          107.4       478.9       50.1% 0.0434    
SChemMet ‐ FarmEn 4.0            9.0            11.9          23.5% 12.0          41.6          65.9          39.6% 0.1922    
SChemMet ‐ LoEnRu 4.0            9.4            11.9          36.1% 12.0          38.2          64.0          54.5% 0.1195    
SChemMet ‐ HiEnRu 4.0            9.6            11.0          28.5% 12.0          39.3          64.4          43.6% 0.1276    
SChemMet ‐ LoEnUr 4.0            9.0            11.0          38.2% 12.0          37.8          64.0          58.2% 0.1870    
SChemMet ‐ HiEnUr 4.0            9.0            11.0          30.0% 12.0          36.3          63.5          48.3% 0.2151    
Mixed time direct Mixed time with loops
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are between 79.1 and 87.3 thousand rupiah within 4 to 64 weeks from the initial 
shock. This means that for every dollar received by low-urban entrepreneurs, it is only 
worth 0.983 to 0.990 rupiah in present time. 
On the other side, by the same reasoning, for every 1 million rupiah injected into 
the chemical and metallic sector, the global influence on farm households is 43.4 
thousand rupiah. When we exclude all of the paths that have a direct influence of less 
than 0.0001 and compute the loops up to 95% of the total influence, we find that farm 
worker households would receive the cumulative 95% total influence of as much as 
20.7 thousand rupiah. This has the present value of between 9.4 and 20.5 thousand 
rupiah within 4 to 479 weeks.  
How about the size of influence and time related to the paths from chemical and 
metallic sector to farm labor or farm entrepreneurs? Tables 2.4.4.3a and 2.4.4.3b 
explain this more clearly. We can observe that the influence goes from chemical and 
metallic sector through other sectors before reaching the farm labor. For example, 
from chemical and metallic sector to farm workers (Table 2.4.4.3a), the path with the 
highest multiplier is through capital, entrepreneurs, and government which has path 
multiplier of 2.1 and thus is expected to reach the farm labor between 66 to 330 weeks 
from the time of its original shock. On the other hand, we have influences that can 
reach farm labor within just 6 weeks of its original influence. In Table 4.4.3a, two 
paths have this short time period – namely, the chemical and metallic sector that goes 
through the pole of capital (CAP), and the pole of production wage in the urban area 
workers (PrWUr) at the second and third row. The results are interesting because it is 
clear that the length of the path represents neither the size of the influences nor the 
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length of time to deliver the influences.  This is evidence that the biggest path 
multiplier is neither the one with the longest path nor the one with the longest time 
required. 
A comparison between the two different recipients – farm workers and farm 
entrepreneurs – reveals that any increase in the output of the domestic commodity of 
chemical and metallic products will increase the income of farm entrepreneurs more 
than farm workers (see Table 2.4.4.3b). In terms of the time required to deliver the 
influences, the farm entrepreneurs receive the influences much faster than farm 
laborers. 
  
Table 2.4.4.3: SPA Results with Mixed-Time Direct and Maximum Mixed-Time 
from Chemical and Metallic Sector to Households  
 
a. Chemical and Metallic Sector to Farm Labor 
 
b. Chemical and Metallic Sector to Farm Entrepreneur  
 
 
 
Direct Path Total Direct Max
Paths Effect Multiplier Effect Time Time
SChemMet ‐ CAP ‐ Ent ‐ Gov ‐ FarmL 0.0024 2.0397 0.0048 64.0 320.0
SChemMet ‐ CAP ‐ FarmL 0.0015 1.5178 0.0023 4.0 12.0
SChemMet ‐ PrWUr ‐ FarmL 0.0014 1.3744 0.0019 4.0 12.0
SChemMet ‐ DCForest ‐ SForest ‐ CAP ‐ Ent ‐ Gov ‐ FarmL 0.0008 2.2735 0.0017 71.9 431.5
SChemMet ‐ DCAgLivSt ‐ SAgLivSt ‐ AgWRu ‐ FarmL 0.0011 1.4660 0.0016 19.8 59.5
Direct Path Total Direct Max
Paths Effect Multiplier Effect Time Time
SChemMet ‐ CAP ‐ FarmEn 0.0173 1.7038 0.0294 4.0 16.0
SChemMet ‐ DCAgLivSt ‐ SAgLivSt ‐ AgNWRu ‐ FarmEn 0.0064 1.6933 0.0109 19.8 79.3
SChemMet ‐ DCForest ‐ SForest ‐ CAP ‐ FarmEn 0.0055 1.8986 0.0104 11.9 59.5
SChemMet ‐ PrNWRu ‐ FarmEn 0.0055 1.5182 0.0083 4.0 12.0
SChemMet ‐ PrWUr ‐ FarmEn 0.0047 1.5801 0.0074 4.0 12.0
Chapter 2 - Gunawan Wicaksono 
 
107 
2.5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Several important results from our exercises are worth emphasizing. First, our case 
studies showed that the influence reduced dramatically once the first pass had 
occurred.  Generally, after just a pass with one to three loops, more than 95% of the 
total influences had been transmitted. Based on that, we argue that when SAM 
assumptions can be held for some period of time, it is actually possible to compute the 
time required for one specific influence to be transmitted from one sector to another. 
Here, of course, we adopted the assumptions of excess supply, a demand-driven model 
and fixed-price assumptions in addition to the implicit fixed structure of the economy 
without substitution effects. The arguments as to whether these assumptions can be 
held for a period of time may still be debatable, but as we have shown, the time 
required to transmit the influences can be estimated by using two approaches: fixed-
time transformation and flexible-time transformation. 
Second, it should be noted that, when including time in the SPA, within the 
context of all paths available from a pole of origin to a pole of destination, the shortest 
time path is not necessarily the shortest path; likewise, the longest time path is not 
necessarily the longest path.  In the past, it has generally been believed that between 
the pole of origin and the pole of destination, the longer the paths, the longer the time 
required for the influence to reach its destination.  Our results show, however, that this 
is not correct. The second and third highest total influences from the chemical and 
metallic sectors reached farm labor through relatively short paths that also had 
relatively short time periods. When the total influences decreased, the time required 
did not consistently follow the length of the paths. As it turned out, one of two crucial 
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paths might contribute to the length of time required for one influence to travel to its 
destination.  
This result regarding the required time to transmit the influences should not be 
confused with the length of the path associated within one specific path. Thus, it 
should be noted that within one specific path, the longer (shorter) the path becomes as 
more arcs are added to (taken out of) the path, the longer (shorter) time is required to 
transmit the influence. Our result surely does not refute this fact but shows that within 
all of the paths available from one specific pole to another, the shorter path does not 
necessarily take a shorter time and the longer path does not necessarily take a longer 
time. 
Third, it is important to note that issue of whether one specific path will be a long 
time path or a short time path depends on the characteristics of the activities embedded 
in the arcs and the structure of that path. When one specific path contains an activity 
with a fixed-time transformation and embedded loop structures, then that path is a 
strong candidate for a long-time path. On the other hand, when a specific path contains 
no loops and none of the arcs represent an activity with a fixed-time transformation 
but only flexible-time transformations, then that path is a strong candidate for a short-
time path. In addition, some types of activities inherently lengthen the amount of time 
required to transmit the influences, and some of these activities are related to 
government activities such as tax returns and subsidies. 
When the direct influence is lower than the total influence, we can only conclude 
that more loops will be required for that specific influence to come close to the level 
of its total influence, however, the exact time required for transmission of the 
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influence cannot generally be estimated. This is simply because not only there are 
several paths which take longer to transmit the influence than the others, but also the 
influences arrive in continuous time from many different paths that connect the origin 
to the destination sector. In addition, we were also able to show that more complicated 
poles and adjacent circuits do not necessarily make the transmission time of the 
influence significantly longer as the crucial paths that inherently require long periods 
of time do not exist in those adjacent circuits. With this in mind, we can focus more on 
where the transmission of influence might possibly be disturbed and what can be done 
to fix those specific paths. 
In all cases, we found that the overall influences are transmitted over a period of 
more than a year mainly due to existing loops caused by government institutions. Any 
subsidies coming from the government based on taxes paid were generally designed to 
be released on a quarterly or yearly basis, depending on the type of activities. 
Therefore, any influences from the government to the households take a long time to 
be received. From the two categories of sectors – agricultural and non-agricultural –
the results indicated that the farm labor group received the influences in the longest 
time periods. Some of the influences that came from taxes and subsidies took many 
periods to accomplish. Even though this long transmission period might influence the 
transmission of influences to agricultural households, the size of these influences after 
some length of time were not big enough to substantially reduce the households’ 
income. 
The SAM 2008 shows how the poor group, which was represented by farm labor, 
received less than the non-poor group, which was represented by the farm 
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entrepreneurs. The two case studies in this paper reveal that influences coming from 
any shocks in the agricultural or chemical and metallic sectors take less time to reach 
farm entrepreneurs than farm labor, and are larger in size. This finding is in line with 
the biggest five total influences on farm labor and farm entrepreneurs, which showed 
that livestock sectors and commodities were also affected and served as important 
channels for transmitting the influence to both households. 
In the first case regarding agriculture, the influence toward the higher-income 
group is larger than that to the lower-income group. In a tendency toward a more 
globalized world, as discussed by Nissanke and Thorbecke (2006), the differences 
may not be diminished but rather amplified due to good relative prices, factor 
mobility, technological advances and diffusion, and institutions among other factors. 
Without any actions to strengthen and improve the channels through which the low-
income group may acquire more benefits from economic growth, the poor households 
would be most likely to receive much less benefits in any economic growth. In 
addition, Thorbecke and Jung (1996) pointed out the need to improve the skills and 
education of the low-income group so that they can receive more benefits from 
economic development. With respect to time, these efforts should be designed as 
much possible on a continual basis rather than periodically. The slow action of the 
government toward the low-income group and the sporadic nature of its efforts, as 
opposed to an integrated planned system of support, will only cause the poor to suffer 
not only through the relatively low level of influences but also the time duration 
required for any influence to reach them. Of course, in addition to all of the above, 
sound macroeconomic policy, as shown by Thorbecke (1991) in the case of the 
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Indonesian economy, public infrastructure investment and policies for low inflation 
with manageable monetary expansion are needed to provide greater benefit to the poor 
and to ultimately reduce income inequality while maintaining economic growth. 
In the case of chemical and metallic sector, there are many paths through which 
this sector influence reaches farm labor and farm entrepreneurs. Government can play 
an important role in guiding the influence toward the farm labor and away the farm 
entrepreneurs. The relatively long span of time that is required to reach the farm labor 
was mainly caused by the presence of government in the middle of the path, which 
alone can delay the influence by 48 months. Compared to the farm entrepreneurs who 
receive higher influence in much less time, one can argue that any changes in chemical 
and metallic sector will influence the non-poor more than the poor. It follows that 
reducing the outputs will influence the higher-income groups more and thus reduce the 
inequality. 
How could we then formulate a policy that could benefit primarily the poor 
quickly enough to eventually reduce the inequality issue? As suggested in Pyatt and  
Thorbecke (1976), fiscal instruments and transfers can be used to redistribute income 
to some lower-income groups in society. While direct money transfers may benefit the 
lower-income households directly, it will not benefit them in the long run because of 
the nature of direct transfers that merely increasing consumption without utilizing 
more factor of production of the poor households. Regarding intangible goods, 
providing free services, such as education and healthcare, for the lower-income groups 
may benefit them more in the long run, although that benefit will be indirect.  These 
measures would all surely be more effective if they were exercised on a continual 
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basis rather than sporadically. Clearly from this exercise, the more continual provision 
of services to these lower-income groups would significantly reduce the time required 
for transmitting the influence that is embedded in returning the benefits from taxes 
into some type of transfers to these income groups. Moreover, if this is in the type of 
productive capital transfer which in turn may increase the income of the poor 
households, then this type of continual provision will even bring more benefits to the 
poor households.   
Therefore, policymakers could estimate the range of economic influence that could 
be transmitted and how long it might possibly take. Most of the influences could be 
realized in just the first pass and the first few loops of the path. Once we realize this 
possibility, we could then establish a SAM-style matrix estimating the time between 
the source and destination cells. Though we realize that no exact time could possibly 
be predicted, we could estimate the averages time required for transmission between 
the source and destination cells. The time required can be defined as fixed-, flexible-
time, or both. Therefore, applying those influences will simply require several passes 
to reach at least 95% of the influences, and we could estimate the transmission of the 
influence in terms of the size and time required for the transmission of influences from 
the source to the destination. 
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APPENDIX 2.A 
THE INDONESIAN SAM 2008 SECTORS AND ITS ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Note: S: sector, DC: domestic commodities, IC: import commodities 
 
 
 
No. Factors, Sectors, Institutions Abbreviations
1 Agriculture receiver of wages and salaries rural AgWRu
2 Agriculture receiver of wages and salaries urban AgWUr
3 Agriculture not receiver of wages and salaries rural AgNWRu
4 Agriculture not receiver of wages and salaries urban AgNWUr
5 Production, Transportation Operator, Manual and laborer receiver of wages and salaries rural PrWRu
6 Production, Transportation Operator, Manual and laborer receiver of wages and salaries urban PrWUr
7 Production, Transportation Operator, Manual and laborer not receiver of wages and salaries rural PrNWRu
8 Production, Transportation Operator, Manual and laborer not receiver of wages and salaries urban PrNWUr
9 Administration, Sales, Services receiver of wages and salaries rural AdWRu
10 Administration, Sales, Services receiver of wages and salaries urban AdWUr
11 Administration, Sales, Services not receiver of wages and salaries rural AdNWRu
12 Administration, Sales, Services not receiver of wages and salaries urban AdNWUr
13 Leaderships, Management, Military, Proffesional and technicians receiver of wages and salaries rural MgWRu
14 Leaderships, Management, Military, Proffesional and technicians receiver of wages and salaries urban MgWUr
15 Leaderships, Management, Military, Proffesional and technicians not receiver of wages and salaries rural MgNWRu
16 Leaderships, Management, Military, Proffesional and technicians not receiver of wages and salaries urban MgNWUr
17 Not Labor Force CAP
18 Farm workers FarmL
19 Farm enterpreneurs FarmEn
20 Low Enterpreneurs rural LoEnRu
21 Not a labor force and unclear workers classification rural NLFRu
22 High Enterpreneurs rural HiEnRu
23 Low Enterpreneurs urban LoEnUr
24 Not a labor force and unclear workers classification urban NLFUr
25 High Enterpreneurs urban HiEnUr
26 Enterprises Ent
27 Government Gov
28 S. Agricultural Crops SAgCrop
29 S. Livestocks and Produce SAgLivSt
30 S. Fishery SAgFish
31 S. Food industries, beverages and tobaccos SAgInd
32 S. Other Crop Agriculture SAgOth
33 S. Forestry and hunts SForest
34 S. Coal and Metal Ore Mining, oil and gas mining SMinOil
35 S. Other mining and quarrying SMinOth
36 S. Industri pemintalan, tekstil dan kulit STextLeath
37 S. Industrial wood and wooden industry SWoodInd
38 S. Paper Industries, printings, transportation from metal and other industries SPapTran
39 S. Chemical industry, fertilizer, clay products & cement and basic metal industry SChemMet
40 S. Electricity, gas dan clean water SElecGas
41 S. Construction SCon
42 S. Wholesale and retails, transportation services support and warehouse SWholeRet
43 S. Restaurants SRet
44 S. Hotels SHotel
45 S. Ground transportation SGroundTr
46 S. Water and air transport, communication SWatAirTr
47 S. Transport Services Support, and Warehouses STranspSup
48 S. Bank and insurance SBankIns
49 S. Real estate and business services SRealEst
50 S. Government and defense, education, heath, other social services, film and entertainments SGovSos
51 S. Individual services, hoseholds and other services SIndServ
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No. Factors, Sectors, Institutions Abbreviations
52 Trade margins TrdMg
53 Transport margins TranMg
54 DC Agricultural Crops DCAgCrop
55 DC Livestocks and Produce DCAgLivSt
56 DC Fishery DCAgFish
57 DC Food industries, beverages and tobaccos DCAgInd
58 DC Other Crop Agriculture DCAgOth
59 DC Forestry and hunts DCForest
60 DC Coal and Metal Ore Mining, oil and gas mining DCMinOil
61 DC Other mining and quarrying DCMinOth
62 DC Spinning, textile, and leather industry DCTextLeath
63 DC Industrial wood and wooden industry DCWoodInd
64 DC Paper Industries, printings, transportation from metal and other industries DCPapTran
65 DC Chemical industry, fertilizer, clay products & cement and basic metal industry DCChemMet
66 DC Electricity, gas dan clean water DCElecGas
67 DC Construction DCCon
68 DC Wholesale and retails, transportation services support and warehouse DCWholeRet
69 DC Restaurants DCRet
70 DC Hotels DCHotel
71 DC Ground transportation DCGroundTr
72 DC Water and air transport, communication DCWatAirTr
73 DC Transport Services Support, and Warehouses DCTranDCpSup
74 DC Bank and insurance DCBankIns
75 DC Real estate and business services DCRealEst
76 DC Government and defense, education, heath, other social services, film and entertainments DCGovSos
77 DC Individual services, hoseholds and other services DCIndServ
78 IC Agricultural Crops ICAgCrop
79 IC Livestocks and Produce ICAgLivSt
80 IC Fishery ICAgFish
81 IC Food industries, beverages and tobaccos ICAgInd
82 IC Other Crop Agriculture ICAgOth
83 IC Forestry and hunts ICForest
84 IC Coal and Metal Ore Mining, oil and gas mining ICMinOil
85 IC Other mining and quarrying ICMinOth
86 IC Industri pemintalan, tekstil dan kulit ICTextLeath
87 IC Industrial wood and wooden industry ICWoodInd
88 IC Paper Industries, printings, transportation from metal and other industries ICPapTran
89 IC Chemical industry, fertilizer, clay products & cement and basic metal industry ICChemMet
90 IC Restaurants ICRet
91 IC Hotels ICHotel
92 IC Ground transportation ICGroundTr
93 IC Water and air transport, communication ICWatAirTr
94 IC Transport Services Support, and Warehouses ICTranICpSup
95 IC Bank and insurance ICBankIns
96 IC Real estate and business services ICRealEst
97 IC Government and defense, education, heath, other social services, film and entertainments ICGovSos
98 IC Individual services, hoseholds and other services ICIndServ
99 Capital CapAct
100 Indirect Taxes IndTax
101 Subsidy Subs
102 External Ext
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APPENDIX 2.B 
RESULTS OF SPA WITH TIME 
Agricultural Crop Sector (SAgCrop) – Farm Labor (FarmL) 
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Agricultural Crop Sector (SAgCrop) – Farm Entrepreneur (FarmEn) 
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Agricultural Crop Sector (SAgCrop) – High Entrepreneur in Urban area 
(HiEnUr) 
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Chemical and Metallic Sector (SChemMet) – Farm Labor (FarmL) 
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APPENDIX 2C 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
 
The 2008 Indonesian SAM structure consists of: 
- Factor of productions: 16 Labor and 1 Non-Labor 
- Institutions: 8 Households (6 well defined and 2 not well defined households), 
1 Government and 1 Enterprise 
- Production sectors: 24 sectors 
- Domestic commodities: 24 commodities 
- Import commodities: 24 commodities 
- 1 Transport margin and 1 Trade margin  
- Other sectors: Capital account, Indirect taxes, Subsidies and External sector.  
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CHAPTER 3 
AN ECONOMETRIC EXAMINATION OF IMPACTS OF MONETARY POLICY 
ON THE WELFARE OF DIFFERENT INCOME GROUPS IN INDONESIA 
USING A DYNAMIC DEMAND SYSTEM APPROACH 
 
3.1.Introduction 
Since 2002, the official monetary policy of the Bank of Indonesia has been one of 
inflation targeting.1  The Bank also establishes in-house targeted rates of growth of the 
money supply (M2), however.  It is well understood that the rate of growth of the 
money supply affects the abilities of consumers to realize their expenditure plans, 
through its impact on their access to liquidity. (See, e.g., Deaton, 1992.)  Hence, 
monetary policy can affect the welfare derived from consumption.  What is not well 
established is how monetary policy affects the welfare levels of members of different 
income groups.  Intuitively, one would expect that those who are more dependent on 
cash for transactions (i.e., lower-income consumers) would be more directly affected 
than those who are not (i.e., higher-income consumers).    
While some studies have been undertaken to estimate the impact of fiscal and 
monetary policies on the welfare levels of different income groups in Indonesia, none 
to our knowledge has examined the effects on welfare levels of changes in a broad 
money aggregate through the effects of such changes on adjustments in expenditure 
shares in a demand system. 
Moreover, most published studies on the effects of monetary policy use a simple-
sum measure of the aggregate money stock as a measure of broad money, instead of a 
component-share-weighted stock index or, better yet, a flow index.  Barnett, Fisher, 
                                                 
1 Inflation targeting policies determine the discount rate set by monetary authorities. 
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and Serletis (1992) have argued that an appropriate measure of broad money to 
employ in studying consumer demand systems is the Divisia index, which captures the 
flow of financial services from monetary assets.  
To depict the influence of monetary policy on consumer welfare through its effects 
on adjustments in expenditure shares, one must first specify a demand system.  The 
Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) has been a 
popular choice in many studies because the flexibility of the underlying functional 
forms it embodies contributes to excellent empirical results.  The AIDS model has 
some drawbacks (is almost ideal), however, in that it is not globally regular.  If 
regularity is violated for given observations, then received demand theory cannot be 
drawn upon to sanction inferences from empirical findings for those observations. The 
AIDS model is derived from a utility function that is dual to a price-independent 
generalized logarithmic (PIGLOG) cost function. Cooper and McLaren (1983) provide 
a more general demand system specification that is derived from a utility function that 
is dual to a modified price-independent generalized logarithmic (or MPIGLOG) cost 
function. This demand system is regular over a wider domain of the economic region 
and, for some choices of component price indices, is globally regular.  This demand 
system has been employed in a dynamic analysis of demand for world monies by 
Donaghy and Richard (2006) and in numerical simulation studies of transportation 
demand by Donaghy  (2010), inter alia.  The modeling work presented in this paper 
adopts the MPIGLOG specification employed in Donaghy (2010).  
The MPIGLOG cost function specification gives rise to another important attribute 
of the utility function that is dual to it for the investigation of the effects of monetary 
policy on consumer welfare: it is non-homothetic whereas the utility function 
associated with the PIGLOG specification is not.  Expenditure shares in a demand 
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system based on the MPIGLOG specification will change as aggregate consumer 
expenditure levels change. 
This paper explores the impacts of monetary policy on the welfare of people in 
different income groups in Indonesia. As noted above, the preferences of income 
groups’ members are represented by a non-homothetic utility function to capture the 
sensitivity of expenditure shares to changes in income groups’ aggregate expenditure 
levels.  The dynamic system of demand equations for each income group is specified 
on the basis of Cooper and McLaren’s (1992) MPIGLOG demand system and 
Anderson and Blundell’s (1983) disequilibrium adjustment mechanism.  In the model, 
income groups adjust their shares of expenditure on food, housing, and other items to 
partial-equilibrium levels as a function of commodity prices and their respective 
aggregate expenditure levels.  These adjustments are taken to be functions of the rate 
of change in the flow of financial services, which is measured as a Divisia aggregate. 
Changes in the growth rate of the money supply (M2), which are determined by Bank 
of Indonesia policy, influence income groups’ commodity expenditure levels, and 
hence levels of welfare derived from consumption of commodities, through the 
Divisia aggregate to which they contribute.  The continuous-time model is estimated 
from annual time-series data on expenditures, prices, and financial aggregates by a 
quasi-Newton maximum-likelihood procedure. The estimation results and 
deterministic numerical simulations conducted with the estimated model suggest that 
the welfare of the low-income group is affected more by monetary policy than is that 
of the high-income group.  They also suggest that the low-income group’s 
expenditures on food consumption are more responsive to monetary policy than are 
the high-income group’s, but its expenditures on housing and other commodities are 
less so.  
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 The paper will be divided into five sections. The first and second sections provide 
a review of relevant literature on prices and low-income groups, monetary policies, 
and demands for money in Indonesia. The third section provides an in-depth 
discussion of the methodology and data used in this research. The last two sections 
discuss the results obtained and conclusions reached as well as future research that can 
be undertaken on the basis of our findings. 
 
3.2. Literature Review 
Most of the research that relates fiscal and monetary policies to poverty reduction 
and income inequality has been conducted either by using a computable general 
equilibrium approach or a discreet econometric one (Maipita, Zantan and Razak 
(2010), Pakpahan, Suryadarma, and Suryahadi (2009), Azis (2008), Thorbecke (2006), 
Damuri and Perdana (2003), and Suryatie and Tjiptoherijanto (2001)). These studies 
have measured the impact of fiscal and monetary policies as well as economic growth 
on different income groups and the inequality between those groups. In general, 
though, high economic growth has been found to have a significant correlation with 
poverty reduction especially when accompanied by relatively stable exchange rates, 
easiness of credit market access, improvement in human capital, reduction of labor 
market distortions and improvement of access to trade markets. 
A large price increase could affect the low-income group by reducing disposable 
income as nominal wages fail to increase as quickly as prices in the case of higher 
inflation. Using Brazilian data, Cardoso has shown that higher inflation can increase 
poverty.  He has also shown how partial indexation, in the absence of perfect 
indexation, may not satisfactorily compensate the poor for higher prices. Furthermore, 
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Powers (1995) found that price increases could have more adverse effects on poverty 
when the poverty measure was based on consumption rather than income. Using US 
poverty data from 1959 to 1992, she found a strong positive effect of the 
unemployment rate on the poverty rate. 
The a priori argument is that the low-income group should be affected more by 
inflation because its members depend more on the state-determined income, which is 
not fully indexed with inflation. In this sense, when inflation occurs, their real income 
will be reduced by the amount of inflation. On the other side, the low-income group is 
also vulnerable to inflation because their liquidity preference is greater than that of the 
rich. This vulnerability is also related to their shallow reach to the financial market and 
their inability to obtain full access to the credit markets that can hedge them from the 
fluctuation of their income to shocks.  In this light, Easterly and Fischer (2001) have 
shown a strong association between inflation and the well-being of the low-income 
group, there being a significant negative correlation between the rise of real wages and 
inflation. Their estimated correlation was obtained from a survey of 31,169 
households in thirty-eight countries, controlling for country effects in their panel data. 
The survey indicated that more poor people ranked inflation as their top national 
concern than the rich.  Easterly and Fisher (2001) have also showed that inflation 
works as a cruel tax that reduces the relative income of the poor. 
While many studies in this area use income data to estimate the well-being of the 
poor, Meyer and Sulivan (2007) suggest that consumption data would be more 
appropriate to use.  Focusing more on the quality of data for measuring the well-being 
of the poor, they used the Consumer Expenditure Interview survey (CE), which covers 
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approximately 7,600 respondents. In this survey, respondents reported their 
expenditure over four consecutive quarters. It was found that consumption inequality 
increases less than income inequality as shown first by Krueger and Perri in 2006. In 
this light, a model describing the effect of inflation on the well-being of the poor 
would be better if it used consumption instead of income as an explanatory variable. 
While the impact of macroeconomic policy on poverty remains unclear, the impact 
of monetary policy on the lower income group is even more so. Seeking to explain  the 
relationship between monetary policy and the well-being of the poor, Romer and 
Romer (1998) found that the short- and long-term effects of monetary policy on the 
well-being of the low-income group tend to go in opposite directions.  Using U.S. 
time-series data, they found that expansionary monetary policy benefits the poor in the 
short run. Cross-sectional analysis of consumption data shows that low inflation and 
stable aggregate demand are significantly associated with higher well-being of the 
low-income group.  Romer and Romer use two indicators to measure the performance 
of monetary policy: average inflation and aggregate demand variability. Rather than 
using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for inflation, they used average change of 
logarithm of GDP deflator over a period of twenty years.  
They found that income of the low-income group tends to be lower in countries 
with higher inflation and greater variability of aggregate demand, and higher in the 
industrialized countries with low variability of aggregate demand. Therefore, they 
conclude that monetary policy can have a long-run effect on the well-being of the 
poor.  
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It is natural to evaluate the performance of central banks in terms of how their 
monetary policies affect inflation in their respective countries. Recently, the most 
popular policy for combating inflation has been the Inflation Targeting (IT) 
framework. There are pros and cons regarding the implementation and effectiveness of 
IT in general.  On one hand, Mishkin (1999, p.595) has observed that “The 
performance of inflation-targeting regimes has been quite good. Inflation-targeting 
countries seem to have significantly reduced both the rate of inflation and inflation 
expectations beyond that which would likely have occurred in the absence of inflation 
targets.” This testimony provides support for the adoption of an IT framework by 
central banks in many countries. On the other hand, contrary to Mishkin’s conclusion, 
Alvaro and Philippe (2006) show, in the context of a time-series model of the U.S. and 
European Union, that the IT framework has not successfully reduced inflation. Rochon 
and Rossi (2006) show, moreover, that the adoption of the IT framework tends to 
worsen income distribution. This exacerbation was perceived through the worsening 
of wage share after the use of the IT framework as a policy of the central bank. In their 
research, wage share is measured as the ratio of salaries or wages to employee and 
GDP at nominal price in the local currency. Despite these negative findings, many 
economists still believe that the IT framework can successfully reduce the inflation. 
Mixed findings raise questions, however, as to whether the adoption of IT is necessary 
and effective for combating inflation and increasing the wealth of the population.  
As for the Indonesian case, the IT framework has been adopted officially since 
2002, encouraged by the new act of the Central Bank in 1999. While inflation may be 
the ultimate target of the central bank, in practice, the amount of money in circulation 
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is still important and is mostly perceived as the intermediate target if not the main 
target of many central banks. The reason for this is that the relationship of money 
supply and price has a more solid theoretical background than that of IT and price. As 
Bernanke (1999, p.8) suggests, “To draw a bright line between central banks 
practicing full-fledged inflation targeting and those firmly outside the inflation 
targeting camp is more difficult than one might first guess.” This observation has 
resulted in some unclear distinctions being drawn between those countries which are 
categorized as IT-adopters and those that are not. As a result, this lack of clarity could 
generate some bias in empirical analysis regarding the success story of the IT 
framework. Furthermore, in that same 1999 paper, Bernanke distinguishes between 
two important uses of the IT framework: 1) as a framework for policy-makers, and 2) 
as a tool for communicating with the public. In this light, the public‘s confidence of 
price stability will enable actors in the private sector to better forecast and plan their 
businesses. Ultimately, the IT framework becomes more like a public announcement 
of accountability with respect to the main measurable target of the monetary authority.  
In Indonesia, the adoption of IT is still relatively recent and has not been fully 
implemented in practice.  Clearly, more research needs to be done regarding the 
effectiveness of this framework. That being said, this paper will analyze the effects of 
changes in the money supply on welfare as they are transmitted through the channel of 
financial services (liquidity).  Bank Indonesia (BI), the central bank of Indonesia, is 
the institution that has the right to conduct monetary policy. Based on the Central 
Bank Act in 1999, BI has autonomy in conducting monetary policy free from any 
influence of the government. This act also narrows down the central bank’s scope 
Chapter 3 – Gunawan Wicaksono 
 
140 
from many objectives (e.g., growth, employment and prices) to a tight focus on price 
stability as its only objective. 
To study the effect of monetary policy on the welfare levels of different income 
groups, we examine how changes in the money stock affecting the flow of financial 
services influence adjustments in income group expenditure shares in a demand 
system, which in turn are induced by changes in prices and aggregate expenditure 
levels.  Ideally, one would like the system of demand equations to aggregate up 
consumer behavior exactly and be globally regular.  A specific demand function is 
said to be an exact aggregator if it can represent “market demands as if they were the 
outcome of decisions [made] by a rational representative consumer.” (Deaton and 
Muelbauer, 1980 p.313).  Furthermore, a function is said to be regular if it manifests 
all the properties stipulated by that specific function according to economic theory 
(Donaghy and Richard, 1993). There are many types of these demand systems but 
perhaps the most common ones are AIDS and modified versions of it.  Donaghy and 
Richard (1993 p.230) have argued that “increasing the extent of regularity is more 
important than preserving exact aggregation,” especially when drawing conclusions 
about the aggregate behavior of people. Considerations of regularity and non-
homotheticity lead us to choose a demand system that derives from a utility function 
that is dual to an MPIGLOG cost function in modeling consumer expenditures of low- 
and high-income groups in Indonesia.  
We model the adjustment of expenditure shares corresponding to an MPIGLOG 
system by employing a continuous-time version of Anderson and Blundell’s (1983) 
disequilibrium adjustment mechanism. We adopt a disequilibrium adjustment 
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specification because consumers cannot adjust expenditure patterns instantaneously.  
Anderson and Blundell’s adjustment framework specifically allows for adjustments of 
all expenditures’ shares to influence each share.  Under the continuous-time 
specification, adjustment lags that are different from the observational frequency of 
the data can be estimated (Gandolfo, 1993). Other considerations favoring a 
continuous-time specification are that 1) differential equation systems are more 
analytically tractable than difference-equation ones, 2) once estimated, they can be 
solved or simulated for any time-interval, 3) there is no natural time unit of 
observation for aggregate behavior, 4) aggregate economic behavior is ongoing, 5) 
stock and flow variables can be treated correctly, and 6) distributed lag processes can 
be handled better (Gandolfo, 1993; Bergstrom, 1993; Wymer, 1993b).  With the 
development of the WYSEA software package, and the ESCONA program in 
particular (Wymer, 2006),2 and the computational processing capability to implement 
it, nonlinear dynamic models can now be estimated and simulated in a straightforward 
manner using continuous-time econometric methods.  
  
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The author is deeply grateful to Prof. Wymer for his permission to use his program, 
ESCONA, and for his advice and help in coding and running the model to estimate the 
Indonesian demand system for this study. ESCONA implements the non-linear continuous-
time estimator set out in Wymer (1993a). 
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3.3. Methodology  
3.3.1. Model 
As noted above, the demand system estimated in this study is derived from the 
utility function that is dual to an MPIGLOG cost function.  As observed by Cooper 
and McLaren (1993) the MPIGLOG family of cost functions is a generalization of the 
PIGLOG family developed by Muellbauer (1975) and is an instance of the Gorman 
polar form (Gorman, 1976), in which preferences are represented as a combination of 
price aggregator functions.  For a utility level u and a price vector p, the MPIGLOG 
family of cost functions can be written as 
      (3.3.1.1) 
in which ln denotes the natural logarithm of a variable, u is defined to lie between zero 
and one, and P1 and P2 are price aggregator functions.  P1 is generally assumed to be 
homogeneous of degree one (HD1) in p, and P2 is homogeneous of degree η (HD η ) 
in p.  Since Equation (3.3.1.1) is an implicit function, it is easier to discuss the 
specification in terms of the indirect utility function that is dual to it. 
Applying Roy’s identity to (3.3.1.2) yields expenditure share equations of the form 
1 2[ ln( / 1)] / [1 ln( / 1)],j j js c P c P         (3.3.1.3) 
where 1 1 2/ , ln 1/ , 1.0, .j j j j j j jj js p q c P p           
Defining a weighting expression, ܼ ൌ ߟ ln ቀ ௖௉ଵቁ / ቂ1 ൅ ߟ ln ቀ
௖
௉ଵቁቃ , the expenditure 
share equations can be rewritten in terms of Z as 
1 2(1 ) ( / ) .j j js Z Z           (3.3.1.4) 
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The MPIGLOG demand system (3.3.1.4) will be globally regular when P1 is a linearly 
homogeneous function and P2 is Cobb-Douglas, which is the case in this study. 
Under Anderson and Blundell’s (1983) disequilibrium adjustment mechanism, 
each household group i is assumed to partially adjust its expenditure shares on 
commodity group j, ijs , to its partial-equilibrium level, 
ie
js , where the partial 
adjustment parameters are denoted using ߛݏ. This adjustment process is also 
influenced by adjustments of all other expenditure shares to their partial-equilibirum 
levels and the rate of change in aggregate financial services in the economy.  Let, ܦݏ௝௜ 
represent the time rate of change in expenditure share j by group i. Then the dynamic 
demand system can be written as (3.3.1.5), in which the time rate of change in 
financial services (expressed as DFS)  influences this adjustment process through the 
parameter . 
ܦݏ௝௜ ൌ ∑ ߛ௝௞௜ ൫ݏ௞௜௘ െ ݏ௞௜ ൯ଷ௞ୀଵ ൅ ߛ௝௙ܦܨܵ      (3.3.1.5) 
The sum of changes in expenditure shares of all commodities for each income group 
∑ ܦݏ௝௜ଷ௝ୀଵ ൌ 0  should be zero. 
The time rate of change in financial service (DFS) is determined using Equation 
(3.3.1.6). The services (contributions to liquidity) of each monetary aggregate are 
weighted by the ratio of return opportunity of that asset toward the cost of liquidity.  
ܦܨܵ ൌ ቀ ௜್஼ை௅ቁ . ܥܥ. ܦ ln ܥܥ ൅ ቀ
௜್ି௜೎ೌ
஼ை௅ ቁ . ܥܣ. ܦ ln ܥܣ ൅ ቀ
௜್ି௜೜೘
஼ை௅ ቁ . ܳܯ.ܦ lnܳܯ  
          (3.3.1.6) 
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The user cost of liquidity (COL) specified in Equation (3.3.1.7) follows from the 
continuous-time version of the Divisia index of monetary aggregates (Barnett et al., 
1992; Donaghy and Richard, 1993, 2006) and is also known as the ‘Fisher dual price’. 
ܥܱܮ ൌ ݅௕. ܥܥ ൅ ሺ݅௕ െ ݅௖௔ሻ. ܥܣ ൅ ൫݅௕ െ ݅௤௠൯. ܳܯ     (3.3.1.7) 
Here, CC, CA, QM, ݅௕, and ݅௖௔ denote currency in circulation, current (checking) 
accounts, quasi-money, bank lending interest rate and quasi money interest rate 
respectively.  
The use of a Divisia index in computing the services of monetary aggregates has 
microeconomic foundations in its construction. Since each financial asset provides 
different monetary services, its weight in the aggregation should be adjusted 
accordingly.  Barnett (1978) introduced the user cost of money as the opportunity cost 
related to a monetary asset component. In his formulation, the return of each asset is 
compared with the benchmark return of asset which is assumed to provide no 
monetary services but only serve as a tool to transfer wealth between the periods with 
no marginal utility to the user.  In its continuous-time case, following Donaghy and 
Richard (2006), the user cost can be expressed as: 
ߨ௜ ൌ ݌ሺܴ െ ݎ௜ሻ        (3.3.1.8) 
Here, subscript i indicates the commodity type, π is the user cost of a monetary 
asset, p is the user price of that asset, R is the benchmark monetary asset return and ݎ௜ 
is the return of the monetary asset. In our case, the benchmark monetary asset is the 
average yearly loan rate, ݅௕, and the user price of each monetary asset is represented 
by the difference between this rate and the interest rate earned on the stock of that 
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monetary asset.  By employing this formulation, one can observe that cash in hand has 
the highest user-cost of any monetary asset. 
In the case of Indonesia, the money supply can be categorized broadly into three 
categories: the base money, money supply narrowly defined (M1) and money supply 
broadly defined (M2). The base money consists of currency in circulation (CC) which 
is the currency held by the people outside of the banking system. Narrowly defined 
money supply consists of currency in circulation and the current accounts owned by 
those other than banks in the banking system, including in those the central bank. 
Broadly defined, money supply is the narrowly defined money supply and the quasi 
money owned by parties other than banks. All kinds of deposits owned by private 
domestic institutions including individuals which can be drawn on at any time and be 
exchanged with currency as much as their values are included in the current account 
money statistics. All other kinds of deposit owned by private domestics and 
temporarily lose their function as medium of exchange but have other functions of 
money (e.g., store of wealth, deferred payments, and counting unit tools) are included 
in quasi money statistics. 
Though, the money supply is officially no longer used as the official target of the 
central bank, in practice, the monetary authorities still monitor the amount of the 
money supply very closely in comparison with its unofficial targeted amount to ensure  
that it falls within the intended benchmark range. The reaction function of the 
monetary authorities should reflect an adjustment in the rate of growth of the money 
supply to some set of conditions that together represent an equilibrium growth rate. 
Only in the period since 1988, have the financial sectors developed quickly enough to 
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include a shift of the target of the central bank in 2002 from a money stock target to an 
inflation target. In day-to-day operation, however, the money supply target is still used 
as an intermediate target, especially in open market operations conducted by the 
central bank through its decision on the interest rates of its bonds. 
Suppose the central bank has a target for the rate of growth of the money stock, λ,  
that may differ from the rate of growth of nominal GDP (ܦ lnܲ ൅ ܦ ln ܻ). Also, 
suppose that authorities acknowledge that the money stock in circulation should grow 
in step with transactions demand for money – i.e., ܦ lnܲ ൅ ܦ ln ܻ – but that the 
capital investment-related demand for money will be inversely related to the long-term 
borrowing rate, r. Then a first pass at a set of equations characterizing authorities' 
adjustment of the money supply might be represented by the following equation: 
ܦ݉ ൌ ߛሼՇ ൅ ߚଵሺܦ ln ܲ ൅ ܦ ln ܻሻ െ ߚଶݎ െ ݉ሽ,       (3.3.1.9) 
where ܦ lnܯ ൌ ݉  
In Equation (3.3.1.9), the parameter  represents an elasticity of response.   When this 
reaction function has been estimated, it can be used to conduct simulations to examine 
the impact of variations in liquidity on the welfare of different income classes induced 
by different targeted levels of growth, ߣ. We would expect different income groups to 
respond differently to different targets of growth in the money supply. 
Each income group reacts to the increase or decrease in financial services by either 
increasing or decreasing of their consumption in the different expenditure categories. 
Rates of change in expenditure shares depend on the time rate of change in financial 
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services, which in turn is a function of the money in circulation. We use the stock of 
currency as the money stock in this equation. The rates of change in expenditure 
shares are captured by Equation (T3.3.1.2.5) in Table (3.3.1.1). Once all of the 
parameters have been estimated, the welfare of each income group can be computed 
using Equation (T3.3.1.2.8). Following Donaghy and Richard (2006, p.83), we can 
also compute the expenditure elasticities of demand and price elasticities of demand 
for each income group and each commodity. The expenditure and price elasticities of 
demand are computed using Equations (T3.3.1.1.9) and (T3.3.1.1.10) respectively. 
The cross-price elasticities of demand for commodity j for the change of the 
commodity price k of the income group i are derived from the following equation 
(Donaghy and Richard, 2006, Eq. 4.10, p.83): 
ܯ௝௞௜ ൌ ఌభೕೖ
೔ ൫ଵି௓೔൯ା൫ఌమೕೖ೔ ఎ೔ൗ ൯௓೔ିథೕ೔ఉೖ೔ ൫ଵି௓೔൯
௦ೕ೔ିఋೕೖାఎ೔థೕ೔൫ଵି௓೔൯
     (3.3.1.10) 
where ߝଵ௝௞௜  and ߝଶ௝௞௜  are  the cross elasticities of the price aggregators  ܲ1 and ܲ2 
with respect to two commodity prices ݌௝ and ݌௞.The symbol δ୨୩ is the Kronecker 
delta which has the value of 0 if  ݆ ് ݇ and 1 if  ݆ ൌ ݇. Since ܲ1 is a CES function and 
ܲ2 is a Cobb-Douglas function, they can be simply written as: 
ߝଵ௝௞௜ ൌ డ
మ ୪୬௉ଵ
డ ୪୬௣ೕడ ୪୬௣ೖ ൌ ߶௝
௜߶௞௜ ߩ௜ܼ௜
భ
ഐ೔షమ݌௝ିఘ
೔݌௞ିఘ
೔
     (3.3.1.11) 
ߝଶ௝௞௜ ൌ డ
మ ୪୬௉ଶ
డ ୪୬௣ೕడ ୪୬௣ೖ ൌ 0  
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The first derivative of the logarithm of the price aggregator ܲ2 with respect to the 
logarithm of the commodity price p୨ results in a share parameter which is a constant. 
Then, it follows that the second derivative of that will just be zero. Therefore, 
Equation (3.3.1.10) can be simplified into Equation (T3.3.1.1.10). 
 The elements of the Slutsky matrix are the result of the decomposition of the 
effects of price changes on Marshallian demand into two components – namely, 
substitution effect and income effect. The substitution effect represents the change of 
the Hicksian demand with respect to price, and the income effect represents the 
product of the change of the income with respect to income changes and the income 
level.3 The elements of the Slutsky matrix of our MPIGLOG demand system can be 
easily computed using the following equation: 
௝ܵ௞௜ ൌ ௖
೔
௣ೕ௣ೖ ൣݏ௝௞
௜ ܯ௝௞௜ ൅ ݏ௝௜ݏ௞௜ ܧ௝௜൧       (3.3.1.12) 
We close the model by endogenizing rates of change in the aggregate expenditure 
levels of the income groups in terms of rates of change in nominal GDP and the 
money supply as in Equation (T3.3.1.1.7).  
                                                 
3We can state the change of the Marshallian demand with respect to price as the summation of 
the change of the Marshallian demand with respect to price and the change of the demand with 
respect to income change: 
ݍ௝ெሺ݌, ݕሻ ≡ ݍ௝ுሺ݌, ݑሻ ൌ ݍ௝ெሺ݌, ܿሺ݌, ݑሻሻ ≡ ݍ௝ுሺ݌, ݑሻ  
Taking the total derivative w.r.t. price, we would have 
డ௤ೕಾ
డ௣ ൅
డ௤ೕಾ
డ௬
డ௖
డ௣ ൌ
డ௤ೕಹ
డ௣  and rearrange it tohave: 
ப୯ౠ౉
ப୮ ൌ
ப୯ౠౄ
ப୮ ‐
ப୯ౠ౉
ப୷
பୡ
ப୮ ൌ
ப୯ౠౄ
ப୮ ‐
ப୯ౠ౉
ப୷ y  
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While data for the financial and monetary sectors are abundantly available, data 
for the expenditure shares to be used in Equation (3.3.1.5) are more limited. For this 
reason, then, the scope of our ambition in modeling economy-wide behavior is limited. 
Table (3.3.1.1) shows the final list of equations used in our simple model.  
Table 3.3.1.1: Model Equations 
Equations Eq. Number 
Price aggregator equation: 
ܲ1௜ ൌ ቌ෍߶௝௜݌௝ିఘ
೔
௝
ቍ
ିଵ ఘ೔⁄
 
ܲ2௜ ൌ 	ෑ݌௝
ఉೕ೔
௝
 
T3.3.1.1.1. 
ܼ௜ ൌ
ߟ௜݈݊ ቆ ܿ௜݌ଵ∗௜ቇ
ቈ1 ൅ ߟ௜݈݊ ቆ ܿ௜݌ଵ∗௜ቇ቉
 
T3.3.1.1.2. 
Equilibrium shares of consumption: 
ݏ௝௜௘ ൌ ߶௝௜ ൭݌ଵ
∗௜
݌௝
൱
ఘ೔
൫1 െ ܼ௜൯ ൅ ቆߚ௝
௜
ߟ௜ቇ ܼ
௜ 
With ߶௝௜ ൒ 0, ߚ௝௜ ൒ 0 and ߟ௜ ൌ ∑ ߚ௝௜௝  
 
T3.3.1.1.3. 
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Time rate of change in financial services: 
ܦܨܵ ൌ ൬ ݅௕ܥܱܮ൰ . ܥܥ. ܦ ln ܥܥ ൅ ൬
݅௕ െ ݅௖௔
ܥܱܮ ൰ . ܥܣ. ܦ ln ܥܣ
൅ ൬݅௕ െ ݅௤௠ܥܱܮ ൰ . ܳܯ.ܦ lnܳܯ 
With cost of liquidity (ܥܱܮ): 
ܥܱܮ ൌ ݅௕. ܥܥ ൅ ሺ݅௕ െ ݅௖௔ሻ. ܥܣ ൅ ൫݅௕ െ ݅௤௠൯. ܳܯ 
T3.3.1.1.4 
Time rates of change in expenditure shares of each income group: 
ܦݏ௝௜ ൌ ∑ ߛ௝௞௜ ൫ݏ௞௜௘ െ ݏ௞௜ ൯ଷ௞ୀଵ ൅ ߛ௝௙௜ ܦܨܵ   for all   ݆ ൌ 1,2,3 
With ∑ ܦݏ௝௜௝ ൌ 0. 
T3.3.1.1.5. 
Time rate of change in the growth rate of the money supply: 
ܦ݉ ൌ ߛ଺ሼՇ ൅ ߚଵሺܦ ln ܲ ൅ ܦ lnܻሻ െ ߚଶݎ െ ݉ሽ  
with ܦ lnܯ ൌ ݉ 	
T3.3.1.1.6. 
Percentage rate of changes in aggregate expenditure of each income 
group: 
ܦ ln ܿ௜ ൌ ߚଷ௜ሺܦ ln ܲ ൅ ܦ lnܻሻ ൅ ߚସ௜ܦ lnܯ 
T3.3.1.1.7. 
Utility of each income group: 
ܷ൫ܿ௜, ݌൯ ൌ ሾln	ሺܿ௜ ܲ1∗௜ሻሿ⁄ ൣܿ௜ ܲ2௜⁄ ൧  
T3.3.1.1.8 
Chapter 3 – Gunawan Wicaksono 
 
151 
Expenditure elasticities of demand for good ݆ by income group ݅: 
ܧ௝௜ ൌ 1 ൅ ൬ ఉೕ
೔
௦ೕ೔ିఎ೔
൰ ൫1 െ ܼ௜൯  
T3.3.1.1.9 
Price elasticities of demand for good ݆ with respect to price change ݇ 
of income group ݅: 
ܯ௝௞௜ ൌ ఌభೕೖ
೔ ൫ଵି௓೔൯ିథೕ೔ఉೖ೔ ൫ଵି௓೔൯
௦ೕ೔ିఋೕೖାఎ೔థೕ೔൫ଵି௓೔൯
  
With:  
ߝଵ௝௞௜ ൌ ߶௝௜߶௞௜ ߩ௜ܼ௜
భ
ഐ೔షమ݌௝ିఘ
೔݌௞ିఘ
೔
 
T3.3.1.1.10 
 
Table 3.3.1.2: Definition of Parameters  
Parameters Definitions of Parameters 
ߩ௜ Parameter of substitution of income group ݅ 
߶௝௜ Share parameter of ݆௧௛ commodity price with ݅௧௛ income group. 
ߚ௝௜ The contribution of ݆௧௛ commodity toward parameter ߟ for each income 
group. 
ߟ௜ The degree of homogeneity of the price aggregator of the ݅௧௛ income 
group. 
ߛ௝௞௜  Parameter of adjustment of ݆௧௛commodity related to  ݇௧௛commodity for 
݅௧௛ income group. 
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ߛ௝௙௜  Parameter of adjustment of ݆௧௛commodity related to the financial 
services for ݅௧௛ income group. 
ߛ଺ Parameter of adjustment for the money supply 
ߚଵ Parameter of adjustment of the real GDP 
ߚଶ Parameter of the benchmark interest rates. 
݌௝ Price of ݆௧௛commodity 
ݏ௞௜  Share of ݇௧௛commodity toward the consumption of the ݅௧௛ income 
group. 
ܥܥ Currency in circulation 
ܥܣ Current account (checking accounts) 
ܳܯ Quasi money (savings accounts) 
݅௕ Benchmark interest rates, here is loan interest rates 
݅௖௔ Current account interest rates, we use BI rates 
݅௤௠ Savings interest rates, we use the average savings rates 
ܲ GDP deflators 
ܻ Real GDP in constant rupiahs. 
ܿ௜ Consumption by income group ݅ 
ܧ௝௜ Expenditure elasticities of demand of income group ݅ 
ܯ௝௞௜  Price elasticities of demand for commodity ݆ of income group ݅ by the 
change of the price ݌௞. 
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3.3.2. Data Processing 
 
Data for this study were gathered from several sources, but the two main sources 
were BPS (Indonesian Statistics Bureau) and BI (Indonesian Central Bank) both of 
which collected annual observations from 1974 to 2011. The data on consumption 
shares were taken from Indonesian household surveys (Socio-economic Survey or 
SUSENAS). Though the surveys collect people’s characteristics such as 
health/nutrition, housing/environment, criminality, socio-cultural activities, 
consumption and income from around 60,000 samples, we only used survey data 
regarding consumption shares of certain commodities. Consumption share data are 
available on a tri-annual basis from 1974 until 2001 and annually from 2002 onwards. 
Price data were taken from consumer price reports that are published on a monthly 
basis. We used the yearly inflation based on the end of the year comparisons. All of 
the output data were taken from GDP reports, which have been published every 
quarter since 1993. All other data were taken from Bank Indonesia publications (for 
monetary data) or the online sources EIU and CEIC (for interest rate data). 
The two household groups represented in this study are divided according to a 
65:35 ratio of population based on nominal expenditures in each particular year.  In 
this ratio, the first number indicates the nominal expenditures of the 65% of the total 
population with the lowest incomes, while the latter number indicates the nominal 
expenditures of the 35% of the total population with the highest incomes.  A least 
squares regression representing the quadratic approximation is used to estimate the 
expenditure share of the expenditure bracket toward the threshold of 65%, which is 
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then categorized as the low-income group. The remaining 35% is then categorized as 
the high-income group. We estimated the nominal expenditures on three kinds of 
goods – i.e., food, housing and other – for the low- and high-income groups. If x 
denotes the cumulative population and y denotes the nominal consumption, then we 
need to estimate the parameters of the following quadratic equation:  
ݕ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵݔ ൅ ߚଶݔଶ       (3.3.2.1) 
The estimated parameters obtained as a result of a simple OLS regression, then 
together with cumulative population data ݔ′ݏ, are used to estimate nominal 
consumption at 65% cumulative population for all data during the period of 1984 to 
2011: 
ݕ଺ହෞ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵݔ଺ହ ൅ ߚଶݔ଺ହଶ       (3.3.2.2) 
The data shares of each household group that resulted from this 65:35 ratio have 
the period of a three-year span between 1974 and 2000 except in 1998 data which was 
published due to the financial crisis 1997. For this reason, we need to interpolate 
between the years in that period. The interpolation method that we used was the 
Catmul-Rom Splines interpolation (Catmul, E. and Rom, R., 1974). Catmul-Rom 
Splines Interpolation is an interpolation within the family of cubic interpolation:  
݌ሺݔሻ ൌ ܿ଴ ൅ ܿଵݔ ൅ ܿଶݔଶ ൅ ܿଷݔଷ,     (3.3.2.3) 
where ܿ′ݏ are parameters of the cubic function that are estimated by the available data. 
Following closely the procedure outlined in Twigg (2003), which was based on 
Catmul and Rom (1974), we can interpolate a value of the variable of interest if we are 
given five consecutive points: ݌଴, ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, ݌ଷ, ݌ସ with a tangent at ݌ଵ that is denoted by 
݃ሺ݌ଵሻ ൌ ߛሺ݌ଶ െ ݌଴ሻ, where ߛ is a parameter of the cubic function that determines the 
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curve of the interpolated points. When we focus our interest on points ݌௜ିଵ, ݌௜, then 
we have the following: 
݌ሺ0ሻ ൌ ܿ଴  
݌ሺ1ሻ ൌ ܿ଴ ൅ ܿଵ ൅ ܿଶ ൅ ܿଷ   
݌ᇱሺ0ሻ ൌ ݃൫݌ሺ0ሻ൯ ൌ ܿଵ   
݌ᇱሺ1ሻ ൌ ݃൫݌ሺ1ሻ൯ ൌ ܿଵ ൅ 2ܿଶ ൅ 3ܿଷ     (3.3.2.4) 
We also know that: 
݌ሺ0ሻ ൌ ݌௜ିଵ  
݌ሺ1ሻ ൌ ݌௜   
݌′ሺ0ሻ ൌ ߛሺ݌௜െ݌௜ିଶሻ	  
݌′ሺ1ሻ ൌ ߛሺ݌௜ାଵെ݌௜ିଵሻ       (3.3.2.5) 
Then, the parameters can be determined by combining equations (3.3.2.4) and 
(3.3.2.5) and solving for	ܿ′ݏ to obtain the following: 
ܿ଴ ൌ ݌௜ିଵ 
ܿଵ ൌ െߛ݌௜ିଶ ൅ ߛ݌௜   
ܿଶ ൌ 2ߛ݌௜ିଶ ൅ ሺߛ െ 3ሻ݌௜ିଵ ൅ ሺ3 െ 2ߛሻ݌௜ െ ߛ݌௜ାଵ    
ܿଷ ൌ െߛ݌௜ିଶ ൅ ሺ2 െ ߛሻ݌௜ିଵ ൅ ሺߛ െ 2ሻ݌௜ ൅ ߛ݌௜ାଵ    (3.3.2.6) 
In the Indonesian case, we select the value of ߛ ൌ 0.5, which is commonly used for 
this kind of interpolation.  We can then compute the interpolated points by using the 
following matrix equation: 
݌ሺݏሻ ൌ ሾ1 ݔ ݔଶ ݔଷሿ ൦
0
െߛ
2ߛ
െߛ
				
1
0
ሺߛ െ 3ሻ
ሺ2 െ ߛሻ
			
0
ߛ
ሺ3 െ 2ߛሻ
ሺߛ െ 2ሻ
			
0
0െߛ
ߛ
൪ ቎
݌௜ିଶ݌௜ିଵ݌௜݌௜ାଵ
቏ (3.3.2.7) 
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When transforming a three-year data period into yearly data with each row associated 
with different x’s according to  ݔ ൌ ሼݔଵ, ݔଶ, ݔଷሻ ൌ 	 ሼ0.333, 0.67, 1ሽ, we will have the 
matrix ܯ which is just the multiplication of the first two matrices in (3.3.2.7). 
ܯ ൌ ቎
െ0.5ݔଵଷ ൅ ݔଵଶ െ 0.5ݔଵ 1.5ݔଷ െ 2.5ݔଶ ൅ 1 െ1.5ݔଷ ൅ 2ݔଶ ൅ 0.5ݔ 0.5ݔଷ െ 0.5ݔଶ
െ0.5ݔଷ ൅ ݔଶ െ 0.5ݔ 1.5ݔଷ െ 2.5ݔଶ ൅ 1 െ1.5ݔଷ ൅ 2ݔଶ ൅ 0.5ݔ 0.5ݔଷ െ 0.5ݔଶ
െ0.5ݔଷ ൅ ݔଶ െ 0.5ݔ 1.5ݔଷ െ 2.5ݔଶ ൅ 1 െ1.5ݔଷ ൅ 2ݔଶ ൅ 0.5ݔ 0.5ݔଷ െ 0.5ݔଶ
቏  
          (3.3.2.8) 
It should be noted that, in order to be complete, the interpolation requires that the 
first and last data points be guessed. The interpolated points will start from the fifth 
interpolated data point and end at the ݊ െ 2 interpolated data point. So, for the three-
year data period from 1984 to 2000, we need data ranging from 1981 to 2002 in order 
to interpolate data points from 1984 to 2000. This enables us to estimate the 
adjustment share parameters of the demand function of different income groups based 
on yearly data.  
 
3.4. Results 
Estimating the model by a quasi-Newton maximum-likelihood method, yielded 
parameter estimates as reported in Table (3.4.1).  The statistical discernability of all 
results is considered at a 0.05 level of statistical significance. The estimation algorithm 
reached convergence when using the base step-length of 4.69e-6 with the optimized 
step-length of 2.85e-6.  A maximum log-likelihood function value of 650.3 was 
attained after 107 iterations.   
The values of ߟ௟ and ߟ௨ in Equations (T3.3.1.1.3), which are the summation of 
ߚ௟௙, ߚ௟௛, ߚ௟௢ and ߚ௨௙, ߚ௨௛, ߚ௨௢, respectively, are estimated and have statistically discernible 
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values, as can be seen in Table (3.4.1). The estimated values of ߶௟௙, ߶௟௛, ߶௟௢	and 
߶௨௙, ߶௨௛, ߶௨௢ can also be seen in Table (3.4.1). The effect of the price index toward food 
consumption with respect to its total shares is greater for the lower-income group than 
for the higher-income group; however, with respect to housing and other commodities, 
the effects of the price index are lower for the low-income group than for the high-
income group. Also as expected, the contribution of the real consumption of food by 
the low-income group to the food share equilibrium is bigger than that of housing and 
other commodities; however, this is not the case for the high-income group.  
 
Table 3.4.1: Estimation of Parameters 
 
 
 
Parameters Values Std. Errors t‐values
rl 0.4423 0.0903 4.90
ru 0.1546 0.0823 1.88
el 0.3002 0.0017 178.88
eu 0.6887 0.0713 9.66
blf 0.2724 0.0106 25.61
blh 0.0092 0.0111 0.83
blo 0.0186 0.0021 8.83
buf 0.2486 0.0197 12.60
buh 0.1210 0.0176 6.87
buo 0.3191 0.0468 6.83
flf 0.3287 0.0338 9.73
flh 0.2109 0.0223 9.44
flo 0.0987 0.0002 651.79
fuf 0.5650 0.0981 5.76
fuh 0.2103 0.0177 11.88
fuo 0.4786 0.0241 19.85
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The result of our Equations (T3.3.1.1.3) and (T3.3.1.1.4) can be seen in Table 
(3.4.2), which represents the estimated forms of the Equations (3.4.1) and (3.4.2). 
ܦݏ௙௟෢ ൌ ߛଵଵ൫ݏ௙௟௘ െ ݏ௙௟൯ ൅ ߛଵଶ൫ݏ௛௟௘ െ ݏ௛௟ ൯ ൅ ߛଵଷሺݏ௢௟௘ െ ݏ௢௟ ሻ ൅ ߛଵସܦܨܵ 
ܦݏ௛௟෢ ൌ ߛଶଵ൫ݏ௙௟௘ െ ݏ௙௟൯ ൅ ߛଶଶ൫ݏ௛௟௘ െ ݏ௛௟ ൯ ൅ ߛଶଷሺݏ௢௟௘ െ ݏ௢௟ ሻ ൅ ߛଶସܦܨܵ 
ܦݏ௙௨෢ ൌ ߛସଵ൫ݏ௙௨௘ െ ݏ௙௨൯ ൅ ߛସଶሺݏ௛௨௘ െ ݏ௛௨ሻ ൅ ߛସଷሺݏ௢௨௘ െ ݏ௢௨ሻ ൅ ߛସସܦܨܵ 
ܦݏ௛௨෢ ൌ ߛହଵ൫ݏ௙௨௘ െ ݏ௙௨൯ ൅ ߛହଶሺݏ௛௨௘ െ ݏ௛௨ሻ ൅ ߛହଷሺݏ௢௨௘ െ ݏ௢௨ሻ ൅ ߛହସܦܨܵ 
ܦݏ௢௟෢ ൌ െܦݏ௙௟෢ െ ܦݏ௛௟෢  
ܦݏ௢௨෢ ൌ െܦݏ௙௨෢ െ ܦݏ௛௨෢         (3.4.1) 
ܦ෢݉ ൌ ߛ଺ሾՇ ൅ ߚଵሺܦ ln ܲ ൅ ܦ lnܻሻ െ ߚଶݎ െ ݉ሿ    (3.4.2) 
where ܦ lnܯ෣ ൌ ݉ 
As one would expect, estimates of the parameters, ߛଵଵ, ߛଶଶ, ߛସଵ, ߛହଶ, which 
represent rates of own partial adjustment of commodity consumption shares, are 
positive and are significantly discernible from zero. These positive values indicate that 
the adjustment of the expenditure share of a commodity is in the same direction of the 
change toward the equilibrium from its disequilibrium position of that commodity.   
As is evident in Table (3.4.2), both income groups adjust their expenditure shares 
in the same manner. When the share of the other consumption falls (increases), then 
the food expenditure adjustment would increase (decrease). Though, the relative 
magnitude of the adjustment of food expenditure shares seems to be bigger for the 
low-income group than for the high-income group. The cross-expenditure adjustments 
toward food consumption shares are positive for all income groups. 
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The estimates of parameters for housing consumption shares seem to be of the 
same signs for both income groups. The cross-adjustment from the disequilibrium of 
food and other shares contributes negatively to the adjustment of housing consumption 
shares. This means that, for both income groups, housing consumption is not a priority 
to adjust before food and other commodities. 
The financial service contributions toward the expenditure adjustments are mostly 
positive and significant for all commodities except for housing expenditure for the 
low-income group which has a negative but significant effect. For the high-income 
group, as indicated by the positive significant values, the increase in the financial 
service would also contribute to a higher proportion of housing expenditure.  This is 
not the case for the low-income group which tends to reduce the proportion of the 
housing expenditure when there is an increase in the financial service. The increase of 
the financial services in general increases the speed of adjustment to the equilibrium 
level for food and other commodities.   
The estimates of ߛ଺ have positive and significantly discernible values, which 
indicates that the increase (decrease) of the monetary target (ߣ), the growth of the 
nominal GDP, and the decrease (increase) of the interest rates would lead the Bank to 
accelerate (decelerate) the money supply growth. The parameters ߣ, ߚଵ, and	ߚଶ are 
positive and significant, which respectively indicate that the money supply would 
react positively to an increase of the money supply target (ߣ), the growth increase of 
the nominal GDP (ߚଵ), and the decrease of the interest rates (ߚଶ). The parameters of 
the growth of the nominal GDP (ߚଷ௟, ߚଷ௨) and the money cash (ߚସ௟, ߚସ௨) for both 
income groups are positive and significant except for parameter	ߚଷ௟.  
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Table 3.4.2: Estimates of Parameters in Equations (T3.3.1.1.5) and (T3.3.1.1.6) 
 
 
In Figures 3.4.1 – 3.4.4, we can see the in-period model solution values and the 
observed values, respectively, for food consumption shares (Fig. 3.4.1), household 
consumptions shares (Fig. 3.4.2) and other consumption shares (Fig. 3.4.3) by all 
types of income groups, as well as changes of the monetary growth (Fig. 3.4.4). With 
Parameters Values Std. Errors t‐values
g11 0.3002 0.0255 11.79
g12 0.1257 0.0165 7.64
g13 0.0743 0.0075 9.97
g14 0.1286 0.0057 22.45
g21 ‐0.0005 0.0105 0.04
g22 0.0995 0.0004 272.84
g23 ‐0.0215 0.0110 1.95
g24 ‐0.0743 0.0029 25.76
g41 0.2667 0.0070 38.15
g42 0.2410 0.0118 20.49
g43 0.0925 0.0016 59.42
g44 0.1706 0.0046 37.16
g51 ‐0.0341 0.0126 2.70
g52 0.1771 0.0064 27.53
g53 ‐0.0108 0.0185 0.58
g54 0.0971 0.0007 133.31
g6 0.0308 0.0047 6.56
b1 0.2459 0.0234 10.49
b2 0.0954 0.0070 13.64
b3l 0.0185 0.0139 1.33
b4l 0.2058 0.0125 16.45
b3u 0.1065 0.0009 118.25
b4u 0.0968 0.0013 76.33
l 0.9506 0.0358 26.55
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the exception of the changes of the monetary growth, all figures of consumption 
shares exhibit increasing fluctuation after the 1997/1998 financial crisis.  
 
Figure 3.4.1: Comparison of Observed and Estimated Food Expenditure Shares  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4.2: Comparison of Observed and Estimated Housing Expenditure 
Shares  
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Figure 3.4.3: Comparison of Observed and Estimated Other Commodity 
Expenditure Shares  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4.4: Comparison of Observed and Estimated Money Growth Changes 
 
 
 
The results of some simulations conducted by changing the targeted rate of 
monetary growth ߣ are given in Table (3.4.3), which exhibits the estimates of food (slf 
and suf) and housing (slh and suh) consumption shares by low- and high-income 
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groups as well as the changes in the rate of growth of the stock of money (cc1) ranging 
from ߣ ൌ 0.45 to ߣ ൌ 4.95.  These values were chosen bearing in mind the value of 
the product of estimation of ߛ଺  and ߣ. 
With respect to food consumption shares, the increase of the monetary targets 
increases the food consumption shares of all income groups (Fig. 3.4.5). As expected 
too, the food consumption shares of the low-income group are higher than those of the 
high-income group. With respect to the housing consumption shares, the increase of 
the monetary targets has an opposite households’ reactions. The low-income groups 
would increase their housing consumption shares while the high-income groups would 
reduce theirs (Fig. 3.4.6).  Next, in Figure 3.4.7, with respect to other commodities, 
both income groups react negatively toward the increase of the monetary targets, by 
reducing their consumption shares of other commodities.  
Lastly, Figure 3.4.8 reveals that the monetary policy changes affect the low-
income group more than they affect the high-income group. The percentage changes 
of the utility level of the low-income group are higher than those of the high-income 
group at every change of the monetary policy, which is represented here by the 
currency in circulation. 
Employing the identity equation as in Equations (T3.3.1.1.9) and (T3.3.1.1.10) to 
compute the expenditure and the price elasticities of demand, respectively, we have 
the following results (Tables 3.4.4 and 3.4.5).  Table 3.4.4 shows that as the level of 
expenditure increases (decreases), those in the low-income group will increase 
(decrease) their food expenditure more than those in the high-income group. For the 
housing and other commodities expenditures, both income groups don’t reveal big 
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differences in their expenditure elasticities of demand. Table 3.4.5 shows that all own-
price elasticities of demand of both income groups have negative values with the own 
food price elasticity of the low-income groups is higher than that of the high-income 
group.4 Though the price elasticities of housing demand are relatively inelastic, the 
high-income groups have more flexibility and thus tend to be more elastic than those 
of the low-income groups. The higher price elasticities of demand for the high-income 
groups are also applied for other commodities which in this case the low income 
groups have relatively inelastic demand while the high-income groups have relatively 
elastic demand.  
Table 3.4.5 also reveals that the cross-price elasticities of demand for all 
commodity groups exhibit positive values and thus inhibit substitution effects between 
commodities. The food demand by the low-income group with respect to the changes 
of housing and other prices are again relatively inelastic, whereas it is relatively elastic 
for the high-income groups when deals with the change of others prices. For the price 
elasticities of the housing demand, the low-income groups are more elastic than the 
high-income groups. This implies that expenditures on housing are not the main 
priority of the low-income group and are very much dependent upon other commodity 
prices.  
Regarding the changes of expenditure elasticities over time, as can be seen from 
Figures 3.4.9 and 3.4.10, the expenditure elasticities of food and housing, respectively, 
                                                 
4 If ܯ௜௝ ൏ 1  the demand of good i by the change of the commodity price ݌௝ is inelastic; and when 
ܯ௜௝ ൐ 1, the price elasticity of the demand is elastic. If ܯ௜௝ ൌ 1,  the price elasticity of the demand is 
unitary elastic.  
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show different trends for high- and low-income people.  Low-income people are more 
responsive to price changes than high-income people, and their food expenditure 
elasticities are relatively stable. On the other hand, though the high-income group’s 
food expenditure elasticities are more inelastic than those of the low-income group, 
they tend to become more elastic over time. This can be understood as the more 
globalized world has induced even more high-income people to look at the relative 
prices among goods that they consume as more choices are available to them. 
Regarding the housing expenditure elasticities, both groups show an increasing trend 
with the housing expenditure elasticity of the low-income group consistently being 
higher than that of the high-income group. 
Now, let us briefly examine the trends of the price elasticities over time. As can be 
seen from Figures 3.4.11 and 3.4.12, the own-price elasticity of demand for food and 
housing, respectively, for both income groups show the same decreasing trend (in 
absolute values). Furthermore, as can be seen from Figure 3.4.13, the cross-price 
elasticities of demand for food with respect to the price of housing show the same 
decreasing trends for both income groups. This trend can also be observed for the 
cross-price elasticities of demand for housing with respect to price of food (Fig. 
3.4.14).  This pattern might simply reflect the availability of more choices for 
consumption in each commodity group, so that even when the price of food (housing) 
increases, people would still be able to consume food (housing) though in different 
kinds and qualities. It follows that the cross-price elasticities would become 
increasingly inelastic with respect to the commodity groups; however, this might not 
be the case with individual commodities. 
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One might inquire, how about the effects of the change of the monetary policy 
toward the expenditure and price elasticities?  Changes of monetary policy affect 
expenditure elasticity and price elasticity differently for households of the different 
income groups. As more (less) cash is available, the food expenditure elasticities of 
both income groups tend to decrease (increase) as can be seen in Figure 3.4.15. This 
finding is in line with the marginal utility of consuming one good that is increasing at 
a decreasing rate.  Meanwhile, Figure 3.4.16 reveals that the own-price elasticity of 
demand for housing for the low-income group tends to increase (decrease) as more 
(less) cash becomes available. This trend is opposite to that of the high-income group, 
which would decline (increase) as more (less) cash becomes available.  
Figures 3.4.17 and 3.4.18 show how the cross-price elasticities of food and 
housing demand vary with respect to the changes of housing and others prices 
respectively. As can be seen in Figure 3.4.17, both income groups react similarly in 
that they reduce (increase) food consumption as a result of the changes in the housing 
price when the monetary policy increases (decreases) the money stock. Figure 3.4.18 
shows a different trend of cross-price elasticities of the housing demand as the other 
commodity prices change in response to the monetary policy changes. The cross-price 
elasticities of demand for housing with respect to other prices of the low-income 
groups tend to increase (decrease) as more (less) cash becomes available. On the other 
hand, the cross-price elasticities of the high-income groups tend to reduce (increase) as 
more (less) cash becomes available.  
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The complete results of the effects of the changes of the monetary policy on 
expenditure and price elasticities of demand can be seen in Appendices 3A and 3B, 
respectively. 
 
Table 3.4.3: Endogenous Variables Estimation and Targeted Rates of Growth of 
the Money Stock ሺࣅs) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4.4: Expenditure Elasticities of Demand for Different Commodities by 
Different Income Groups 
 
 
 
 
Variables
l =  0.4506 0.9506 1.4506 1.9506 2.4506 2.9506 3.4506 3.9506 4.4506 4.9506
slf 0.6728 0.6758 0.6748 0.6754 0.6769 0.6764 0.6762 0.6775 0.6794 0.6785
0.6728 0.6758 0.6748 0.6754 0.6769 0.6764 0.6762 0.6775 0.6794 0.6785
slh 0.1563 0.1545 0.1551 0.1548 0.1539 0.1542 0.1543 0.1535 0.1523 0.1529
0.1563 0.1545 0.1551 0.1548 0.1539 0.1542 0.1543 0.1535 0.1523 0.1529
suf 0.5127 0.5165 0.5152 0.5159 0.5178 0.5172 0.5170 0.5186 0.5210 0.5199
0.5127 0.5165 0.5152 0.5159 0.5178 0.5172 0.5170 0.5186 0.5210 0.5199
suh 0.2177 0.2200 0.2193 0.2197 0.2208 0.2204 0.2203 0.2213 0.2227 0.2220
0.2177 0.2200 0.2193 0.2197 0.2208 0.2204 0.2203 0.2213 0.2227 0.2220
cc1 0.1681 0.1757 0.1833 0.1909 0.1985 0.2063 0.2137 0.2214 0.2290 0.2366
0.1681 0.1757 0.1833 0.1909 0.1985 0.2063 0.2137 0.2214 0.2290 0.2366
Estimated
Commodities Low‐Income High‐Income
Food expenditure 1.8045 0.5201
Housing expenditure 0.9292 0.9204
Others expenditure 0.8416 0.7678
Computed by the author
Type of Households
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Table 3.4.5: Price Elasticities of Demand for Different Commodities by Different 
Income Groups 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4.5: Simulations with Different Targeted Rates of Growth (TROG) of 
the Money Stock ሺ	ࣅ࢙ሻ for Expenditure Share of Food toward Different Income 
Groups 
 
 
Commodities Low‐Income High‐Income
Food ‐ price of food ‐5.286100 ‐2.933375
Food ‐ price of housing 0.860205 0.622748
Food ‐ price of others 0.468892 1.326905
Housing ‐ price of food 2.606485 1.038709
Housing ‐ price of housing ‐0.593384 ‐0.179992
Housing ‐ price of others 1.228677 0.961760
Others ‐ price of food 1.254140 2.201273
Others ‐ price of housing 0.942039 1.043369
Others ‐ price of others ‐0.231077 ‐1.137441
Computed by the author
Type of Households
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Figure 3.4.6: Simulations with Different TROG of the Money Stock ሺ	ࣅ࢙ሻ for 
Expenditure Share of Housing toward Different Income Groups 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4.7: Simulations with Different TROG of the Money Stock ሺ	ࣅ࢙ሻ for 
Expenditure Share of Other Commodities toward Different Income Groups 
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Figure 3.4.8: Changes in Utility by Income Groups for Alternative TROG of the 
Money Stock ሺࣅ࢙ሻ  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4.9: Expenditure Elasticities of Demand for Food through Time 
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Figure 3.4.10: Expenditure Elasticities of Demand for Housing through Time 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4.11: Own-Price Elasticities of Demand for Food through Time 
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Figure 3.4.12: Own-Price Elasticities of Demand for Housing through Time 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4.13: Cross-Price Elasticities of Demand for Food with Respect to Price 
of Housing through Time 
 
 
Chapter 3 – Gunawan Wicaksono 
 
173 
Figure 3.4.14: Cross-Price Elasticities of Demand for Housing with Respect to 
Price of Food through Time 
 
 
Figure 3.4.15: Simulations with Different TROG of the Money Stock ሺ	ࣅ࢙ሻ and 
Expenditure Elasticities of Demand for Food  
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Figure 3.4.16: Simulations with Different TROG of the Money Stock ሺ	ࣅ࢙ሻ and 
Own-Price Elasticities of Demand for Housing  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4.17: Simulations with Different TROG of the Money Stock ሺ	ࣅ࢙ሻ and 
Cross-Price Elasticities of Demand for Food and Housing Prices 
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Figure 3.4.18: Simulations with Different TROG of the Money Stock ሺ	ࣅ࢙ሻ and 
Cross-Price Elasticities of Demand for Housing and Other Commodity Prices 
 
 
 
3.5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Our findings lead us to conclude several important points. First, we have found 
expenditure shares for different commodities by different income groups reflect 
different priorities. For example, the elasticity of response of the food consumption 
share for the low-income groups to the changes in its own partial equilibrium 
consumption share is larger in proportion than elasticities of response for housing and 
other commodities. This is not the case for the high-income groups who put relatively 
almost the same weight on adjustments between food commodities and other 
commodities.  The low-income group who have less income than those of high-
income group spend the larger portion of their income on their food consumption 
before proceeding to consume other commodities. When relative prices change, the 
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low-income group tends to adjust their consumption more than those of high-income 
group. This tendency is understandable since the same price changes might mean more 
in percentage toward the low-income groups than those of high-income groups.  
The positive changes in the flow of financial services positively affect the 
adjustment of the consumption of every commodity by all income groups. This 
implies that the more available is money in the market, the more likely are people to 
consume. More specifically, when people hold more cash in their hands, they would 
be more likely to consume than not. The positive elasticity signs of the food 
consumption with respect to the financial services of both income groups show that 
both income groups are more likely to adjust their food consumption when they hold 
more cash in hands.  
An increase of liquidity will positively affect housing consumption by only the 
high-income group, as they tend to consume more housing faster in adjusting to their 
equilibrium expenditure level. On the other hand, the low-income group tends to 
increase either food or other types of consumption and tends to slow down their 
consumption of housing when they have more cash in hand. This might relate to the 
limited amount of resources owned by the low-income groups such that they would 
place a higher priority on food and other commodities than on housing services. 
Our empirical findings would lead one to infer that the low-income group tends to 
view the housing needs as part of their dreams, in the sense that when the housing 
prices decline and more cash becomes available, they tend to increase their 
expenditure on housing. The high-income group reacts in the opposite manner by 
minimizing the increase of their expenditure on housing when housing prices decline 
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and more cash becomes available. This finding implies that the low-income people 
increase consumption of housing when they are able to afford it. This finding is also 
reflected in the values of computed cross-price elasticities which indicate that the low-
income groups tend to increase their percentage change of their housing consumption 
as price of other goods increase whenever more cash becomes available.    
Though it is true in terms of absolute value that the monetary policy affects the 
high-income group more than the low-income group, it is not true in terms of the 
percentage change of poor households’ wealth. A change of monetary policy would 
affect the low-income group more than the high-income group because the low-
income group suffers or benefits more because the changes represent a higher 
percentage of their utility than for members of the high-income group. When the 
policymakers only consider the effects of their policy in absolute terms, then they fail 
to realize that the expansion or contraction of the money supply might cause bigger 
impacts on low-income households. 
Though it is true in terms of absolute value that the monetary policy affects the 
high-income group more than the low-income group, it is not true in terms of the 
percentage change of poor households’ wealth. A change of monetary policy would 
affect the low-income group more than the high-income group because the low-
income group suffers or benefits more as the percentage changes of their utility are 
larger than those of the high-income group. When the policymakers only consider the 
effects of their policy in absolute terms, then they fail to realize that the expansion or 
contraction of the money supply might cause bigger impacts on low-income 
households.  
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These results support our intuitions that the poor would be affected more by an 
increase or decrease of liquidity.  This explains why any monetary policies such as 
increasing or reducing the money supply drastically would affect households’ cash in 
hand more severely, which cause more consumption share adjustments within the low-
income households.   
We have shown that changes in monetary policy would affect low-income and 
high-income households differently, and that the effects of changes in liquidity on the 
expenditure patterns of different income groups also differ.  If more data were 
available, it would be possible to estimate a model with more complete economic 
behaviors and including more economic agents and sectors. The limited availability of 
data on consumption shares in finer and longer periods than a three-year basis (before 
2002) or yearly basis (from 2002 onward) prevented us from employing more 
equations to capture more economic behavior and tell a more complete story. The use 
of the MPIGLOG demand system, which for the price indices chosen ensures 
regularity over the entire economic region, can certainly be used to estimate the 
responses of different income groups.  
We have shown that changes in monetary policy would affect low-income and 
high-income households differently, and that the effects of changes in liquidity on the 
expenditure patterns of different income groups also differ.  If more data were 
available, it would be possible to estimate a model with more complete economic 
behaviors including more economic agents and sectors.   
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APPENDIX 3A 
EXPENDITURE ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND AT DIFFERENT ߣ 
 
 
 
  
 
  
Variables
l =  0.4506 0.9506 1.4506 1.9506 2.4506 2.9506 3.4506 3.9506 4.4506 4.9506
efl 1.8104 1.8045 1.8056 1.8041 1.8011 1.7990 1.8009 1.7982 1.7947 1.7954
0.1017 0.1053 0.1028 0.1032 0.1053 0.1067 0.1019 0.1033 0.1062 0.1035
ehl 0.9285 0.9292 0.9291 0.9293 0.9296 0.9299 0.9296 0.9300 0.9304 0.9303
0.0106 0.0111 0.0108 0.0108 0.0111 0.0113 0.0107 0.0109 0.0113 0.0109
eol 0.8403 0.8416 0.8414 0.8417 0.8424 0.8428 0.8424 0.8430 0.8438 0.8436
0.0197 0.0205 0.0199 0.0200 0.0205 0.0209 0.0198 0.0201 0.0208 0.0202
efu 0.5321 0.5201 0.5234 0.5234 0.5162 0.5092 0.5191 0.5135 0.5015 0.5091
0.1375 0.1422 0.1435 0.1386 0.1420 0.1498 0.1432 0.1456 0.1568 0.1473
ehu 0.9208 0.9204 0.9205 0.9205 0.9203 0.9202 0.9204 0.9203 0.9200 0.9202
0.0072 0.0072 0.0073 0.0071 0.0071 0.0072 0.0072 0.0072 0.0073 0.0072
eou 0.7646 0.7678 0.7669 0.7676 0.7690 0.7699 0.7686 0.7699 0.7715 0.7710
0.0180 0.0191 0.0180 0.0178 0.0193 0.0206 0.0175 0.0184 0.0207 0.0188
Estimated
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APPENDIX 3B 
PRICE ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND AT DIFFERENT ߣ 
 
Variables
l =  0.4506 0.9506 1.4506 1.9506 2.4506 2.9506 3.4506 3.9506 4.4506 4.9506
mffl (5.2531) (5.2861) (5.2796) (5.2826) (5.3018) (5.3179) (5.3001) (5.3165) (5.3442) (5.3320)
5.4825 5.4729 5.4867 5.4934 5.4920 5.4912 5.5136 5.5143 5.5093 5.5259
mhhl (0.5948) (0.5934) (0.5932) (0.5926) (0.5917) (0.5911) (0.5910) (0.5902) (0.5892) (0.5890)
0.5220 0.5217 0.5210 0.5205 0.5201 0.5198 0.5189 0.5184 0.5181 0.5174
mool (0.2314) (0.2311) (0.2310) (0.2308) (0.2305) (0.2303) (0.2302) (0.2300) (0.2297) (0.2296)
0.1798 0.1797 0.1795 0.1794 0.1793 0.1792 0.1789 0.1788 0.1787 0.1784
mfhl 0.8626 0.8602 0.8600 0.8591 0.8576 0.8565 0.8565 0.8551 0.8534 0.8531
0.8125 0.8124 0.8112 0.8103 0.8098 0.8093 0.8076 0.8070 0.8066 0.8053
mfol 0.4702 0.4689 0.4688 0.4682 0.4674 0.4668 0.4667 0.4659 0.4650 0.4648
0.4174 0.4174 0.4167 0.4162 0.4159 0.4157 0.4147 0.4144 0.4142 0.4135
mhol 1.2192 1.2287 1.2257 1.2263 1.2314 1.2354 1.2290 1.2332 1.2405 1.2363
0.9694 0.9676 0.9698 0.9698 0.9693 0.9691 0.9724 0.9722 0.9715 0.9733
mhfl 2.5944 2.6065 2.6027 2.6041 2.6106 2.6156 2.6078 2.6132 2.6222 2.6175
2.1609 2.1572 2.1607 2.1611 2.1600 2.1593 2.1648 2.1641 2.1622 2.1657
mofl 1.2513 1.2541 1.2531 1.2535 1.2550 1.2561 1.2542 1.2555 1.2575 1.2564
1.0269 1.0257 1.0266 1.0267 1.0263 1.0260 1.0275 1.0273 1.0266 1.0276
mohl 0.9389 0.9420 0.9409 0.9412 0.9428 0.9440 0.9419 0.9432 0.9454 0.9441
0.7712 0.7703 0.7711 0.7711 0.7709 0.7707 0.7719 0.7718 0.7714 0.7721
mffu (2.9162) (2.9334) (2.9307) (2.9337) (2.9438) (2.9520) (2.9444) (2.9532) (2.9669) (2.9624)
2.7053 2.7016 2.7089 2.7124 2.7126 2.7130 2.7241 2.7252 2.7241 2.7321
mhhu (0.1797) (0.1800) (0.1799) (0.1799) (0.1801) (0.1802) (0.1800) (0.1802) (0.1804) (0.1803)
0.1542 0.1541 0.1542 0.1542 0.1542 0.1541 0.1543 0.1543 0.1542 0.1543
moou (1.1444) (1.1374) (1.1384) (1.1364) (1.1327) (1.1302) (1.1320) (1.1286) (1.1245) (1.1249)
0.9456 0.9470 0.9442 0.9431 0.9428 0.9424 0.9386 0.9381 0.9382 0.9355
mfhu 0.6254 0.6227 0.6231 0.6224 0.6209 0.6199 0.6207 0.6194 0.6177 0.6179
0.5155 0.5161 0.5150 0.5146 0.5145 0.5144 0.5129 0.5128 0.5129 0.5118
mfou 1.3320 1.3269 1.3277 1.3262 1.3234 1.3214 1.3229 1.3204 1.3172 1.3176
1.0644 1.0657 1.0636 1.0628 1.0628 1.0626 1.0597 1.0595 1.0597 1.0578
mhou 0.9664 0.9618 0.9626 0.9613 0.9589 0.9572 0.9587 0.9565 0.9537 0.9542
0.8061 0.8070 0.8053 0.8046 0.8045 0.8043 0.8019 0.8017 0.8018 0.8001
mhfu 1.0432 1.0387 1.0394 1.0382 1.0358 1.0341 1.0355 1.0333 1.0306 1.0310
0.8915 0.8925 0.8907 0.8900 0.8899 0.8897 0.8872 0.8870 0.8871 0.8854
mofu 2.1790 2.2013 2.1969 2.2002 2.2140 2.2259 2.2126 2.2241 2.2441 2.2355
1.8560 1.8506 1.8588 1.8619 1.8610 1.8609 1.8737 1.8741 1.8716 1.8805
mohu 1.0288 1.0434 1.0406 1.0418 1.0509 1.0591 1.0497 1.0571 1.0710 1.0642
0.8883 0.8857 0.8906 0.8922 0.8920 0.8923 0.8997 0.9002 0.8994 0.9042
Estimated
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APPENDIX 3C 
INDONESIAN MODEL IN ESCONA 
 
The Indonesian model was written in Escona which is provided by the generosity of 
Prof. Wymer who is the writer of the Escona program. The Escona program was 
designed to compute the maximum likelihood of the differential equations of the non-
linear models. 
 
rhol = 2 - 1.9*SIN(rholx)*SIN(rholx) $ 
rhou = 2 - 1.9*SIN(rhoux)*SIN(rhoux) $ 
plbd = 4.0 $ 
lbd = GEX(0.5, lbdp*lbdp) + CON*plbd $ 
F1 =1/ rhol $  F2 =1/ rhou $ 
etal = 0.3 + 0.7 - 0.7*SIN(etalp)*SIN(etalp) $ 
etau = 0.3 + 0.7 - 0.7*SIN(etaup)*SIN(etaup) $ 
 
betlfs = SIN(belfp)*SIN(belfp)  $  
betlhs = SIN(belhp)*SIN(belhp)  $ 
betlos = SIN(belop)*SIN(belop) $ 
 
betufs = SIN(beufp)*SIN(beufp) $ 
betuhs = SIN(beuhp)*SIN(beuhp) $ 
betuos = SIN(beuop)*SIN(beuop) $ 
 
bcl = etal/(betlfs + betlhs + betlos) $ 
bcu = etau/(betufs + betuhs + betuos) $ 
 
betlf = bcl * betlfs $   
betlh = bcl * betlhs $ 
betlo = bcl * betlos $ 
 
betuf = bcu * betufs $   
betuh = bcu * betuhs $ 
betuo = bcu * betuos $ 
 
F3= betlf + betlh + betlo $ 
F4 = betuf + betuh + betuo $ 
 
philf = GEX(0.5, pilfp*pilfp)  $ 
philh = GEX(0.5, pilhp*pilhp)  $ 
philo = GEX(0.5, pilop*pilop)  $ 
 
phiuf= GEX(0.5, piufp*piufp)   $  
phiuh= GEX(0.5, piuhp*piuhp)   $  
phiuo= GEX(0.5, piuop*piuop)   $  
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Vp1lr = philf * GEX(-rhol,pf) + philh * GEX(-rhol,ph) + philo * GEX(-rhol,po) $ 
Vp1l = GEX(-F1,Vp1lr) $ 
 
Vp1ur = phiuf * GEX(-rhou,pf) + phiuh * GEX(-rhou,ph) + phiuo *GEX(-rhou, po) $ 
Vp1u = GEX(-F2,Vp1ur) $  
 
Vzld = 1.0 + F3 *cl - F3 * LOG(Vp1l) $ 
Vzl = F3 *cl / Vzld - F3 * LOG(Vp1l) / Vzld $ 
 
Vzud = 1.0 + F4 *cu - F4 * LOG(Vp1u) $    
Vzu = F4 *cu / Vzud - F4 * LOG(Vp1u) / Vzud $  
 
Vpflr = Vp1l /  pf $ 
Vphlr = Vp1l /  ph $ 
Vpolr = Vp1l /  po $ 
 
Vpfur = Vp1u /  pf $ 
Vphur = Vp1u / ph $ 
Vpour = Vp1u /  po $  
 
Vslf = philf * GEX(rhol,Vpflr) * (1 - Vzl) + betlf * Vzl / F3 $ 
Vslh = philh * GEX(rhol,Vphlr) * (1 - Vzl) + betlh * Vzl / F3 $ 
Vslo = 1-Vslf-Vslh  $ 
 
Vsuf = phiuf * GEX(rhou,Vpfur) * (1 - Vzu) + betuf * Vzu / F4 $ 
Vsuh = phiuh * GEX(rhou,Vphur) * (1 - Vzu) + betuh * Vzu / F4 $ 
Vsuo = 1-Vsuf-Vsuh  $ 
 
Vx1=Vslf+Vslh+Vslo  $  Vx2=Vsuf+Vsuh+Vsuo  $  
 
tx3=philf + philh + philo $  tx4=phiuf + phiuh + phiuo $   
tx5=betlf + betlh + betlo $  tx6=betuf + betuh + betuo $ 
 
COL = ib * EXP(cc) + (ib - ica) * ca + (ib - iqm) * qm $ 
 
VDLFS = ( ib * EXP(cc) / COL) * cc1 + (ib - ica)*ca*ca1/COL + (ib - iqm) * qm*qm1/COL $ 
 
gm11 = GEX(0.5,gam11*gam11) $ 
gm22 = GEX(0.5, gam22*gam22) $ 
 
gm41 = GEX(0.5,gam41*gam41) $ 
gm52 = GEX(0.5, gam52*gam52) $ 
 
gm6 = GEX(0.5, gam6*gam6) $ 
bt1 = GEX(0.5, bet1*bet1) $ 
bt2 = GEX(0.5, bet2*bet2) $ 
 
Vclet = GEX(F3, EXP(cl)) $ 
Vcuet = GEX(F4, EXP(cu)) $ 
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Vp2l = GEX(betlf,pf)*GEX(betlh,ph)*GEX(betlo,po) $ 
Vp2u = GEX(betuf,pf)*GEX(betuh,ph)*GEX(betuo,po) $ 
 
Vul = (cl - LOG(Vp1l))*(Vclet/Vp2l) $ 
Vuu = (cu - LOG(Vp1u))*(Vcuet/Vp2u) $ 
 
Ve1ffl = philf*philf* rhol*GEX(F1-2,Vp1lr)*GEX(-rhol,pf)*GEX(-rhol,pf) $ 
Ve1hhl = philh*philh*rhol*GEX(F1-2,Vp1lr)*GEX(-rhol,ph)*GEX(-rhol,ph) $ 
Ve1ool = philo*philo/tx3*rhol*GEX(F1-2,Vp1lr)*GEX(-rhol,po)*GEX(-rhol,po) $ 
 
Ve1fhl = philf*philh*rhol*GEX(F1-2,Vp1lr)*GEX(-rhol, pf*ph) $ 
Ve1fol = philf*philo*rhol*GEX(F1-2,Vp1lr)*GEX(-rhol, pf*po) $ 
Ve1hol = philh*philo*rhol*GEX(F1-2,Vp1lr)*GEX(-rhol, ph*po) $ 
 
Ve1ffu = phiuf*phiuf*rhou*GEX(F2-2,Vp1ur)*GEX(-rhou,pf)*GEX(-rhou,pf) $ 
Ve1hhu = phiuh*phiuh*rhou*GEX(F2-2,Vp1ur)*GEX(-rhou,ph)*GEX(-rhou,ph) $ 
Ve1oou = phiuo*phiuo*rhou*GEX(F2-2,Vp1ur)*GEX(-rhou,po)*GEX(-rhou,po) $ 
 
Ve1fhu = phiuf*phiuh*rhou*GEX(F2-2,Vp1ur)*GEX(-rhou, pf*ph) $ 
Ve1fou = phiuf*phiuo*rhou*GEX(F2-2,Vp1ur)*GEX(-rhou, pf*po) $ 
Ve1hou = phiuh*phiuo*rhou*GEX(F2-2,Vp1ur)*GEX(-rhou, ph*po) $ 
 
Vefl = 1 + (betlf / (slf - F3))*(1 - Vzl) $ 
Vehl = 1 + (betlh / (slh - F3))*(1 - Vzl) $ 
Veol = 1 + (betlo / (1-slf-slh - F3))*(1 - Vzl) $ 
 
Vefu = 1 + (betuf / (suf - F4))*(1 - Vzu) $ 
Vehu = 1 + (betuh / (suh - F4))*(1 - Vzu) $ 
Veou = 1 + (betuo / (1-suf - suh - F4))*(1 - Vzu) $ 
 
Vmffl = (Ve1ffl * (1 - Vzl) - betlf * philf * (1 - Vzl)) / (slf - 1 + F3 * philf * (1  - Vzl)) $ 
Vmhhl = (Ve1hhl * (1 - Vzl) - betlh * philh * (1 - Vzl)) / (slh - 1 + F3 * philh * (1 - Vzl)) $ 
Vmool = (Ve1ool * (1 - Vzl) - betlo * philo * (1 - Vzl)) / (1 - slf - slh - 1 + F3 * philo * (1 - Vzl)) $ 
 
Vmfhl = (Ve1fhl * (1 - Vzl) - betlf * philh * (1 - Vzl)) / (slf + F3 * philh * (1 - Vzl)) $ 
Vmfol = (Ve1fol * (1 - Vzl) - betlf * philo * (1 - Vzl)) / (slf + F3 * philo * (1 - Vzl)) $ 
 
Vmhol = (Ve1hol * (1 - Vzl) - betlh * philo * (1 - Vzl)) / (slh + F3 * philo * (1 - Vzl)) $ 
Vmhfl = (Ve1fhl * (1 - Vzl) - betlh * philf * (1 - Vzl)) / (slh + F3 * philf * (1 - Vzl)) $ 
 
Vmofl = (Ve1fol * (1 - Vzl) - betlo * philf * (1 - Vzl)) / (1-slh-slf + F3 * philf * (1 - Vzl)) $ 
Vmohl = (Ve1hol * (1 - Vzl) - betlo * philh * (1 - Vzl)) / (1-slh-slf + F3 * philh * (1 - Vzl)) $ 
 
Vmffu = (Ve1ffu * (1 - Vzu) - betuf * phiuf * (1 - Vzu)) / (suf - 1 + F4 * phiuf * (1 - Vzu)) $ 
Vmhhu = (Ve1hhu * (1 - Vzu) - betuh * phiuh * (1 - Vzu)) / (suh - 1 + F4 * phiuh * (1 - Vzu)) $ 
Vmoou = (Ve1oou * (1 - Vzu) - betuo * phiuo * (1 - Vzu)) / (1 - suf - suh - 1 + F4 * phiuo * (1 - Vzu)) $ 
 
Vmfhu = (Ve1fhu * (1 - Vzu) - betuf * phiuh * (1 - Vzu)) / (suf + F4 * phiuh * (1 - Vzu)) $ 
Vmfou = (Ve1fou * (1 - Vzu) - betuf * phiuo * (1 - Vzu)) / (suf + F4 * phiuo * (1 - Vzu)) $ 
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Vmhou = (Ve1hou * (1 - Vzu) - betuh * phiuo * (1 - Vzu)) / (suh + F4 * phiuo * (1 - Vzu)) $ 
Vmhfu = (Ve1fhu * (1 - Vzu) - betuh * phiuf * (1 - Vzu)) / (suh + F4 * phiuf * (1 - Vzu)) $ 
 
Vmofu = (Ve1fou * (1 - Vzu) - betuo * phiuf * (1 - Vzu)) / (1-suh-suf + F4 * phiuf * (1 - Vzu)) $ 
Vmohu = (Ve1hou * (1 - Vzu) - betuo * phiuh * (1 - Vzu)) / (1-suh-suf + F4 * phiuh * (1 - Vzu)) $ 
 
EQN1: Dslf= gm11*Vslf -gm11*slf +gam12*Vslh -gam12*slh +gam13*Vslo -gam13*(1-slf-slh) 
+gam14*VDLFS $ 
 
EQN2: Dslh= gam21*Vslf -gam21*slf +gm22*Vslh -gm22*slh +gam23*Vslo -gam23*(1-slf-slh) 
+gam24*VDLFS $ 
 
EQN3: Dsuf= gm41*Vsuf -gm41*suf +gam42*Vsuh -gam42*suh +gam43*Vsuo -gam43*(1-suf-suh) 
+gam44*VDLFS $ 
 
EQN4: Dsuh= gam51*Vsuf -gam51*suf +gm52*Vsuh -gm52*suh +gam53*Vsuo -gam53*(1-suf-suh) 
+gam54*VDLFS $ 
 
EQN5: Dcc1 = gm6*lbd*Ko + gm6*bt1*gdf1 + gm6*bt1*gdpr1 - gm6*bt2*ib - gm6*cc1 $ 
 
EQN6: Dcl = bet31*gdpr1 + bet31*gdf1 + bet32*cc1 $ 
 
EQN7: Dcu = bet41*gdpr1 + bet41*gdf1 + bet42*cc1 $  
 
EQN8: Dcc = cc1 $ 
 
EQN9: ulo = Vul $ 
 
EQN10: uhi = Vuu $ 
 
EQN11: efl = Vefl $ 
 
EQN12: ehl = Vehl $ 
 
EQN13: eol = Veol $ 
 
EQN14: efu = Vefu $ 
 
EQN15: ehu = Vehu $ 
 
EQN16: eou = Veou $ 
 
EQN17: mffl = Vmffl $ 
 
EQN18: mhhl = Vmhhl $ 
 
EQN19: mool = Vmool $ 
 
EQN20: mfhl = Vmfhl $ 
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EQN21: mfol = Vmfol $ 
 
EQN22: mhol = Vmhol $ 
 
EQN23: mhfl = Vmhfl $ 
 
EQN24: mofl = Vmofl $ 
 
EQN25: mohl = Vmohl $ 
 
EQN26: mffu = Vmffu $ 
 
EQN27: mhhu = Vmhhu $ 
 
EQN28: moou = Vmoou $ 
 
EQN29: mfhu = Vmfhu $ 
 
EQN30: mfou = Vmfou $ 
 
EQN31: mhou = Vmhou $ 
 
EQN32: mhfu = Vmhfu $ 
 
EQN33: mofu = Vmofu $ 
 
EQN34: mohu = Vmohu $ 
 
